La syndication de contenu (fils RSS) en bibliothèque

Présenté au personnel de la Direction des bibliothèques lors d'une conférence-midi le 8 mars 2006.

Les fils RSS en bibliothèques : pourquoi et comment?

Présentation donnée le 10 novembre 2006 dans le cadre du Programme de formation continue de la Corporation des bibliothécaires professionnels du Québec (CBPQ).

Les fils RSS en bibliothèque de droit

Présentation donnée le 1er mars 2007 à l'Association des bibliothèques de droit de Montréal (ABDM) / Montreal Association of Law Libraries (MALL).

Les fils RSS en droit: un outil à découvrir

Présentation donnée le 17 mai 2007 aux professeurs de la Faculté de droit de l'Université de Montréal.

Les fils RSS en bibliothèque de droit en 2010

Présentation donnée le 29 avril 2010 à l'Association des bibliothèques de droit de Montréal (ABDM) / Montreal Association of Law Libraries (MALL).

Sentence de mort confirmee par Arrest de la Cour de Parlement de Paris, contre Manuel Magnan compagnon cordonnier, executé, à mort, Pour avoir pris & derobé le sainct Sacrement de l'Autel, en l'Eglise Commandataire de S. Iean de Lattran le 14 Féburier, 1620. Ensemble tout le contenu du Procès, Informations, et confessions, faicte par ledict Magnã, sur ledict larrecin & Sacrilege

[Acte. 1620-02-14]

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Le thresor des trois langues, espagnole, françoise, et italienne : auquel est contenuë l'explication de toutes les trois, respectivement l'une par l'autre... ([Reprod.]) / par Caesar Oudin, Nicot, La Crusca, et autres

Collection : Archives de la linguistique française ; 308