Do political incentives matter for tax policies? Ideology, opportunism and the tax structure

This paper investigates the importance of political ideology and opportunism in the choice of the tax structure. In particular, we examine the effects of cabinet ideology and elections on the distribution of the tax burden across factors of production and consumption for 21 OECD countries over the period 1970-2000 by employing four alternative cabinet ideology measures and by using the methodology of effective tax rates. There is evidence of both opportunistic and partisan effects on tax policies. More precisely, we find that left-wing governments rely more on capital relative to labor income taxation and that they tend to increase consumption taxes. Moreover, we find that income tax rates (but not consumption taxes) tend to be reduced in preelectoral periods and that capital effective tax rates (defined broadly to include taxes on selfemployed income) are reduced by more than effective labor tax rates.

Revenue-neutral tax policies under price uncertainty: reply

In their comment on my 1990 article, Yeh, Suwanakul, and Mai extend my analysis-which focused attention exclusively on firm output-to allow for simultaneous endogeneity of price, aggregate output, and numbers of firms. They show that, with downward- sloping demand, industry output adjusts positively to revenue-neutral changes in the marginal rate of taxation. This result is significant for two reasons. First, we are more often interested in predictions about aggregate phenomena than we are in predictions about individual firms. Indeed, firm-level predictions are frequently irrefutable since firm data are often unavailable. Second, the authors derive their result under a set of conditions that appear to be more general than those invoked in my 1990 article. In particular, they circumvent the need to invoke specific assumptions about the nature of firms' aversions toward risk. I consider this a useful extension and I appreciate the careful scrutiny of my paper.

Federal tax deductibility for local taxes and its effect on local revenue policies

This dissertation analyzes whether and how changes in federal tax policy affect local tax policies, specifically, the elimination of the federal deductibility of state and local taxes for individual taxpayers by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) in 59 California cities. Two methods are used in the study: a survey of local revenue officials and a time event time-series/cross sectional sales tax reliance study.^ The reliance study uses a covariance model to pool cross-section and time-series observations. The results of the reliance study indicate a statistically significant overall decline in sales tax reliance after 1986. The results of the survey indicate that local policy makers generally do not believe that federal deductibility is an important factor when considering raising local sales taxes. Further analysis shows that local revenue officials claiming federal deductibility is not an important factor are associated mostly with cities that registered no significant decline in sales tax reliance after 1986. Similarly, local revenue officials claiming federal deductibility is an important factor when considering local tax policy are associated mostly with cities that suffered a significant decline in sales tax reliance after 1986.^ Of that group, further analysis shows that the declines in sales tax reliance are associated mostly with cities located in the southwestern part of the state. When compared to other cities in the state, an analysis of variance reveals that there are a series of statistically significant factors associated with southwestern cities which may contribute to the decline in sales tax reliance following the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. ^

Taxing Sweets: Sweetener Input Tax or Final Consumption Tax?

In order to reduce obesity and associated costs, policymakers are considering various policies, including taxes, to change consumers high-calorie consumption habits. We investigate two tax policies aimed at reducing added sweetener consumption. Both a consumption tax on sweet goods and a sweetener input tax can reach the same policy target of reducing added sweetener consumption. Both tax instruments are regressive, but the associated surplus losses are limited. The tax on sweetener inputs targets sweeteners directly and causes about five times less surplus loss than the final consumption tax. Previous analyses have overlooked this important point.

Poverty impacts of increased openness and fiscal policies in a dollarized economy: a CGE-micro approach for Ecuador

We quantify the effects on poverty and income distribution in Ecuador of bilateral trade liberalization with the US and a budget-neutral value added tax increase which seeks to compensate tariff revenue losses. We stress the study of fiscal policies that the government could tap in order to compensate for tariff revenue loss. This is a very important issue for Ecuador because this country adopted the US dollar as its currency in 2000, forgiving the use of important policy instruments. To study these issues we combine a reduced-form micro household income and occupational choice model (using 2005/6 data from the Ecuadorian LSMS) with a standard single-country computable general equilibrium model (employing a 2004 SAM). We follow a sequential approach that simulates the full distributional impact of trade and tax policies. We find that the impact of these policy changes on extreme poverty and income distribution is small but positive.

Budget constrained tax policy under price uncertainty: implications for supply control

Tax policies that constrain net transfers between the farm sector and the fisc are modeled under price uncertainty. Increasing the level of tax on profits causes the firm to expand output. Implications are derived for supply control and the distributions of profits and net receipts at the fisc.

Tax structure and tax evasion in Latin America

Incluye bibliografia

From Convergence to Diffusion: The EU's influence on national tax systems. ACES Cases No. 2011.2

In this article I investigate to what extent European Integration stimulates policy convergence and diffusion of various forms of tax policy. Using a mixed-methods design, I find that several causal mechanisms contribute to an EU-wide diffusion of tax policies: imposition, competition, harmonization and learning/communication. I show that these mechanisms have different effects on different forms of taxation. Even if the ultimate outcome of this influence only in few cases leads to unconditional convergence, the EU has markedly accelerated policy diffusion among its member states.

Changes in tax structures in European Union Member States

The European Union does not have a comprehensive common tax policy and substantial changes in this specialized policy area are not likely in the foreseeable future. Albeit common rules, requirements, minimum rates for certain tax types were implemented in the last few decades, they barely limit the Member States in using their tax policies as one of the worthiest elements of their arsenal in increasing competitiveness or quite the contrary, to undermining their own international competitiveness inadvertently through a misguided tax policy. In this article, we put the tax policies of the Visegrad Group and the Eurozone core countries (Germany, Austria and the Netherlands), as well as changes in these policies under the magnifying glass, in terms of the impact of tax structure changes on economic growth and employment in the last decade.

Utilização de gás natural comprimido em veículos pesados de passageiros

Dissertação de mestrado em Engenharia Mecânica

Consumption externalities, habit formation, and equilibrium efficiency

We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.

O Impacto dos Impostos no Orçamento das Câmaras Municipais: o Caso do Município do Tarrafal de Santiago

O objectivo deste trabalho é desenvolver uma breve contextualização sobre o impacto dos impostos nos orçamentos das Autarquias Locais em Cabo Verde e a forma como as receitas recebidas pelo Estado central são depois distribuídas aos municípios. Convém ainda salientar que este trabalho visa analisar as políticas fiscais e os impostos em particular. Nele ir-se-á demonstrar e comprovar a contribuição das autarquias locais no desenvolvimento de Cabo Verde e a necessidade de serem transferidos mais recursos às câmaras municipais, visando maior e melhor desenvolvimento do país, tendo em conta a experiência acumulada durante as duas últimas décadas. Por outro lado, o presente estudo tem a finalidade de diagnosticar os principais problemas financeiros com que as autarquias locais se debatem, o que sugere a adopção de um conjunto de alterações nos actuais instrumentos financeiros. Algumas medidas aqui previstas, podem e devem ser adoptadas de imediato pelas autarquias locais. Desde logo, o estudo do Sistema Tributário visa promover a difusão de procedimentos amparados por lei com a finalidade de auxiliar os profissionais e ajudá-los a ampliar a sua participação individual na consolidação da autonomia financeira dos municípios. Há claramente avanços em matéria legislativa, mas é preciso aprovar um novo modelo, cuja aplicação irá trazer, seguramente, maiores benefícios para o país, porquanto reclama por um desenvolvimento mais equilibrado e promoverá uma equidade inter-geracional muito mais ampla.

The Bogota – sabana region : the political economy behind the struggle to implement a sustainable urban development model

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Taxes, corruption, and entry

Tax policies and corruption are important institutional considerations which can shape entrepreneurship. We investigate how tax rates, and the interaction between corruption and tax rates, influence variations in entry across a panel of 72 countries in the period 2005–2011. We use a series of panel estimations as well as several robustness checks to test these effects, using relevant controls for economic development, the size of the state, and other regulatory and tax policy measures. We find that higher tax rates consistently discourage entry. Further, we find that although the direct influence of corruption on entry is also consistently negative, the interaction influence of corruption and tax rate is positive. This indicates that corruption can offset the negative influence of high taxes on entry. We discuss the implications of our findings for policymakers and future research.