New TPP leak reveals how we’re trading our sovereignty for cheap tariffs

WikiLeaks has published the secret investment chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Dr Matthew Rimmer, associate professor at ANU College of Law, explains its insidious implications....

Optimal foreign aid and tariffs

This paper investigates the optimal choice of foreign aid when trade policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion. Three alternative scenarios, depending on the timing of the actions and on whether aid is tied, are analyzed. It is shown that, in the case where aid is decided before tariffs, untied aid can lead to the reduction of the recipient's optimal trade tax. When the donor can tie the aid to a reduction in the recipient's tariff, the optimal aid level is always positive and the world can always achieve a Pareto-efficient equilibrium.

Reducing tariffs according to WTO accession rules: The case of Vietnam

When Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007 it was granted an accession period up to 2014. During this period tariffs would have to fall according to the accession agreement. This paper evaluates this 2007–2014 trade liberalization by building an applied general equilibrium model and calibrating it to the Vietnamese data. The model pays careful attention to the fact that Vietnam has many state-owned enterprises. The model simulations show that the WTO tariff reductions will reduce overall welfare. Moreover, the biggest loss will take place among the poor rural households in Vietnam. This paper proposes other tariff reforms that will both raise overall welfare and reduce income inequality.

On the functional relationship between tariffs and welfare

This paper uses a model of trade in two commodities between two countries to establish the following proposition. If the foreign offer curve has no points of inflection and if for each home rate of duty the equilibrium most favorable to the home country is selected (or else there is only one equilibrium), then as the rate of duty increases from zero, home welfare first rises then declines while foreign welfare steadily falls. © 1975.

Remuneration and tariffs in the context of virtual power players

Power systems have been through deep changes in recent years, namely with the operation of competitive electricity markets in the scope and the increasingly intensive use of renewable energy sources and distributed generation. This requires new business models able to cope with the new opportunities that have emerged. Virtual Power Players (VPPs) are a new player type which allows aggregating a diversity of players (Distributed Generation (DG), Storage Agents (SA), Electrical Vehicles, (V2G) and consumers), to facilitate their participation in the electricity markets and to provide a set of new services promoting generation and consumption efficiency, while improving players` benefits. A major task of VPPs is the remuneration of generation and services (maintenance, market operation costs and energy reserves), as well as charging energy consumption. This paper proposes a model to implement fair and strategic remuneration and tariff methodologies, able to allow efficient VPP operation and VPP goals accomplishment in the scope of electricity markets.

Desirable role in an international duopoly model with tariffs

In this paper, we study an international market model in which the home government imposes a tariff on the imported goods. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize a function that cares about the home firm’s profit and the total revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

International Stackelberg model with tariffs

This paper analyses the effects of tariffs on an international economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, located in two countries, each one producing a homogeneous good for both home consumption and export to the other identical country. We consider a game among governments and firms. First, the government imposes a tariff on imports and then we consider the two types of moving: simultaneous (Cournot-type model) and sequential (Stackelberg-type model) decisions by the firms. We also compare the results obtained in each model.

Defining Electricity Tariffs Using the Knowledge About the Consumers Profiles in ELECON Project

The increasing importance of the integration of distributed generation and demand response in the power systems operation and planning, namely at lower voltage levels of distribution networks and in the competitive environment of electricity markets, leads us to the concept of smart grids. In both traditional and smart grid operation, non-technical losses are a great economic concern, which can be addressed. In this context, the ELECON project addresses the use of demand response contributions to the identification of non-technical losses. The present paper proposes a methodology to be used by Virtual Power Players (VPPs), which are entities able to aggregate distributed small-size resources, aiming to define the best electricity tariffs for several, clusters of consumers. A case study based on real consumption data demonstrates the application of the proposed methodology.

Intelligent Remuneration and Tariffs for Virtual Power Players

Power systems have been through deep changes in recent years, namely due to the operation of competitive electricity markets in the scope the increasingly intensive use of renewable energy sources and distributed generation. This requires new business models able to cope with the new opportunities that have emerged. Virtual Power Players (VPPs) are a new type of player that allows aggregating a diversity of players (Distributed Generation (DG), Storage Agents (SA), Electrical Vehicles (V2G) and consumers) to facilitate their participation in the electricity markets and to provide a set of new services promoting generation and consumption efficiency, while improving players’ benefits. A major task of VPPs is the remuneration of generation and services (maintenance, market operation costs and energy reserves), as well as charging energy consumption. This paper proposes a model to implement fair and strategic remuneration and tariff methodologies, able to allow efficient VPP operation and VPP goals accomplishment in the scope of electricity markets.

Real-Time Tariffs for Electric Vehicles in Wind Power based Power Systems

The use of Electric Vehicles (EVs) will change significantly the planning and management of power systems in a near future. This paper proposes a real-time tariff strategy for the charge process of the EVs. The main objective is to evaluate the influence of real-time tariffs in the EVs owners’ behaviour and also the impact in load diagram. The paper proposes the energy price variation according to the relation between wind generation and power consumption. The proposed strategy was tested in two different days in the Danish power system. January 31st and August 13th 2013 were selected because of the high quantities of wind generation. The main goal is to evaluate the changes in the EVs charging diagram with the energy price preventing wind curtailment.

Definition of Distribution Network Tariffs Considering Distribution Generation and Demand Response

The use of distribution networks in the current scenario of high penetration of Distributed Generation (DG) is a problem of great importance. In the competitive environment of electricity markets and smart grids, Demand Response (DR) is also gaining notable impact with several benefits for the whole system. The work presented in this paper comprises a methodology able to define the cost allocation in distribution networks considering large integration of DG and DR resources. The proposed methodology is divided into three phases and it is based on an AC Optimal Power Flow (OPF) including the determination of topological distribution factors, and consequent application of the MW-mile method. The application of the proposed tariffs definition methodology is illustrated in a distribution network with 33 buses, 66 DG units, and 32 consumers with DR capacity.

The adoption of advanced feed-in tariffs in Ontario : a case of institutional layering

En mai 2009, l’Ontario a adopté la Loi sur l’énergie verte et devint ainsi la première juridiction en Amérique du Nord à promouvoir l’énergie renouvelable par le biais de tarifs de rachat garantis. En novembre 2010, dans son Plan énergétique à long terme, la province s’est engagée à déployer 10,700 MW en capacité de production d’énergie renouvelable non-hydroélectrique par 2018. Il s’agit de la cible de déploiement la plus élevée dans ce secteur au Canada. Les infrastructures de production et de distribution d’électricité comprennent des coûts d’installation élevés, une faible rotation des investissements et de longs cycles de vie, facteurs qui servent habituellement à ancrer les politiques énergétiques dans une dynamique de dépendance au sentier. Depuis le début des années 2000, cependant, l’Ontario a commencé à diverger de sa traditionnelle dépendance aux grandes centrales hydroélectriques, aux centrales à charbon et aux centrales nucléaires par une série de petits changements graduels qui feront grimper la part d’énergie renouvelable dans le mix énergétique provincial à 15% par 2018. Le but de ce mémoire est d’élucider le mécanisme de causalité qui a sous-tendu l’évolution graduelle de l’Ontario vers la promotion de l’énergie renouvelable par le biais de tarifs de rachat garantis et d’une cible de déploiement élevée. Ce mémoire applique la théorie du changement institutionnel graduel de Mahoney et Thelen au cas du développement de politiques d’énergie renouvelable en Ontario afin de mieux comprendre les causes, les modes et les effets du changement institutionnel. Nous découvrons que le contexte canadien de la politique énergétique favorise la sédimentation institutionnelle, c’est-à-dire un mode changement caractérisé par de petits gains favorisant l’énergie renouvelable. Ces gains s’accumulent pourtant en transformation politique importante. En Ontario, la mise sur pied d’une vaste coalition pour l’énergie renouvelable fut à l’origine du changement. Les premiers revendicateurs de politiques favorisant l’énergie renouvelable – les environnementalistes et les premières entreprises d’approvisionnement et de service en technologies d’énergie renouvelable – ont dû mettre sur pied un vaste réseau d’appui, représentant la quasi-totalité de la société ontarienne, pour faire avancer leur cause. Ce réseau a fait pression sur le gouvernement provincial et, en tant que front commun, a revendiqué l’énergie renouvelable non seulement comme solution aux changements climatiques, mais aussi comme solution à maints autres défis pressants de santé publique et de développement économique. La convergence favorable d’un nombre de facteurs contextuels a certes contribué à la réussite du réseau ontarien pour l’énergie renouvelable. Cependant, le fait que ce réseau ait trouvé des alliés au sein de l’exécutif du gouvernement provincial s’est révélé d’importance cruciale quant à l’obtention de politiques favorisant l’énergie renouvelable. Au Canada, les gouvernements provinciaux détiennent l’ultime droit de veto sur la politique énergétique. Ce n’est qu’en trouvant des alliés aux plus hauts échelons du gouvernement que le réseau ontarien pour l’énergie renouvelable a pu réussir.