Learning to 'understand backwards' in time: children's temporal cognition and the primary history curriculum

This study examines children’s temporal ways of knowing and it highlights the centrality of temporal cognition in the development of children’s historical understanding. It explores how young children conceptualise time and it examines the provision for temporal cognition at the levels of the intended, enacted and received history curriculum in the Irish primary school context. Positioning temporality as a prerequisite second-order concept, the study recognises the essential role of both first-order and additional second-order concepts in historical understanding. While the former can be defined as the basic, substantive content to be taught, the latter refers to a number of additional key concepts that are deemed fundamental to children's capacity to make meaningful sense of history. The study argues for due recognition to be given to temporality, in the belief that both sets of knowledge, the content and skills, are required to develop historical thinking (Lévesque, 2011). The study addresses a number of key research questions, using a mixed methods research design, comprising an analysis of history textbooks, a survey among final year student teachers about their teaching of history, and school-based interviews with primary school children: What opportunities are available for children to develop temporal ways of knowing? How do student teachers experience being apprenticed into the available culture for teaching history and understanding temporality at primary level? What insights do the cognitive-developmental and sociocultural perspectives on learning provide for understanding the dynamics of children’s temporal ways of knowing? The study argues that the skill of developing a deeper understanding of time is a key prerequisite in connecting with, and constructing, understandings and frameworks of the past. The study advances a view of temporality as complex, multi-faceted and developmental. The findings have a potential contribution to make in influencing policy and pedagogy in establishing an elaborated and well-defined curriculum framework for developing temporal cognition at both national and international levels.

Moving along the mental time line influences the processing of future related words

Abstract concepts like numbers or time are thought to be represented in the more concrete domain of space and the sensorimotor system. For example, thinking of past or future events has a physical manifestation in backward or forward body sway, respectively. In the present study, we investigated the reverse effect: can passive whole-body motion influence the processing of temporal information? Participants were asked to categorize verbal stimuli to the concepts future or past while they were displaced forward and backward (Experiment 1), or upward and downward (Experiment 2). The results showed that future related verbal stimuli were categorized faster during forward as compared to backward motion. This finding supports the view that temporal events are represented along a mental time line and that the sensorimotor system is linked to that representation. We showed that body motion is not just an epiphenomenon of temporal thoughts. Passive whole-body motion can influence higher-order temporal cognition.

Interaction between Normative Systems and Cognitive Agents in Temporal Modal Defeasible Logic

While some recent frameworks on cognitive agents addressed the combination of mental attitudes with deontic concepts, they commonly ignore the representation of time. An exception is [1]that manages also some temporal aspects both with respect to cognition and normative provisions. We propose in this paper an extension of the logic presented in [1]with temporal intervals.

Semantic memory impairment in temporal lobe epilepsy associated with hippociampal sclerosis

Episodic memory impairment is a well-recognized feature of mesial temporal lobe epilepsy. Semantic memory has received much less attention in this patient population. In this study, semantic memory aspects (word-picture matching, word definition, confrontation and responsive naming, and word list generation) in 19 patients with left and right temporal lobe epilepsy secondary to mesial temporal sclerosis (MTS) were compared with those of normal controls. Patients with LMTS showed impaired performance in word definition (compared to controls and RMTS) and in responsive naming (compared to controls). RMTS and LMTS patients performed worse than controls in word-picture matching. Both patients with left and right mesial temporal lobe epilepsy performed worse than controls in word list generation and in confrontation naming tests. Attentional-executive dysfunction may have contributed to these deficits. We conclude that patients with left and right NITS display impaired aspects of semantic knowledge. A better understanding of semantic processing difficulties in these patients will provide better insight into the difficulties with activities of daily living in this patient population. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The pyramidal cell in cognition: A comparative study in human and monkey

Here we present evidence that the pyramidal cell phenotype varies markedly in the cortex of different anthropoid species. Regional and species differences in the size of, number of bifurcations in, and spine density of the basal dendritic arbors cannot be explained by brain size. Instead, pyramidal cell morphology appears to accord with the specialized cortical function these cells perform. Cells in the prefrontal cortex of humans are more branched and more spinous than those in the temporal and occipital lobes. Moreover, cells in the prefrontal cortex of humans are more branched and more spinous than those in the prefrontal cortex of macaque and marmoset monkeys. These results suggest that highly spinous, compartmentalized, pyramidal cells (and the circuits they form) are required to perform complex cortical functions such as comprehension, perception, and planning.

Cortex, cognition and the cell: New insights into the pyramidal neuron and prefrontal function

Arguably the most complex conical functions are seated in human cognition, the how and why of which have been debated for centuries by theologians, philosophers and scientists alike. In his best-selling book, An Astonishing Hypothesis: A Scientific Search for the Soul, Francis Crick refined the view that these qualities are determined solely by cortical cells and circuitry. Put simply, cognition is nothing more, or less, than a biological function. Accepting this to be the case, it should be possible to identify the mechanisms that subserve cognitive processing. Since the pioneering studies of Lorent de No and Hebb, and the more recent studies of Fuster, Miller and Goldman-Rakic, to mention but a few, much attention has been focused on the role of persistent neural activity in cognitive processes. Application of modern technologies and modelling techniques has led to new hypotheses about the mechanisms of persistent activity. Here I focus on how regional variations in the pyramidal cell phenotype may determine the complexity of cortical circuitry and, in turn, influence neural activity. Data obtained from thousands of individually injected pyramidal cells in sensory, motor, association and executive cortex reveal marked differences in the numbers of putative excitatory inputs received by these cells. Pyramidal cells in prefrontal cortex have, on average, up to 23 times more dendritic spines than those in the primary visual area. I propose that without these specializations in the structure of pyramidal cells, and the circuits they form, human cognitive processing would not have evolved to its present state. I also present data from both New World and Old World monkeys that show varying degrees of complexity in the pyramidal cell phenotype in their prefrontal cortices, suggesting that cortical circuitry and, thus, cognitive styles are evolving independently in different species.

The pyramidal neuron in occipital, temporal and prefrontal cortex of the owl monkey (Aotus trivirgatus): regional specialization in cell structure

Recent studies have revealed marked regional variation in pyramidal cell morphology in primate cortex. In particular, pyramidal cells in human and macaque prefrontal cortex (PFC) are considerably more spinous than those in other cortical regions. PFC pyramidal cells in the New World marmoset monkey, however, are less spinous than those in man and macaques. Taken together, these data suggest that the pyramidal cell has become more branched and more spinous during the evolution of PFC in only some primate lineages. This specialization may be of fundamental importance in determining the cognitive styles of the different species. However, these data are preliminary, with only one New World and two Old World species having been studied. Moreover, the marmoset data were obtained from different cases. In the present study we investigated PFC pyramidal cells in another New World monkey, the owl monkey, to extend the basis for comparison. As in the New World marmoset monkey, prefrontal pyramidal cells in owl monkeys have relatively few spines. These species differences appear to reflect variation in the extent to which PFC circuitry has become specialized during evolution. Highly complex pyramidal cells in PFC appear not to have been a feature of a common prosimian ancestor, but have evolved with the dramatic expansion of PFC in some anthropoid lineages.

Volumetric MRI changes, cognition and personality traits in old age depression.

BACKGROUND: The presence of cognitive and structural deficits in euthymic elderly depressed patients remains a matter of debate. Integrative aetiological models assessing concomitantly these parameters as well as markers of psychological vulnerability such as persistent personality traits, are still lacking for this age group. METHODS: Cross-sectional comparisons of 38 elderly remitted patients with early-onset depression (EOD) and 62 healthy controls included detailed neuropsychological assessment, estimates of brain volumes in limbic areas and white matter hyperintensities, as well as evaluation of the Five-Factor personality dimensions. RESULTS: Both cognitive performances and brain volumes were preserved in euthymic EOD patients. No significant group differences were observed in white matter hyperintensity scores between the two groups. In contrast, EOD was associated with significant increase of Neuroticism and decrease of Extraversion facet scores. LIMITATIONS: Results concern the restricted portion of EOD patients without psychiatric and physical comorbidities. Future longitudinal studies are necessary to determine the temporal relationship between the occurrence of depression and personality dimensions. CONCLUSIONS: After remission from acute depressive symptoms, cognitive performances remain intact in elderly patients with EOD. In contrast to previous observations, these patients display neither significant brain volume loss in limbic areas nor increased vascular burden compared to healthy controls. Further clinical investigations on EOD patterns of vulnerability in old age will gain from focusing on psychological features such as personality traits rather than neurocognitive clues.

Impact of brain aging and neurodegeneration on cognition: evidence from MRI.

PURPOSE OF REVIEW: We present an overview of recent concepts in mechanisms underlying cognitive decline associated with brain aging and neurodegeneration from the perspective of MRI. RECENT FINDINGS: Recent findings challenge the established link between neuroimaging biomarkers of neurodegeneration and age-related or disease-related cognitive decline. Amyloid burden, white matter hyperintensities and local patterns of brain atrophy seem to have differential impact on cognition, particularly on episodic and working memory - the most vulnerable domains in 'normal aging' and Alzheimer's disease. Studies suggesting that imaging biomarkers of neurodegeneration are independent of amyloid-β give rise to new hypothesis regarding the pathological cascade in Alzheimer's disease. Findings in patients with autosomal-dominant Alzheimer's disease confirm the notion of differential temporal trajectory of amyloid deposition and brain atrophy to add another layer of complexity on the basic mechanisms of cognitive aging and neurodegeneration. Finally, the concept of cognitive reserve in 'supernormal aging' is questioned by evidence for the preservation of neurochemical, structural and functional brain integrity in old age rather than recruitment of 'reserves' for maintaining cognitive abilities. SUMMARY: Recent advances in clinical neuroscience, brain imaging and genetics challenge pathophysiological hypothesis of neurodegeneration and cognitive aging dominating the field in the last decade and call for reconsidering the choice of therapeutic window for early intervention.

Voluntary action and causality in temporal binding

Previous studies have documented temporal attraction in perceived times of actions and their effects. While some authors argue that voluntary action is a necessary condition for this phenomenon, others claim that the causal relationship between action and effect is the crucial ingredient. In the present study, we investigate voluntary action and causality as the necessary and sufficient conditions for temporal binding. We used a variation of the launching effect proposed by Michotte, in which participants controlled the launch stimulus in some blocks. Volunteers reported causality ratings and estimated the interval between the two events. Our results show dissociations between causality ratings and temporal estimation. While causality ratings are not affected by voluntary action, temporal bindings were only found in the presence of both voluntary action and high causality. Our results indicate that voluntary action and causality are both necessary for the emergence of temporal binding.

O estatuto temporal e social do signo

Este trabalho tem como objetivo mostrar como o processo de conhecimento traduz-se numa estrutura triádica, cuja característica não pode prescindir da temporalidade e de seu aspecto social. de outra forma, conforme o dualismo subjacente nas teorias tradicionais, a esfera do conhecimento tornar-se-ia limitada pela inevitabilidade do recurso à coisa-em-si.

Temporal memory of emotional experience

The few studies that have investigated judgments of time have suggested that the memory of duration is distorted more for emotional events than for neutral events, while in contrast there is abundant evidence that other aspects of memories of emotional events are more accurate. To reconcile this apparent discrepancy, we used a procedure in which the participants learned a standard duration over several trials under three emotional conditions: a threatening, a nonthreatening, and a neutral control condition. They were then tested either immediately or 24 h after learning. In this test phase, they had to indicate whether presented comparison durations were or were not the same as the previously learned standard duration. We found that durations were recalled better in the emotional than in the neutral condition, and that this occurred to a greater extent in the threatening than in the nonthreatening condition. Arousing emotions thus enhanced temporal memory, just as they enhance memory for other aspects of emotional events.

Bias and learning in temporal binding: intervals between actions and outcomes are compressed by prior bias

It has consistently been shown that agents judge the intervals between their actions and outcomes as compressed in time, an effect named intentional binding. In the present work, we investigated whether this effect is result of prior bias volunteers have about the timing of the consequences of their actions, or if it is due to learning that occurs during the experimental session. Volunteers made temporal estimates of the interval between their action and target onset (Action conditions), or between two events (No-Action conditions). Our results show that temporal estimates become shorter throughout each experimental block in both conditions. Moreover, we found that observers judged intervals between action and outcomes as shorter even in very early trials of each block. To quantify the decrease of temporal judgments in experimental blocks, exponential functions were fitted to participants’ temporal judgments. The fitted parameters suggest that observers had different prior biases as to intervals between events in which action was involved. These findings suggest that prior bias might play a more important role in this effect than calibration-type learning processes.

Interactions between normative systems and software cognitive agents. A formalization in temporal modal defeasible logic and its implementation

Sustainable computer systems require some flexibility to adapt to environmental unpredictable changes. A solution lies in autonomous software agents which can adapt autonomously to their environments. Though autonomy allows agents to decide which behavior to adopt, a disadvantage is a lack of control, and as a side effect even untrustworthiness: we want to keep some control over such autonomous agents. How to control autonomous agents while respecting their autonomy? A solution is to regulate agents’ behavior by norms. The normative paradigm makes it possible to control autonomous agents while respecting their autonomy, limiting untrustworthiness and augmenting system compliance. It can also facilitate the design of the system, for example, by regulating the coordination among agents. However, an autonomous agent will follow norms or violate them in some conditions. What are the conditions in which a norm is binding upon an agent? While autonomy is regarded as the driving force behind the normative paradigm, cognitive agents provide a basis for modeling the bindingness of norms. In order to cope with the complexity of the modeling of cognitive agents and normative bindingness, we adopt an intentional stance. Since agents are embedded into a dynamic environment, things may not pass at the same instant. Accordingly, our cognitive model is extended to account for some temporal aspects. Special attention is given to the temporal peculiarities of the legal domain such as, among others, the time in force and the time in efficacy of provisions. Some types of normative modifications are also discussed in the framework. It is noteworthy that our temporal account of legal reasoning is integrated to our commonsense temporal account of cognition. As our intention is to build sustainable reasoning systems running unpredictable environment, we adopt a declarative representation of knowledge. A declarative representation of norms will make it easier to update their system representation, thus facilitating system maintenance; and to improve system transparency, thus easing system governance. Since agents are bounded and are embedded into unpredictable environments, and since conflicts may appear amongst mental states and norms, agent reasoning has to be defeasible, i.e. new pieces of information can invalidate formerly derivable conclusions. In this dissertation, our model is formalized into a non-monotonic logic, namely into a temporal modal defeasible logic, in order to account for the interactions between normative systems and software cognitive agents.