Illinois property tax rate & levy manual /

Description based on: Feb. 1991.

Illinois tax rate and levy manual.

Mode of access: Internet.

Illinois tax rate and levy manual /

Mode of access: Internet.

Tax evasion, inequality, and progressive taxes : a political economy perspective

The standard approach to tax compliance applies the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968): in its first application, due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) it models the behaviour of agents as a decision involving a choice of the extent of their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional environment, represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties in the event the agent is caught. While this basic framework yields important insights on tax compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations. Specifically, it indicates a level of compliance that is significantly below what is observed in the data. This thesis revisits the original framework with a view towards addressing this issue, and examining the political economy implications of tax evasion for progressivity in the tax structure. The approach followed involves building a macroeconomic, dynamic equilibrium model for the purpose of examining these issues, by using a step-wise model building procedure starting with some very simple variations of the basic Allingham and Sandmo construct, which are eventually integrated to a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations framework with heterogeneous agents. One of the variations involves incorporating the Allingham and Sandmo construct into a two-period model of a small open economy of the type originally attributed to Fisher (1930). A further variation of this simple construct involves allowing agents to initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, the agents then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that the ‘evade or not’ assumption has strikingly different and more realistic implications for the extent of evasion, and demonstrate that it is a more appropriate modeling strategy in the context of macroeconomic models, which are essentially dynamic in nature, and involve consumption smoothing across time and across various states of nature. Specifically, since deciding to undertake tax evasion impacts on the consumption smoothing ability of the agent by creating two states of nature in which the agent is ‘caught’ or ‘not caught’, there is a possibility that their utility under certainty, when they choose not to evade, is higher than the expected utility obtained when they choose to evade. Furthermore, the simple two-period model incorporating an ‘evade or not’ choice can be used to demonstrate some strikingly different political economy implications relative to its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart. In variations of the two models that allow for voting on the tax parameter, we find that agents typically choose to vote for a high degree of progressivity by choosing the highest available tax rate from the menu of choices available to them. There is, however, a small range of inequality levels for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a relatively low value of the tax rate. The final steps in the model building procedure involve grafting the two-period models with a political economy choice into a dynamic overlapping generations setting with more general, non-linear tax schedules and a ‘cost-of evasion’ function that is increasing in the extent of evasion. Results based on numerical simulations of these models show further improvement in the model’s ability to match empirically plausible levels of tax evasion. In addition, the differences between the political economy implications of the ‘evade or not’ version of the model and its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart are now very striking; there is now a large range of values of the inequality parameter for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a low degree of progressivity. This is because, in the ‘evade or not’ version of the model, low values of the tax rate encourages a large number of agents to choose the ‘not-evade’ option, so that the redistributive mechanism is more ‘efficient’ relative to the situations in which tax rates are high. Some further implications of the models of this thesis relate to whether variations in the level of inequality, and parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties for tax evasion matter for the political economy results. We find that (i) the political economy outcomes for the tax rate are quite insensitive to changes in inequality, and (ii) the voting outcomes change in non-monotonic ways in response to changes in the probability of detection and penalty rates. Specifically, the model suggests that changes in inequality should not matter, although the political outcome for the tax rate for a given level of inequality is conditional on whether there is a large or small or large extent of evasion in the economy. We conclude that further theoretical research into macroeconomic models of tax evasion is required to identify the structural relationships underpinning the link between inequality and redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. The models of this thesis provide a necessary first step in that direction.

Powering innovation through tax concessions: The changing research & development tax incentives

The changes to the R&D tax concession in 2011 were touted as the biggest reform to business innovation policy in over a decade. Three years later, as part of the 2014 Federal Budget, a reduction in the concession rates was announced. While the most recent of the pro-posed changes are designed to align with the reduction in company tax rate, the Australian Federal Government also indicated that the gain to revenue from the reduction in the incentive scheme will be redirected by the Government to repair the Budget and fund policy priori-ties. The consequence is that the R&D concessions, while designed to encourage innovation, are clearly linked with the tax system. As such, the first part of this article considers whether the R&D concession is a changing tax for changing times. Leading on from part one, this article also addresses a second question of ‘what’s tax got to do with it’? To answer this question, the article argues that, rather than ever being substantive tax reform, the constantly changing measures simply alter the criteria and means by which companies become eligible for a Federal Government subsidy for qualifying R&D activity, whatever that amount is. It further argues that when considered as part of the broader innovation agenda, all R&D tax concessions should be evaluated as a government spending program in the same way as any direct spending on innovation. When this is done, the tax regime is arguably merely the administrative policy instrument by which the subsidy is delivered. However, this may not be best practice to distribute those funds fairly, efficiently, and without distortion, while at the same time maintaining adequate government control and accountability. Finally, in answering the question of ‘what’s tax got to do with it?’ the article concludes that the answer is: very little.

Taxation and Household Financial Decisions: Evidence from the Bush Tax Acts

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2013

Tax policy stance over the business cycle: evidence from Europe

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Empirical evidence on the difference between the effective and the statutory tax rates for listed groups in Germany

The difference between the statutory and effective tax rate for listed groups is a complex variable influenced by a variety of factors. This paper aims to analyze whether this difference exists for listed groups in the German market and tests which factors have an impact on it. Thus the sample consists of 130 corporations listed in the three major German stock indices. The findings suggest that the companies that pay less than the statutory rate clearly outweigh the ones that pay more, and that the income earned from associated companies has a significant impact on this difference.

Reporting Income Taxes in the Banking Sector In Angola - Accounting, Tax Regulation and Financial Reporting Evidences

This research provides an insight into income taxes reporting in Angola, based on hand collected data from the annual reports of banks. Empirical studies on Angolan companies are scarce, in part due to the limited access to data. The results show that income taxes’ reporting has improved over the years 2010-2013, becoming more reliable and understandable. The Angolan Government is boosting the economic growth through tax benefits in the investment in public debt, which cause a reduction in the banks’ effective tax rate. The new income tax law will reduce the statutory tax rate from 2015 onwards and change the taxable income, resulting in shifting the focus to promoting private investment.

Tax+

Un grupo de estudiantes de la Universidad del Rosario encontró la oportunidad de iniciar un proyecto basado en la recuperación de impuestos de renta de los ciudadanos colombianos que trabajan o trabajaron en Estados Unidos, bajo el tipo de visa J1. El mercado en Colombia actualmente se encuentra constituido por aproximadamente 4.256 consumidores cuyo consumo per cápita es de $ 2.143.800 de pesos, la estrategia a utilizar para captar un nivel de clientes importante esta resguardada en el valor agregado del servicio, este pretende ofrecer un precio más bajo que la competencia incrementando la tasa de retorno de impuestos para nuestros clientes. Para iniciar, durante el primer año se espera obtener un 20% de participación en el mercado con 889 clientes, lo que conforma un promedio de 75 personas mensuales. Los pasos que se deben seguir para realizar el trámite de recuperación de impuestos son: 1) Contactar al cliente y darle la información, 2) Envió de los requisitos y formularios para que llene el cliente, 3) Devolución de los papeles diligenciados por el cliente, 4) Envió de papeles a Estados Unidos, 5) Contacto con el agente y devolución del dinero, 6) Informar al estudiante que ya está su dinero, 7) Encuesta de satisfacción. Para esto es necesario contar con un equipo conformado por un gerente general, gerente financiero, gerente de servicio al cliente y gerente comercial. La compañía estará ubicada en Bogotá, sin embargo, Tax + aspira tener un crecimiento importante en el país entrando a ciudades con una actividad importante dentro del mercado de work and travel como lo son Medellín, Cali y Barranquilla. El proyecto se iniciará con la constitución de una sociedad anónima simplificada (S.A.S.), una inversión total de $ 26.000.000 de pesos, la cual se encuentra constituida por un aporte de $ 6.500.000 pesos de cada uno de los miembros del equipo emprendedor, con esto se pretende adquirir los activos fijos y capital necesarios para iniciar el funcionamiento de la empresa. 10 Durante el primer año se espera tener unos ingresos de $ 355.600.000 de pesos, para el segundo año se pretende incrementar el número de clientes a 964, lo cual constituye unos ingresos equivalentes a $ 471.328.000 de pesos, y para el tercer año las ventas esperadas deberán alcanzar los $ 538.204.160 de pesos, que generan una rentabilidad sobre ventas del 6,31%, 0,73% y 1,6%, respectivamente. Para alcanzar el punto de equilibrio la empresa debe vender $322.083.104 al año, lo que indica que se puede alcanzar en el primer año de operación. En el primer año de operación se obtiene un flujo de efectivo de $43.272.320, en el segundo año, $5.570.581 y en el tercero $11.521.539. La tasa interna de retorno del proyecto es de 89,99% y la inversión se recupera en el tercer año de operación.

Asymmetric oligopoly and foreign direct investment: implications for host-country tax-setting

We present a duopoly model with heterogeneous firms that vary in cost-efficiency, each of which can choose to serve a foreign market by either exporting or local production. We do so to analyse the effects of a host-country corporate profit tax on both the scale and composition of FDI, and find that: strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms provides for a pattern of FDI that favours cost-inefficiency to the detriment of host-country welfare; and the host-country tax rate can be optimally used to avoid such patterns of FDI and instead promote direct investment by a relatively cost-efficient firm.

Applications of behavioural economics to tax evasion

The paper reviews recent models that have applied the techniques of behavioural economics to the analysis of the tax compliance choice of an individual taxpayer. The construction of these models is motivated by the failure of the Yitzhaki version of the Allingham–Sandmo model to predict correctly the proportion of taxpayers who will evade and the effect of an increase in the tax rate upon the chosen level of evasion. Recent approaches have applied non-expected utility theory to the compliance decision and have addressed social interaction. The models we describe are able to match the observed extent of evasion and correctly predict the tax effect but do not have the parsimony or precision of the Yitzhaki model.

The structure of the optimal income tax in the quasi-linear model

Existing numerical characterizations of the optimal income tax have been based on a limited number of model specifications. As a result, they do not reveal which properties are general. We determine the optimal tax in the quasi-linear model under weaker assumptions than have previously been used; in particular, we remove the assumption of a lower bound on the utility of zero consumption and the need to permit negative labor incomes. A Monte Carlo analysis is then conducted in which economies are selected at random and the optimal tax function constructed. The results show that in a significant proportion of economies the marginal tax rate rises at low skills and falls at high. The average tax rate is equally likely to rise or fall with skill at low skill levels, rises in the majority of cases in the centre of the skill range, and falls at high skills. These results are consistent across all the specifications we test. We then extend the analysis to show that these results also hold for Cobb-Douglas utility.

Revenue-neutral tax policy under price uncertainty

The firm's response to revenue-neutral taxation is investigated under price uncertainty. Revenue-neutral policies adjust simultaneously the marginal tax rate and the level of exemptions while keeping expected tax receipts constant. Nonincreasing absolute risk aversion is sufficient to sign the firm's response: a reduction in the marginal rate causes the firm to contract output. Implications are established for the equilibrium level of treasury receipts.

Influence of individual ethical orientation on tax compliance: evidence among Ghanaian taxpayers

Even though Africa has constantly emphasized the need to reduce deficit financing through mobilization of more internal revenues, this has not been achieved. Perhaps encouraging voluntary tax compliance can improve internal revenue mobilization. This study explores the relationship between ethical orientation and tax compliance and finds that ethical persons are generally more tax compliant than unethical persons but are more influenced by considerations of tax rate and withholding positions compared to unethical persons. The findings of this study differ from Reckers et al. in a number of ways and contribute to the literature by providing a possible explanation of the cause(s) of tax non- compliance.