Extracting ontological concepts for tendering conceptual structures

It has been argued that beyond software engineering and process engineering, ontological engineering is the third capability needed if successful e-commerce is to be realized. In our experience of building an ontological-based tendering system, we face the problem of building an ontology. In this paper, we demonstrate how to build ontologies in the tendering domain. The ontology life cycle is identified. Extracting concepts from existing resources like on-line catalogs is described. We have reused electronic data interchange (EDI) to build conceptual structures in the tendering domain. An algorithm to extract abstract ontological concepts from these structures is proposed.

Tracking cost savings from competitive tendering in the short and long run

A major initiative of the Thatcher and Major Conservative administrations was that public sector ancillary and professional services provided by incumbent direct service organisations [DSOs] be put out to tender. Analyses of this initiative, in the UK and elsewhere, found costs were often reduced in the short run. However, few if any studies went beyond the first round of tendering. We analyze data collected over successive rounds of tendering for cleaning and catering services of Scottish hospitals in order to assess the long term consequences of this initiative. The experience of the two services was very different. Cost savings for cleaning services tended to increase with each additional round of tendering and became increasingly stable. In accordance with previous results in the literature, DSOs produced smaller cost reductions than private contractors: probably an inevitable consequence of the tendering process at the time. Cost savings from DSOs tended to disappear during the first round of tendering, but they appear to have been more permanent in successive rounds. Cost savings for catering, on the other hand, tended to be much smaller, and these were not sustained.

L'expérience anglaise des appels d'offres obligatoires (Compulsory competitive tendering).

Rapport de recherche

The impact of market and supply configurations on the costs of tendering in the construction industry

The cost of tendering in the construction industry is widely suspected to be excessive, but there is little robust empirical evidence to demonstrate this. It also seems that innovative working practices may reduce the costs of undertaking construction projects and the consequent improvement in relationships should increase overall value for money. The aim of this proposed research project is to develop mechanisms for measuring the true costs of tendering based upon extensive in-house data collection undertaken in a range of different construction firms. The output from this research will enable all participants in the construction process to make better decisions about how to select members of the team and identify the price and scope of their obligations.

Criticial determinants of construction tendering costs: Quantity surveyors' standpoint

Identification of cost-determinant variables and evaluation of their degree of influence play an essential role in building reliable cost models and enhance the competitive edge of quantity surveyors as well as contracting organisations. Sixty-seven variables affecting pre-tender construction cost estimates are identified through literature and interviews. These factors are grouped into six categories and a comparison analysis of their impact is conducted. Priority ranking of cost-influencing factors is carried out using a questionnaire survey commissioned amongst quantity surveyors based in the UK. Findings of this survey indicate that there is a strong agreement between quantity surveyors in ranking cost-influencing factors of construction projects. Comparisons between the outcomes of this research and other related studies are presented.

The tendering process and performance analysis of a public building project in Ghana

A case study on the tendering process and cost/time performance of a public building project in Ghana is conducted. Competitive bids submitted by five contractors for the project, in which contractors were required to prepare their own quantities, were analyzed to compare differences in their pricing levels and risk/requirement perceptions. Queries sent to the consultants at the tender stage were also analyzed to identify the significant areas of concern to contractors in relation to the tender documentation. The five bidding prices were significantly different. The queries submitted for clarifications were significantly different, although a few were similar. Using a before-and-after experiment, the expected cost/time estimate at the start of the project was compared to the actual cost/time values, i.e. what happened in the actual construction phase. The analysis showed that the project exceeded its expected cost by 18% and its planned time by 210%. Variations and inadequate design were the major reasons. Following an exploration of these issues, an alternative tendering mechanism is recommended to clients. A shift away from the conventional approach of awarding work based on price, and serious consideration of alternative procurement routes can help clients in Ghana obtain better value for money on their projects.

Tendering: optimization and rationality

There have been various techniques published for optimizing the net present value of tenders by use of discounted cash flow theory and linear programming. These approaches to tendering appear to have been largely ignored by the industry. This paper utilises six case studies of tendering practice in order to establish the reasons for this apparent disregard. Tendering is demonstrated to be a market orientated function with many subjective judgements being made regarding a firm's environment. Detailed consideration of 'internal' factors such as cash flow are therefore judged to be unjustified. Systems theory is then drawn upon and applied to the separate processes of estimating and tendering. Estimating is seen as taking place in a relatively sheltered environment and as such operates as a relatively closed system. Tendering, however, takes place in a changing and dynamic environment and as such must operate as a relatively open system. The use of sophisticated methods to optimize the value of tenders is then identified as being dependent upon the assumption of rationality, which is justified in the case of a relatively closed system (i.e. estimating), but not for a relatively open system (i.e. tendering).

Ideological dominance in recreation provision: towards a theory of Local Authority response to Compulsory Competitive Tendering in Britain

This paper considers how the delivery of public leisure services in Britain has been affected by the imposition of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) on the management of facilities. In particular, it focuses on the changing relationship between the central and local levels of government, theorising a tripartite local response to CCT, incorporating local statism, post-Fordist rejection of CCT and post- Fordist compliance with the aims of the central administration. The paper then discusses the actual implementation of CCT, relating the theorised responses to those witnessed in practice. This results in the delineation of a continuum of stances, ranging from pragmatic forms of local statism, such as the protection of the former direct labour force, to centrist attempts to combine the ethics of socialism with the mechanics of the market, to an outright rejection of state organisation and control. The paper concludes that although legitimate attempts have been made to protect local services, the outcome of the CCT process has undoubtedly been the regeneration of public leisure provision away from its service roots towards a market model of provision.

Public leisure provision under Compulsory Competitive Tendering: the maintenance of ideological dominance?

Although much has been written about the effect on services of public sector restructuring, little is yet available on public leisure provision. This omission is addressed by considering how the delivery of public leisure services in Britain has been affected by the imposition of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT). In particular, it focuses on the changing relationship between the central and local levels of government recognising, on the part of local government, a continuum of structural responses to central initiatives which have, in some cases, conspired to reduce the impact of CCT on public leisure provision. The paper concludes that although attempts have been made to protect local services, the outcome of the CCT process has been the regeneration of public leisure provision away from its service roots, but within an enduring ideological paradigm of conservative professionalism.

Mathematical relationships between scoring parameters in capped tendering

Mathematical relationships between Scoring Parameters can be used in Economic Scoring Formulas (ESF) in tendering to distribute the score among bidders in the economic part of a proposal. Each contracting authority must set an ESF when publishing tender specifications and the strategy of each bidder will differ depending on the ESF selected and the weight of the overall proposal scoring. This paper introduces the various mathematical relationships and density distributions that describe and inter-relate not only the main Scoring Parameters but the main Forecasting Parameters in any capped tender (those whose price is upper-limited). Forecasting Parameters, as variables that can be known in advance before the deadline of a tender is reached, together with Scoring Parameters constitute the basis of a future Bid Tender Forecasting Model.

Detecting abnormal and collusive bids in capped tendering

Recent developments in the area of Bid Tender Forecasting have enabled bidders to implement new types of easy-to-use tools for increasing their chances of winning contracts. Although these new tools (such as iso-Score Curve Graphs, Scoring Probability Graphs, and Position Probability Graphs) are designed for bidders in capped tendering (tenders with an upper price limit), some of their principles can also be applied by a Contracting Authority to detect which bidders do not follow a standard pattern, that is, their bids are extremely high or low. Since a collusive bid generally needs to be sufficiently high or low to make an impact on the bid distribution, any person in charge of supervising capped tenders can be alerted to any bidder that might be involved in a cartel after identifying the same abnormal behavior in a series of tenders through simple calculations and a new type of graph.

Analysis of alternative tendering mechanisms for transportation Public-Private Partnerships

This paper describes a theoretical model based primarily on transaction costs, for comparing the various tendering mechanisms used for transportation Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. In particular, the model contrasts negotiated procedures with the open procedure, as defined by the current European Union legislation on public tendering. The model includes both ex ante transaction costs (borne during the tendering stage) and ex post transaction costs (such as enforcement costs, re-negotiation costs, and costs arising from litigation between partners), explaining the trade-off between them. Generally speaking, it is assumed that the open procedure implies lower transaction costs ex ante, while the negotiated procedure reduces the probability of the appearance of new contingencies not foreseen in the contract, hence diminishing the expected value of transaction costs ex post. Therefore, the balance between ex ante and ex post transaction costs is the main criterion for deciding whether the open or negotiated procedure would be optimal. Notwithstanding, empirical evidence currently exists only on ex ante transaction costs in transportation infrastructure projects. This evidence has shown a relevant difference between the two procedures as far as ex ante costs are concerned, favouring the open procedure. The model developed in this paper also demonstrates that a larger degree of complexity in a contract does not unequivocally favour the use of a negotiated procedure. Only in those cases dealing with very innovative projects, where important dimensions of the quality of the asset or service are not verifiable, may we observe an advantage in favour of the negotiated procedure. The bottom line is that we find it difficult to justify the employment of negotiated procedures in most transportation PPP contracts, especially in the field of roads. Nevertheless, the field remains open for future empirical work and research on the levels of transaction costs borne ex post in PPP contracts, as well as on the probabilities of such costs appearing under any of the procurement procedures.