Empirical evidence on the difference between the effective and the statutory tax rates for listed groups in Germany

The difference between the statutory and effective tax rate for listed groups is a complex variable influenced by a variety of factors. This paper aims to analyze whether this difference exists for listed groups in the German market and tests which factors have an impact on it. Thus the sample consists of 130 corporations listed in the three major German stock indices. The findings suggest that the companies that pay less than the statutory rate clearly outweigh the ones that pay more, and that the income earned from associated companies has a significant impact on this difference.

The distribution of average and marginal effective tax rates in European Union member states

Macro-based summary indicators of effective tax burdens do not capture differences in effective tax rates facing different sub-groups of the population. They also cannot provide information on the level or distribution of the marginal effective tax rates thought to influence household behaviour. I use EUROMOD, an EU-wide tax-benefit microsimulation model, to compute distributions of average and marginal effective tax rates across the household population in fourteen European Union Member States. Using different definitions of ‘net taxes’, the tax base and the unit of analysis I present a range of measures showing the contribution of the tax-benefit system to household incomes, the average effective tax rates applicable to income from labour and marginal effective tax rates faced by working men and women. In a second step, effective tax rates are broken down to separately show the influence of each type of tax-benefit instrument. The results show that measures of effective tax rates vary considerably depending on incomes, labour market situations and family circumstances. Using single averages or macro-based indicators will therefore provide an inappropriate picture of tax burdens faced by large parts of the population.

Tax rates, San Diego County, California /

Vol. for 1918 includes a table of tax rates in San Diego County from 1874 to 1918.

Assessed valuations and tax rates:

Mode of access: Internet.

Equalized assessed valuation per pupil and tax rates descending order ... Illinois public schools.

Title varies slightly.

How capital gains tax rates affect revenues : the historical evidence.

Shipping list no.: 88-156-P.

Problems relating to State applications for a convention to propose constitutional limitations on Federal tax rates : staff report to the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives.

At head of title: 82d Congress, 2d Session. House Committee print.

The responsiveness of government revenue to marginal tax rates

Ce document utilise des données fiscales et démographiques pour calculer les changements dans les recettes du gouvernement engendrés par les ajustements dans le taux marginal d'imposition, et cela en mettant l’accent sur la fourchette d'imposition la plus élevée. La portée de l’étude est une sélection de pays de l’O.C.D.E. Une analyse des changement de comportement des contribuables et des différentes alternatives dont le gouvernement dispose en termes de politique fiscale en suivaient. En fin, les possibles faiblesses dans des techniques de référence sont examinées en détail. 

The responsiveness of government revenue to marginal tax rates

Ce document utilise des données fiscales et démographiques pour calculer les changements dans les recettes du gouvernement engendrés par les ajustements dans le taux marginal d'imposition, et cela en mettant l’accent sur la fourchette d'imposition la plus élevée. La portée de l’étude est une sélection de pays de l’O.C.D.E. Une analyse des changement de comportement des contribuables et des différentes alternatives dont le gouvernement dispose en termes de politique fiscale en suivaient. En fin, les possibles faiblesses dans des techniques de référence sont examinées en détail. 

Tax evasion, inequality, and progressive taxes : a political economy perspective

The standard approach to tax compliance applies the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968): in its first application, due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) it models the behaviour of agents as a decision involving a choice of the extent of their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional environment, represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties in the event the agent is caught. While this basic framework yields important insights on tax compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations. Specifically, it indicates a level of compliance that is significantly below what is observed in the data. This thesis revisits the original framework with a view towards addressing this issue, and examining the political economy implications of tax evasion for progressivity in the tax structure. The approach followed involves building a macroeconomic, dynamic equilibrium model for the purpose of examining these issues, by using a step-wise model building procedure starting with some very simple variations of the basic Allingham and Sandmo construct, which are eventually integrated to a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations framework with heterogeneous agents. One of the variations involves incorporating the Allingham and Sandmo construct into a two-period model of a small open economy of the type originally attributed to Fisher (1930). A further variation of this simple construct involves allowing agents to initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, the agents then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that the ‘evade or not’ assumption has strikingly different and more realistic implications for the extent of evasion, and demonstrate that it is a more appropriate modeling strategy in the context of macroeconomic models, which are essentially dynamic in nature, and involve consumption smoothing across time and across various states of nature. Specifically, since deciding to undertake tax evasion impacts on the consumption smoothing ability of the agent by creating two states of nature in which the agent is ‘caught’ or ‘not caught’, there is a possibility that their utility under certainty, when they choose not to evade, is higher than the expected utility obtained when they choose to evade. Furthermore, the simple two-period model incorporating an ‘evade or not’ choice can be used to demonstrate some strikingly different political economy implications relative to its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart. In variations of the two models that allow for voting on the tax parameter, we find that agents typically choose to vote for a high degree of progressivity by choosing the highest available tax rate from the menu of choices available to them. There is, however, a small range of inequality levels for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a relatively low value of the tax rate. The final steps in the model building procedure involve grafting the two-period models with a political economy choice into a dynamic overlapping generations setting with more general, non-linear tax schedules and a ‘cost-of evasion’ function that is increasing in the extent of evasion. Results based on numerical simulations of these models show further improvement in the model’s ability to match empirically plausible levels of tax evasion. In addition, the differences between the political economy implications of the ‘evade or not’ version of the model and its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart are now very striking; there is now a large range of values of the inequality parameter for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a low degree of progressivity. This is because, in the ‘evade or not’ version of the model, low values of the tax rate encourages a large number of agents to choose the ‘not-evade’ option, so that the redistributive mechanism is more ‘efficient’ relative to the situations in which tax rates are high. Some further implications of the models of this thesis relate to whether variations in the level of inequality, and parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties for tax evasion matter for the political economy results. We find that (i) the political economy outcomes for the tax rate are quite insensitive to changes in inequality, and (ii) the voting outcomes change in non-monotonic ways in response to changes in the probability of detection and penalty rates. Specifically, the model suggests that changes in inequality should not matter, although the political outcome for the tax rate for a given level of inequality is conditional on whether there is a large or small or large extent of evasion in the economy. We conclude that further theoretical research into macroeconomic models of tax evasion is required to identify the structural relationships underpinning the link between inequality and redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. The models of this thesis provide a necessary first step in that direction.

Fundamental Tax Legislation 2013

Fundamental Tax Legislation 2013 contains the essential provisions from the primary legislation that affects Australia’s taxation system. Updated and expanded for 2013, this volume is an indispensable reference for undergraduate and postgraduate students of taxation. New in 2013 is a revised Year in Review section, which summarises the legislative developments in taxation over the previous 12 months, a listing of the passage of tax-related legislation during the last year and the inclusion of reference statistics (such as CPI quarterly figures and individual tax rates for residents and non-residents). Also, new for 2013 is a Tax Rates and Tables section which contains an accessible summary of the main tax rates and tables that students will need to refer to for their tax studies.

Fundamental Tax Legislation [22nd Edition]

This edition includes a revised Year in Review section, which summarises the legislative developments in taxation over the previous 12 months, a listing of the passage of tax-related legislation during the last year and the inclusion of reference statistics (such as CPI quarterly figures and individual tax rates for residents and non-residents). A Tax Rates and Tables section which contains an accessible summary of the main tax rates and tables that students will need to refer to for their tax studies

Fundamental Tax Legislation [23nd Edition]

Fundamental Tax Legislation 2015 contains the essential provisions from the primary legislation that affects Australia’s taxation system. Updated and expanded for changes which occurred in 2014, this volume is an indispensable reference for undergraduate and postgraduate students of taxation. The Year in Review section has been updated to summarise the main legislative developments in taxation over the previous 12 months, a listing of the passage of tax related legislation during the last year and the inclusion of reference statistics (such as CPI quarterly figures and individual tax rates for residents and foreign residents). Also fully updated and revised to reflect the changes in 2014 is the Tax Rates and Tables section, which contains an accessible summary of the main tax rates and tables that students will need to refer to for their tax studies.

The dilemma of international capital tax competition in the presence of public capital and endogenous growth

Using an OLG-model with endogenous growth and public capital we show, that an international capital tax competition leads to inefficiently low tax rates, and as a consequence to lower welfare levels and growth rates. Each national government has an incentive to reduce the capital income tax rates in its effort to ensure that this policy measure increases the domestic private capital stock, domestic income and domestic economic growth. This effort is justified as long as only one country applies this policy. However, if all countries follow this path then all of them will be made worse off in the long run.