Residential tariff structure and battery energy storage impact in queensland LV network

Distributed renewable energy has become a significant contender in the supply of power in the distribution network in Queensland and throughout the world. As the cost of battery storage falls, distribution utilities turn their attention to the impacts of battery storage and other storage technologies on the low voltage (LV) network. With access to detailed residential energy usage data, Energex's available residential tariffs are investigated for their effectiveness in providing customers with financial incentives to move to Time-of Use based tariffs and to reward use of battery storage.

On the tying of aid to tariff reform

This paper considers the welfare effects of foreign aid that is tied to changes in the recipient's tariff. By constructing a three-country model with tariffs, and by allowing for changes both in the amount of aid and in the tariff rates, we are able to consider the welfare implications of two different rules of aid conditionality: (i) a rule which leaves the donor's welfare unchanged, and (ii) a rule which leaves the recipient government's total revenue unchanged. It is shown that the tying of aid to a tariff reform can, inter alia, be used to ensure Pareto improvement.

Steepest ascent tariff reform

The policy reform literature is primarily concerned with the construction of reforms that yield welfare gains. By contrast, this paper’s contribution is to develop a theoretical concept for which the focus is upon the sizes of welfare gains accruing from policy reforms rather than upon their signs. In undertaking this task, and by focusing on tariff reforms, we introduce the concept of a steepest ascent policy reform, which is a locally optimal reform in the sense that it achieves the highest marginal gain in utility of any feasible local reform. We argue that this reform presents itself as a natural benchmark for the evaluation of the welfare effectiveness of other popular tariff reforms such as the proportional tariff reduction and the concertina rules, since it provides the maximal welfare gain of all possible local reforms. We derive properties of the steepest ascent tariff reform, construct an index to measure the relative welfare effectiveness of any given tariff reform, determine conditions under which proportional and concertina reforms are locally optimal and provide illustrative examples.

Tariff strategies and small open economies

In this paper we examine the issue of optimal tariffs for a small economy that trades with a large economy. We define ‘small’ and ‘large’ in the sense that the world prices are determined solely by the large country, and, therefore, the small country faces exogenously given world prices. Within this framework it is shown that there exist situations in which the small country has an incentive to behave as a Stackelberg leader by committing itself to a non-zero optimal tariff. Although the small country is unable to directly affect world prices, by pre-committing to a non-zero trade tax it may induce a reduction of the large country's optimal trade tax, thereby indirectly improving its terms of trade and welfare. JEL Classification: F13, F35

Tariff-tax reforms and market access

Reducing tariffs and increasing consumption taxes is a standard IMF advice to countries that want to open up their economy without hurting government finances. Indeed, theoretical analysis of such a tariff–tax reform shows an unambiguous increase in welfare and government revenues. The present paper examines whether the country that implements such a reform ends up opening up its markets to international trade, i.e. whether its market access improves. It is shown that this is not necessarily so. We also show that, comparing to the reform of only tariffs, the tariff–tax reform is a less efficient proposal to follow both as far as it concerns market access and welfare.

Two-part tariff licensing mechanisms

Most of the patent licensing agreements that are observed include royalties, in particular per-unit or ad valorem royalties. This paper shows that in a differ entiated duopoly that competes á la Cournot the optimal contract for an internal patentee always includes a positive royalty. Moreover, we show that the patentee would prefer to use ad valorem royalties rather than per-unit royalties when goods are complements or when they are substitutes and the degree of differentiation is suffciently low. The reason is that by including an ad valorem royalty in the licensing contract the patentee can commit strategically to be more (less) aggressive when goods are complements (substitutes) since his licensing revenues become increasing with the price of output of his rival. As a result, licensing may hurt consumers although it always increases social welfare.

Understanding Tariff Deficit and its Challenges

Regulators and market participants have become increasingly concerned about the Spanish electricity tariff deficit due to its size and the difficulties to control its growth. The deficit can be traced to inefficiencies in market organization and solutions should be designed to mitigate those inefficiencies. Tariff deficits have allowed for the transfer of part of the present costs of electricity services to future consumers, but this situation has reached a limit and a deep revision of regulation in this market cannot be postponed. In general, solutions that interfere with market prices and signals are not appropriate.

The Impact of Environmental Non-Tariff Measures on China's Agricultural Exports

This article assesses the impact of environmental non-tariff measures on China's agricultural exports. It uses two measures to show which countries make most intensive use of environmental non-tariff measures and which agricultural products exported by China are the most affected. Environmental non-tariff measures were most prevalence in Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines, Mexico, Japan, Russian, USA, Germany, and Netherland. Labor-intensive agricultural products, such as fish, vegetables, and fruit were most seriously affected.

The ranking of alternative tariff and quota policies in the presence of domestic monopoly

Bhagwati demonstrated the nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas in the presence of monopoly. This paper also assumes domestic production to be monopolized and shows that giving import licenses or tariff revenues to the domestic producer may raise or lower the welfare cost of protection and the price paid by consumers from the price under other tariff and quota arrangements which maintain the same market share for the domestic producer. However, if the monopolist realizes that commercial policy is an instrument used to maximize the policymaker's welfare function, instead of being a goal in itself, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas re-emerges. © 1977.

The Spanish social tariff and renewable energy cooperatives: situation and perspectives

Social tariffs are, along with transfer payments and energy efficiency measures, an instrument to alleviate energy poverty. The name of the Spanish social tariff is “bono social”, and it was established in 2009. To qualify for bono social, the electricity consumer should meet any of the socioeconomic requirements stipulated by law and contract the electricity supply with a “comercializadora de referencia”, companies that are required to offer the bono social by law.Renewable energy cooperatives, a recent phenomenon in Spain, are not comercializadoras de referencia, so they are not obliged to offer the bono social. This does not mean there are no cooperative members at risk of energy poverty or vulnerable consumers.This study has two objectives. The first is to sketch the socioeconomic profile of members of the renewable energy cooperatives. The second is to analyze if these members are entitled to the bono social, or would be to other subsidized prices with different requirements to those of the bono social.For this purpose, we conducted a survey to members of the largest renewable energy cooperative in Spain, Som Energia. The results show that the members of renewable energy cooperatives are exposed to energy poverty risk, although its reach depends on the definition of vulnerable consumer.

Memorial with the resolutions adopted at the anti-tariff meeting held at Abbeville Court-House, South Carolina, on Monday, the 3d of September, 1827

This document contains the resolutions adopted at the anti-tariff meeting held at the Abbeville courthouse following taxes imposed by the federal government, which members of the state believed to be unconstitutional.

Memorial of the inhabitants of Fairfield District, S. Carolina, praying a revision of the tariff, &c., December 14, 1827

This document contains a memorial, which was written by the citizens of Fairfield district of South Carolina, with a purpose of securing their constitutional right of expressing formal sentiments in regard to excluding tariff on woolen manufactures. It was presented to the president and members of the Senate, and to the speaker and members of the House of Representatives in Congress.

The sectionalism of the tariff bill. Speech of Hon. John L. McLaurin, of South Carolina, in the Senate of the United States

This document contains a speech by John L. McLaurin, representative of South Carolina. Sections of the speech include: sectionalism exposed, the bill might have been defeated, the south plundered of its rights, not a protectionist, fraudulent demands of New England, Hon. Randolph Tucker, Hon. W.R. Morrison, and Hon. R.Q. Mills strangers to the doctrine in 1882, a tariff for revenue against the doctrine of free raw material, don’t want Cleveland’s interpretation, contest of schedules, and my remedy.