Powering innovation through tax concessions : the changing research and development tax incentives

The changing R&D Tax Concession has been touted as the biggest reform to business innovation policy in over a decade. But, is it a changing tax for changing times? This paper addresses this question and further asks ‘what’s tax got to do with it?’. To answer this question, the paper argues that rather than substantive tax reform, the proposed measures simply alter the criteria and means by which companies become eligible for a Federal Government subsidy for qualifying R&D activity. It further argues that when considered as part of the broader innovation agenda, the R&D Tax Concession should be evaluated as a government spending program in the same way as any direct spending on innovation. When this is done, the tax regime is arguably only the administrative policy instrument by which the subsidy is delivered. However, it is proposed that this may not be best practice to distribute those funds fairly, efficiently, and without distortion, while at the same time maintaining adequate government control and accountability. Finally, in answering the question of ‘what’s tax got to do with it?’ the paper concludes that the answer is ‘very little’.

Powering innovation through tax concessions: The changing research & development tax incentives

The changes to the R&D tax concession in 2011 were touted as the biggest reform to business innovation policy in over a decade. Three years later, as part of the 2014 Federal Budget, a reduction in the concession rates was announced. While the most recent of the pro-posed changes are designed to align with the reduction in company tax rate, the Australian Federal Government also indicated that the gain to revenue from the reduction in the incentive scheme will be redirected by the Government to repair the Budget and fund policy priori-ties. The consequence is that the R&D concessions, while designed to encourage innovation, are clearly linked with the tax system. As such, the first part of this article considers whether the R&D concession is a changing tax for changing times. Leading on from part one, this article also addresses a second question of ‘what’s tax got to do with it’? To answer this question, the article argues that, rather than ever being substantive tax reform, the constantly changing measures simply alter the criteria and means by which companies become eligible for a Federal Government subsidy for qualifying R&D activity, whatever that amount is. It further argues that when considered as part of the broader innovation agenda, all R&D tax concessions should be evaluated as a government spending program in the same way as any direct spending on innovation. When this is done, the tax regime is arguably merely the administrative policy instrument by which the subsidy is delivered. However, this may not be best practice to distribute those funds fairly, efficiently, and without distortion, while at the same time maintaining adequate government control and accountability. Finally, in answering the question of ‘what’s tax got to do with it?’ the article concludes that the answer is: very little.

Should tax incentives for charitable giving stop at Australia's borders?

Around the world, philanthropic gifts are increasingly crossing borders, driven by globalisation and facilitated by liberalised cross-border tax incentives. Australia is considered to have one of the strictest regimes for the tax treatment of cross-border donations. With bipartisan political support for a significant reduction in the amount and scope of Australian foreign aid, the nation’s international presence through the ‘soft power’ of aid will fall increasingly upon private philanthropy. Are the current tax incentives for Australian cross-border philanthropy and the supervision of those incentives appropriate to both facilitate and regulate international giving? To address this question, this article analyses the amount of Australian cross-border philanthropy and explains the current legislative architecture affecting the tax deductibility of cross-border gifts. It then examines the Australian Government’s proposed ‘in Australia’ reform agenda against the underlying fiscal and regulatory policy imperatives, and makes recommendations for the future tax treatment of Australian cross-border philanthropy.

Tax incentives for foreign direct investment part II : Design considerations

Part I of this article concluded that tax incentives for foreign direct investment (FDI) have become increasingly common over the past 10 years or so, especially among developing countries, and that there is substantial evidence to support the proposition that tax considerations now play an important role in many investment decisions. Countries seeking to attract FDI often feel compelled to offer tax inducements that are at least as attractive as those offered by their neighbours or competitors. Countries do so at a cost, however, and that cost may be substantial. Governments are thus placed in a dilemma - can they afford to cut taxes in order to attract investment, and can they afford not to? The second part of this article assumes that countries, and especially most developing countries, will continue to feel obliged to provide tax incentives. The aim of this part therefore is to examine ways in which those incentives can be made more effective and more efficient, thereby reducing their cost to the host country.

Tax incentives for foreign direct investment part I : Recent trends and countertrends

According to the conventional wisdom, tax incentives for investment - in particular for foreign direct investment (FDI) - are not recommended. That is the view held almost universally by theorists and by the international bodies that advise on tax matters.' Tax incentives are bad in theory and bad in practice. They are bad in theory principally because they cause distortions: investment decisions are made that would not have been made without the inducement of special tax concessions. They are bad in practice, being both ineffective and inefficient. They are ineffective in that tax considerations are only rarely a major determinant in FDI decisions; they are inefficient because their cost, in terms of tax revenue foregone, often far exceeds any benefits they may produce. Other criticisms are also frequently levelled against tax incentives for FDI - they are inequitable (since they benefit some investors but not others), they are difficult to administer and open to abuse, and they lack transparency. Thus, it is not surprising that ''the standard advice given by institutions like the World Bank and the lMF to developing countries is to refrain from offering tax incentives to foreign investors".2 The purpose of this article is not to question that advice or to challenge the conventional wisdom - except in one respect. Recent evidence does suggest that tax considerations are an increasingly important factor in investment decisions and that special tax incentives have become substantially more effective as instruments for attracting FDI than they were 10 or 20 years ago.3 The first part of this article, published here, examines some of that evidence, reviews some recent trends in national policies towards FDI, attempts to suggest why investment incentives have become more important and more effective, and looks at the pressures that are exerted on governments, especially in developing countries, to compete for FDI by offering special incentives. The second part of the article, to be published in the Bulletin next month, assumes that many countries will continue to offer tax incentives to investors regardless of the best advice, and considers how incentives might be designed in order to increase their effectiveness and efficiency.

The effects of tax incentives for small firms on employment levels

This paper will examine the effects of tax incentives for small businesses on employment level evaluating a program with this purpose implemented in Brazil in the 1990s. We first develop a theoretical framework which guides both the de nition of the parameters of interest and their identi cation. Selection problems both into the treatment group and into the data sample are tackled by combining fixed effects methods and regression discontinuity design on alternative sub-samples of a longitudinal database of manufacturing firms. The results show that on the one hand the size composition of the treated fi rms may be changed due to the survival of some smaller firms that would have exited had it not been eligible to the program. On the other hand, the treated firms who do not depend on the program to survive do employ more workers.

The effects of small firm tax incentives on employment levels

This paper aims to evaluate the impact on employment growth of a tax incentive program targeting Brazilian manufacturing small businesses (SIMPLES). This evaluation is conducted for two distinct periods: for the year 1997, when the program was first implemented, and for the year 1999, when the eligibility rule was modified to allow the eligibility of a broader group of firms. The evaluation takes into account two distinct channels through which the charted effects operate. The first is the employment variation in the firms that became eligible for the incentives, and the second is the change in the survival probability experienced by the same group of firms. Moreover, each of these channels can be activated either by the tax reduction dimension of the program or by its dimension of red tape simplification. Our results identify positive effects on employment growth for the tax incentive program only in the dimension of red tape simplification and its effects on the 1997 sample.

Tax incentives in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Commercial/business/industrial tax incentives in Illinois.

Prepared by the House Democratic staff?

Illinois tax incentives : a report on Illinois tax incentives /

In January 2007, the Commission took a look at the State's business tax incentives and how Illinois' business climate compared to other states in its report entitled "State Tax Incentives for Illinois Businesses." This report is an update and expansion of that effort and includes : a detailed description of Illinois' current tax incentives, and economic growth programs; an examination of the business tax, climate based on different methodologies; and, a discussion of the importance of tax incentives in business site selection.

Municipal use of tax incentives for economic development.

May 1988.

State tax incentives for Illinois businesses.

"January 2007"

Preservation tax incentives for historic buildings /

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