Notes on market failure and the Paretian (Kaldor-Hicks) relevance and irrelevance of unfavourable externalities

The following are notes that have been distributed by me over the last few years to students in Environmental Economics at The University of Queensland. They give particular attention to whether externalities are Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks relevant from a policy point of view. Externalities are Kaldor-Hicks or Pareto irrelevant if no change is possible for which gainers could compensate losers. Both absolute and marginal externalities may be Kaldor-Hicks relevant. Infra-marginal negative externalities are often, but not always, Kaldor-Hicks irrelevant. There are at least two cases where such externalities can be relevant. First, the absolute impact of the negative externality may be so great that the source of the externality should be eliminated. Secondly, if the externality arises from production, its nature may depend on the type of production technique adopted. Although for the technique adopted, an infra-marginal negative externality occurs. That is Paretian irrelevant given that choice of this technique is the only available possibility, alternative techniques may actually be available in practice. Some of these may generate even smaller total external effects and be socially preferable. Both cases are outlined and illustrated in these notes. The analysis reveals the dangers of relying on marginalism for deciding on environmental policy. Total (external) effects are often of great social and economic importance and appropriate social choices cannot be made on the basis of marginalism alone.

Governmental start-up support in the light of allocative market failure : justification, analysis, and design

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2011

Market failure, inequality and redistribution

We consider the following question: does market failure justify redistribution? We argue that the general answer to this question is no, in the sense that policies for correcting market failures do not aim at producing a "desirable" income distribution. This follows from the fact that, by construction, market failure is a deviation from "efficiency" that does not involve any notion of a desirable distribution of welfare (or income). However, there are special cases where a "corrective measure" involving redistribution can offset a market failure, so this can provide a form of efficiency- based justification for redistribution.

Market failure and technological policy

Includes bibliography

Market failure in long-term private health insurance markets: a proposed solution

Recently, private health insurance rates have declined in many countries. In places requiring community rating in their health insurance premiums, a major cause is age-based adverse selection. However, even in countries without community rating, a de facto type of partial community rating tends to occur. In this note, a modified version of Pauly et al.'s guaranteed renewability model, which addresses the problem of age-based adverse selection (Pauly et al., 1995) is presented. Their model is extended from three to 35 periods. Also, probabilities are allowed to increase by age for low-risk types using actual age-based probabilities. This extension of their work shows that private health insurance contracts available stray far from optimal contracts that deal with age-based adverse selection. This suggests that government actions to affect private insurance options are warranted.

Regulatory governance of ‘training markets’, ‘market failure’, and ‘quasi’ markets: historical dimensions of the post-initial training market in the Netherlands

This article examines regulatory governance of the post-initial training market in The Netherlands. From an historical perspective on policy formation processes, it examines market formation in terms of social, economic, and cultural factors in the development of provision and demand for post-initial training; the roles of stakeholders in the longterm construction of regulatory governance of the market; regulation of and public providers; policy responses to market failure; and tripartite division of responsibilities between the state, social partners, commercial and publicly-funded providers. Historical description and analysis examine policy narratives of key stakeholders with reference to: a) influence of societal stakeholders on regulatory decision-making; b) state regulation of the post-initial training market; c) public intervention regulating the market to prevent market failure; d) market deregulation, competition, employability and individual responsibility; and, e) regulatory governance to prevent ‘allocative failure’ by the market in non-delivery of post-initial training to specific target groups, particularly the low-qualified. Dominant policy narratives have resulted in limited state regulation of the supply-side, a tripartite system of regulatory governance by the state, social partners and commercial providers as regulatory actors. Current policy discourses address interventions on the demand-side to redistribute structures of opportunity throughout the life courses of individuals. Further empirical research from a comparative historical perspective is required to deepen contemporary understandings of regulatory governance of markets and the commodification of adult learning in knowledge societies and information economies. (DIPF/Orig.)

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.