Applicant Reference Guide For Individuals Filing For Unemployment Insurance Benefits

This guide gives important information about how to receive unemployment benefits. Topics include: Privacy Act, Equal Opportunity Statement, Income and Eligibility Verification Notice, Unemployment Insurance Benefits, Eligibility requirements, Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees, Employment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers,School Worker Claims, Pension Reduction, Official Court Appearances and Benefit eligibility, Benefits are Based on Wages Paid, Initial Determination, Benefit Year, Waiting Period, Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount, To Establish a Weekly Benefit Amount, Disqualification, Fraudulent claims, Requests for Reconsideration, Appeal Provisions, Standard and Alternate Base Period Explained, Partial Employment,Self-Employment, Students, Interstate Benefits, Benefits Will Be Taxable, Individual Benefits, Filing Your Weekly Claim, Filing Your Weekly Claim Online,Filing Your Weekly Claim by TelClaim and New Hires.

How do different entitlements to unemployment benefits affect the transitions from unemployment into employment?

In Portugal duration of benefits is exclusively age determined while replacement rates are essentially uniform. We exploit differences in potential maximum duration of benefits for nearly matched pairs of individuals to determine the effects of benefit duration on job finding. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Unemployment Benefits and Reservation Wages: Key Elasticities from a Stripped-Down Job Search Approach

This paper exploits survey information on reservation wages and data on actual wages from the European Community Household Panel to deduce, in the manner of Lancaster and Chesher, additional parameters of a stylized structural search model; specifically, reservation wage and transition/duration elasticities. The informational requirements of this approach are minimal, thereby facilitating comparisons between countries. Further, its policy content is immediate in so far as the impact of unemployment benefit rules and measures increasing the arrival rate of job offers are concerned. These key elasticities are computed for the United Kingdom and 11 other European nations.

Preliminary analysis of extended benefits /

WI docs no.: EMP 1.6/2:TEC/1961/2

Unemployment benefits and family finances : a study of income and expenditures of beneficiaries and their families in Utica, New York, 1958 : report of findings from a survey conducted /

Sponsored by New York State Dept. of Labor, Division of Employment.

Financing unemployment benefits : summary of proceedings of the Council's first conference on employment security objectives, July 25-26, 1962.

Mode of access: Internet.

The long-range financing of unemployment benefits under state unemployment compensation laws. A report to the Interstate conference of employment security agencies...

Paul A. Raushenbush, chairman.

Partial unemployment; administrative studies of unemployment insurance and of the interrelation of partial and total unemployment benefits including reports submitted by the industrial commissioner to the Legislature during the 1939 and 1940 sessions. Bureau of research and statistics, Meredith B. Givine, director. Division of placement and unemployment insurance, Milton O. Loysen, executive director.

Part II also issued separately.

An exploratory memorandum on partial unemployment benefits in the state unemployment compensation systems,

Mode of access: Internet.

Material relating to adjustment assistance for workers.

At head of title: 93d Congress, 1st session. Committee print. Briefing paper no. 5.

In the matter of United Steelworkers of America-CIO and various steel and iron ore companies : case no. D-18-C, appendix to a guaranteed wage plan for the workers in the steel industry /

"Union exhibit no. 11A"--Cover.

Benefits and drawbacks of European Unemployment Insurance. Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/06, September 2014

The issue: Unemployment in Europe has increased to high levels and economic growth has remained subdued. A debate on additional policy instruments to address the situation is therefore warranted. Fiscal stabilisation mechanisms have not provided adequate fiscal stabilisation during the crisis in some countries nor in the euro area as a whole. Different preferences and historical developments mean that national labour markets are differently organised, which sometimes hinders the efficient working of the monetary union. European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) has been proposed as a measure to contribute to fiscal policy management and improve labour markets. | Read more at Bruegel http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/847-benefits-and-drawbacks-of-european-unemployment-insurance/

Institutional Moral Hazard in the Multi-tiered Regulation of Unemployment and Social Assistance Benefits. CEPS Special Report No. 137/April 2016 Wednesday, 27 April 2016

This paper studies eight countries in which the regulation of unemployment benefits and related benefits and the concomitant activation of unemployed individuals has a multi-tiered architecture. It assesses their experiences and tries to understand possible problems of ‘institutional moral hazard’ that may emerge in the context of a hypothetical European Unemployment Benefit Scheme.

How Does the Unemployment Insurance System Shape the Time Profile of Jobless Duration?

This paper updates a sparse literature on the effects of unemployment benefits (UB) on the time profile of escape rates from unemployment. These effects, as well as those of other regressors, are found to vary profoundly over the course of unemployment.

Six ways to leave unemployment

This paper uses a unique Portuguese dataset to examine the effect of access to unemployment benefits (UBs) and their maximum potential duration on escape rates from unemployment. In examining the time profile of transitions out of unemployment, the principal contributions of the paper are twofold. First, it provides a detailed state space of potential outcomes: open-ended employment, fixed-term contracts, part-time work, government-provided jobs, self employment, and labour force withdrawal. Second, it is able to exploit major exogenous discontinuities in the maximum duration of unemployment benefits to identify disincentive effects. While confirming strong disincentive effects, it is shown that use of an aggregate hazard function regression model compounds very different and even contradictory effects of the determinants of unemployment.