Formal network behaviour analysis using model checking

In this research we modelled computer network devices to ensure their communication behaviours meet various network standards. By modelling devices as finite-state machines and examining their properties in a range of configurations, we discovered a flaw in a common network protocol and produced a technique to improve organisations' network security against data theft.

Model checking Z specifications using SAL

The Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) is a suite of tools for analysis of state transition systems. Tools supported include a simulator and four temporal logic model checkers. The common input language to these tools was originally developed with translation from other languages, both programming and specification languages, in mind. It is, therefore, a rich language supporting a range of type definitions and expressions. In this paper, we investigate the translation of Z specifications into the SAL language as a means of providing model checking support for Z. This is facilitated by a library of SAL definitions encoding the Z mathematical toolkit.

A software tool that generates symbolic model verifier (SMV) input language from a predicate transition net

The purpose of this research was to apply model checking by using a symbolic model checker on Predicate Transition Nets (PrT Nets). A PrT Net is a formal model of information flow which allows system properties to be modeled and analyzed. The aim of this thesis was to use the modeling and analysis power of PrT nets to provide a mechanism for the system model to be verified. Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV) was the model checker chosen in this thesis, and in order to verify the PrT net model of a system, it was translated to SMV input language. A software tool was implemented which translates the PrT Net into SMV language, hence enabling the process of model checking. The system includes two parts: the PrT net editor where the representation of a system can be edited, and the translator which converts the PrT net into an SMV program.

On the Decidability of Model-Checking Information Flow Properties

Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance about information flow security: the end-to-end behavior of a computing system. Noninterference is the basic semantical condition used to account for information flow security. In the literature, there are many definitions of noninterference: Non-inference, Separability and so on. Mantel presented a framework of Basic Security Predicates (BSPs) for characterizing the definitions of noninterference in the literature. Model-checking these BSPs for finite state systems was shown to be decidable in [8]. In this paper, we show that verifying these BSPs for the more expressive system model of pushdown systems is undecidable. We also give an example of a simple security property which is undecidable even for finite-state systems: the property is a weak form of non-inference called WNI, which is not expressible in Mantel’s BSP framework.

Model-checking bisimulation-based information flow properties for infinite state sstems

Bisimulation-based information flow properties were introduced by Focardi and Gorrieri [1] as a way of specifying security properties for transition system models. These properties were shown to be decidable for finite-state systems. In this paper, we study the problem of verifying these properties for some well-known classes of infinite state systems. We show that all the properties are undecidable for each of these classes of systems.

Model checking support for conflict resolution in multiple non-functional concern management

When implementing autonomic management of multiple non-functional concerns a trade-off must be found between the ability to develop independently management of the individual concerns (following the separation of concerns principle) and the detection and resolution of conflicts that may arise when combining the independently developed management code. Here we discuss strategies to establish this trade-off and introduce a model checking based methodology aimed at simplifying the discovery and handling of conflicts arising from deployment-within the same parallel application-of independently developed management policies. Preliminary results are shown demonstrating the feasibility of the approach.

Model Checking for ROC Regression Analysis

The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is a prominent tool for characterizing the accuracy of continuous diagnostic test. To account for factors that might invluence the test accuracy, various ROC regression methods have been proposed. However, as in any regression analysis, when the assumed models do not fit the data well, these methods may render invalid and misleading results. To date practical model checking techniques suitable for validating existing ROC regression models are not yet available. In this paper, we develop cumulative residual based procedures to graphically and numerically assess the goodness-of-fit for some commonly used ROC regression models, and show how specific components of these models can be examined within this framework. We derive asymptotic null distributions for the residual process and discuss resampling procedures to approximate these distributions in practice. We illustrate our methods with a dataset from the Cystic Fibrosis registry.

Formal analysis of human-computer interaction using model checking

Experiments with simulators allow psychologists to better understand the causes of human errors and build models of cognitive processes to be used in human reliability assessment (HRA). This paper investigates an approach to task failure analysis based on patterns of behaviour, by contrast to more traditional event-based approaches. It considers, as a case study, a formal model of an air traffic control (ATC) system which incorporates controller behaviour. The cognitive model is formalised in the CSP process algebra. Patterns of behaviour are expressed as temporal logic properties. Then a model-checking technique is used to verify whether the decomposition of the operator's behaviour into patterns is sound and complete with respect to the cognitive model. The decomposition is shown to be incomplete and a new behavioural pattern is identified, which appears to have been overlooked in the analysis of the data provided by the experiments with the simulator. This illustrates how formal analysis of operator models can yield fresh insights into how failures may arise in interactive systems.