Green prospects in Greece

The radical left-wing Syriza and the Green party Ecologists Greens/Oikologoi Prasinoi (EG) have been seen as representatives of the left-libertarian/new politics party families in Greece. These type of parties are marked by a commitment to new politics issues such as gender and racial equality, peace and ecology. In countries where two party formations of this kind are in competition to attract a very similar clientele and one of them is electorally significant, it is unlikely for the other to achieve autonomous electoral success. This is a well-known fact that has penetrated discussions on the strategic orientation of both parties since their first electoral participation in 2004 (only European parliament elections for EG).

Locally Unwanted Sea Use: The Case of Syrian Chemical weapons disposal in the Mediterranean

This paper discusses the opposition to the disposal of Syrian chemical weapons in the Mediterranean Sea. Following insights from Green criminology and recent calls in that discipline for the inclusion of new social movements and resistance, it discusses in detail how the issue was framed in terms of environmental and ecological justice by different protest actors. This process is aided by an analytical model that brings together the sociology of protest and social movements, insights from reflexive modernisation and the study of southern European civil societies. Methodologically, the focus is on mobilisations that took place in Greece in general and the island of Crete in particular. Data have been harvested through the examination of online sources, such as newspapers, blogs and dedicated social networks. The analysis of the findings suggests that these mobilisations were initially stimulated by real concern, but subsequently these were only carried through by certain movement entrepreneurs who didn’t hesitate to pepper these concerns with false claims and/or linkages to an already active anti-imperialist discourse.

After Charlie: free speech and the political economy of communication

Three significant events at the start of 2015 have put freedom of speech firmly on the global agenda. The first was the carry-over from the December 2014 illegal entry to the Sony Corporation’s file servers by anonymous hackers, believed to be linked to the North Korean regime. The second was the horrible attack on journalists, editors, and cartoonists at the French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo on 7 January. The third was the election of leftwing anti-austerity party Syrzia in Greece on 25 January.While each event is different in scope and size, they are important to scholars of the political economy of communication because they all speak to ongoing debates about freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom of the press. I name each of these concepts separately because, despite popular confusion, they are not the same thing (Patching and Hirst, 2014) . Freedom of expression is the right to individual self-expression through any means; it is an inalienable human right. Freedom of speech refers to the right (and the physical ability) to utter political speech, to say what others wish to repress and to demand a voice with which to express a range of social and political thoughts. Freedom of the press is a very particular version of freedom of expression that is intimately bound with the political economy of speech and of the printing press. Freedom of the press is impossible without the press and, despite its theoretical availability to all of us, this principle is impossible to articulate without the material means (usually money) to actually deploy a printing press (or the electronic means of broadcasting and publishing).Freedom of expression is immutable; freedom of speech subject to legal, ethical and ideological restriction (for better, or worse) and freedom of the press is peculiar to bourgeois society in that it entails the freedom to own and operate a press, not the right to say or publish on a level playing field. Access to freedom of the press is determined in the marketplace and is subject to the unequal power relationships that such determination implies.It is fitting to start with the Charlie Hebdo massacre because the loss of 17 lives makes this the most chilling of the three events and demands that it be given prominence in any analysis. No lives have been lost yet because Sony’s computers were hacked and the election of Syriza has not (yet) led to mass deaths in Greece.

A esquerda radical no período pós 2009: nada de (muito) novo em Portugal?

A crise económica que eclodiu nas democracias europeias periféricas a partir de 2009 teve, em vários países da Europa do Sul, consequências graves em termos de estabilidade governativa e dos sistemas partidários. Neste contexto, o caso português tem sido apontado como excecional, visto que o agravamento da situação económica e as suas consequências políticas não provocaram uma afirmação eleitoral sem precedentes de forças de esquerda radical (como na Espanha e na Grécia). Neste artigo, apresenta-se o panorama da esquerda radical em Portugal e procede-se à análise de algumas dimensões associadas a este fenómeno de maior estabilidade do sistema partidário português à esquerda, nomeadamente a ausência de um fenómeno SYRIZA ou Podemos, recorrendo a explicações de natureza económica, ligadas à cultura política e à natureza do sistema partidário consolidado nas últimas quadro décadas.

Reshaping politics of the left and centre in Greece after the 2014 EP election. EPIN Commentary No. 21/10 September 2014

The political landscape in Greece is confused and volatile at the moment; the right and extreme- right-wing parties are accorded a disproportionately large place in political debate, while the radical left-wing SYRIZA party is attempting to maintain a ‘leftist’ profile and demonstrate its capacity to govern through a strategy of image normalisation. These tensions make it very difficult for the Greek government to stick to the EU’s tough reform agenda. The governing coalition is trying to conceal the social effects of implementing structural policy reforms, even postponing some measures to avoid bearing their political cost. At the same time, it is adopting a very rushed, and thus quite worrying, attitude towards a fast-track growth agenda, without taking into consideration the conditions for sustainable economic development.

Greece in limbo: Post-election 2015 scenarios. EPIN Commentary No. 22/ 21 January 2015

In the run-up to elections in Greece on January 25th, this EPIN commentary explores the likelihood and consequences of four potential post-election scenarios: 1. Syriza single-party majority government or Syriza-led coalition government with anti-austerity parties 2. Syriza-led coalition government with pro-austerity parties or Syriza minority government 3. New Democracy government or ND-led coalition government 4. No government is formed.

Grexit 2015: A primer. CEPS Commentary, 22 January 2015

In the run-up to the Greek elections on January 25th and the subsequent renegotiation of the country's economic adjustment programme with the troika, Daniel Gros writes in this Commentary that "nobody officially wants Grexit": not Syriza, which wants Greece to stay in the euro. It is ‘only’ asking for a reduction in Greece’s official debt and an end to austerity. The German government also does not favour Grexit because European unification remains the central project for German policy-makers across all mainstream parties. Only some protest parties and vocal economists think Greece (and Germany) would better off with a new Drachma. In his view, the substantive issues are thus the demands for a reduction of the official debt of Greece and an end to austerity, both of which he describes as eminently fudgeable. In any event, change in policy will be minor if a Syriza government is as successful in fulfilling its promise to spend as the previous government was in promising not to spend.

The Cost of Servicing Greece’s Debt: A Sisyphean task? CEPS Commentary, 4 February 2015

Following the victory of Syriza in the Greek elections on January 25th, policy-makers, economists and concerned EU citizens are scrambling to understand the causes, modalities and consequences of a possible Greek default in order to anticipate and prepare for what is likely to unfold in the coming weeks and months. The debate on the sustainability of Greek public finances has often been characterised by a lack of clarity and even a certain degree of confusion. This brief note focuses first on the cost that Greece faces in servicing its debt and then asks whether this is a manageable or a Sisyphean task. It concludes by reflecting on the political implications of the new government’s announced intentions and whether these are being taken into account in the current debate over debt restructuring.

Will this time be different for Greece? How to assess its ability to deliver on the reform agenda. CEPS Commentary, 13 March 2015

Taking its inspiration from the ongoing debate on whether this time will be different for Greece and whether Syriza will deliver on its reform promises to the European partners, this Commentary expresses bemusement that the public debate on such an important issue as well as internal discussions among senior policy-makers frequently resort to ‘gut feelings’ or simple stereotypes. To counteract this tendency, the author presents a simple analytical framework that can be used to assess the likelihood that a government will deliver on its reform agenda. Its purpose is not to allow for a precise probabilistic calculation, but to enable better structuring of the knowledge we have. It emphasises that the change depends NOT only on the capacity of the state to design and deliver policies, but even more crucially on state autonomy from both illegitimate and legitimate interests and cognitive models used by policy-makers to make sense of the world.

The Greek elections and the third bailout programme: Why it could work this time round. CEPS Commentary, 21 September 2015

Following the decisive victory won by the Syriza party in Greece’s general election on September 20th, this commentary explores the key question of whether the third bailout programme can work, where the previous two programmes failed. Whereas most observers argue that the third one cannot work because it merely represents a continuation of an approach that has manifestly failed, the authors argue that a closer inspection of the conditions today give grounds for cautious optimism.

Mídia à luz do desejo: cartografias dos processos da mídia livre contemporânea brasileira

This paper aims to understand the specifics of the network communication and the logic of articulation of social insurgencies in contemporary inferred from the rizome concept coined by Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze and the multitude as preach Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. To do so, it raises the processes and practices of political bodies, reaching lines and common strategies of operation. Unless the specifics, it is possible to draw a continuous and rizomatic communication that traverses both bodies enrolled in institutionalized democracy, as the spanish movement-party Podemos and the greek coalition Syriza, as the autonomous collectives, such as the Movimento Passe Livre, fighting for universal public, free and quality transport, and the free media initiatives Media Ninja and Catarina Santos, willing to understand the social movements. The constitutional amendment of this model of communication networking seems to be the desire to radicalization of democracy, the bias of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, as a strategic and common struggle. Indeed, speaking specifically of free media, they are built from here processes that take place in understanding the agency of the bodies as relevant to political action toward the radical democracy project, and the use of free softwares, the communicator-protester agency, the performance, the collective experience.