Targeting terrorist financing

Targeting terrorist financing involves international cooperation and coordination. However, the primacy of domestic interests over collective good and a predisposition to unilateral action, notably on the part of the US, have completely overwhelmed the spirit of cooperation among states and have undermined the effectiveness of the regimes against terrorist financing.

Terrorism, Charities and Diasporas: Contrasting the fundraising practices of Hamas and al Qaeda among Muslims in Europe

Gunning, Jeroen. 'Terrorism, Charities and Diasporas: Contrasting the fundraising practices of Hamas and al Qaeda among Muslims in Europe', In: Countering the Financing of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp.93-125 RAE2008

The role of the intelligence service in preventing and combating transnational terrorism

Outrora dominado por ameaças provenientes de Estados-nação, o cenário global actual, dominado por uma rápida mudança de poderes que nos apresenta uma interacção complexa entre múltiplos actores, onde inimigos desconhecidos, anteriormente bem identificados, é actualmente controlado por grupos terroristas bem preparados e bem organizados. Hezbollah é reconhecido como um dos grupos terroristas mais capazes, com uma extensa rede fora do Líbano dedicada a tráfico de droga, armas e seres humanos, tal como o branqueamento de capitais para financiar o terrorismo, representando um grande foco de instabilidade à segurança. Como instrumento de Estado, os serviços de informações detêm a capacidade de estar na linha da frente na prevenção e combate ao terrorismo. Todavia, para compreender este fenómeno é necessário analisar os actores desta ameaça. À luz desta conjuntura, esta dissertação está dividida em três capítulos principais que visam responder às seguintes questões fundamentais: O que é o terrorismo? Como opera um grupo terrorista transnacional? Será que os serviços de informações têm as ferramentas necessárias para prevenir e combater estas ameaças?

The EU’s Paradoxical Efforts at Tracking the Financing of Terrorism: From criticism to imitation of dataveillance. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security No. 56, August 2013

In July 2011, the European Commission published a Communication aimed at setting out different options for establishing a European terrorist finance tracking system (TFTS). The Communication followed the adoption of the EU-US agreement on the US Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) in 2010. The agreement concluded various series of national, European and transatlantic negotiations after the disclosure through public media of the US TFTP in 2006. This paper takes stock of the wide range of controversies surrounding this security-focused programme with dataveillance capabilities. After stressing the impact of the US TFTP on international relations, the paper argues that the EU-US agreement primarily has the effect of shifting information-sharing practices from the justice/judicial/penal/criminal investigation framework into the security/intelligence/administrative/prevention context as the main rationale. The paper then questions the TFTP-related conception of mass intelligence through large-scale databases and transnational communication of bulk data in the name of targeted surveillance. Following an examination of the project creating an EU system equivalent to the TFTP, the paper emphasises the fundamental paradox of transatlantic security matters, in which European criticism of American programmes tends to be ultimately translated into EU imitation of US dataveillance practices.

Housing supply in Australia : the impact of the availability of development finance

Before the Global Financial Crisis many providers of finance had growth mandates and actively pursued development finance deals as a way of gaining higher returns on funds with regular capital turnover and re-investment possible. This was able to be achieved through high gearing and low presales in a strong market. As asset prices fell, loan covenants breached and memories of the 1990’s returned, banks rapidly adjusted their risk appetite via retraction of gearing and expansion of presale requirements. Early signs of loosening in bank credit policy are emerging, however parties seeking development finance are faced with a severely reduced number of institutions from which to source funding. The few institutions that are lending are filtering out only the best credit risks by way of constrictive credit conditions including: low loan to value ratios, the corresponding requirement to contribute high levels of equity, lack of support in non-prime locations and the requirement for only borrowers with well established track records. In this risk averse and capital constrained environment, the ability of developers to proceed with real estate developments is still being constrained by their inability to obtain project finance. This paper will examine the pre and post GFC development finance environment. It will identify the key lending criteria relevant to real estate development finance and will detail the related changes to credit policies over this period. The associated impact to real estate development projects will be presented, highlighting the significant constraint to supply that the inability to obtain finance poses.

Self-defence against terrorism in the post 9/11 world

In 1986 the then United States Secretary of State George Shultz asserted that: It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing terrorists in international waters or airspace; from attacking them on the soil of other nations, even for the purpose of rescuing hostages; or from using force against states that support, train and harbor terrorists or guerrillas. At that time the United States’ claim of a right to use military force in self-defence against terrorism2 received little support from other states.3 The predominant view then was that terrorist attacks committed by private or non-state actors were a form of criminal activity to be combated through domestic and international criminal justice mechanisms. The notion that such terrorist acts should be treated as ‘armed attacks’ triggering a victim state’s right of self-defence was not accepted by the majority of states. To suggest, as Shultz had done, that a state not directly responsible for terrorist acts could have its territorial integrity violated by military action targeting terrorists located within that state, was a controversial proposition in 1986. However, some fifteen years later, when the United States and a coalition of allies launched a military campaign in Afghanistan following the 11 September 2001 (hereafter ‘9/11’) terrorist attacks, there was virtually unanimous international support for the use of force.