968 resultados para Structural adjustment (Economic policy)
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"February 1, 1991."
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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2nd annual report. The Economic Policy Committee (EPC) is made up of representatives of the Member States and contributes to the work of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Council as regards the coordination of Member State and Community economic policies. The EPC also provides the Commission and the Council with advice in this area, focusing particularly on structural reforms.
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This thesis compares the foreign economic poUcy dimension of the development strategies adopted by the governments of two Commonwealth caribbean countries: The Hardey government In Jamaica, and the· Williams government in Trlnidad and T ooago, The foreign economic policIes adopted by these governments appeared, on the surface~ to be markedly dissimilar. The Jamakan strategv on the one hand, emphasised self-reliance and national autonomy; and featured the espousal of radical oonaHgnment together with attempts to re-deftne the terms of the Islands externaa economIc relaUoos. The Trinidadian strategy 00 the other hand, featured Uberal externaUy-oriented growth poUctes, and close relatjoos with Western governments and financial institutions. Th1s study attempts to identify the explanatory factors that account for the apparent dlssimUarUy 1n the foreign economic policies of these two govemnents. The study is based on a comparison of how the structural bases of an underdeveloped ecooomYg and the foreign penetration and vulnerabUUy to external pressures asSOCiated wUh dependence, shape and influence foreign economic poUcy strategy. The framework views fore1gn ecooom1c strategy as an adaptive response on the part of the decision makers of a state to the coostralnts and opportunities provided by a particular situation. The · situat i 00' in this case being the events, conditions, structures and processes, associated wUh dependente and underdevelopment. The results indicate that the similarities and dissimHarities in the foreign economic policies of the governments of Jamaica and Trinidad were a reflecUon of the simHarities and dissimilarities in their respective situations. The conclusion derived suggests that If the foreign pol1cy field as an arena of choice, Is indeed one of opportunities and constraints for each and every state, then poHcy makers of smaU, weak, hlghW penetrated and vulnerable states enter thlS arena with constraints outweighing opportunities. This places effective limits 00 their decisional latitude and the range of policy options avaUable. Policy makers thus have to decide critical issues with few estabUshed precedents, in the face of domestic social and political cleavages, as wen as serious foreign pressures. This is a reflection not only of the trappings of dependence, but also of the Umned capabilities arising from the sman size of the state, and the Impact of the resource-gap In an underdeveloped economy. The Trinidadian strategy 1s UlustraUve of a development strategy made viable through a combination of a fortuitous circumstance, a confluence of the interests of influential groups» and accurate perception on the part of poUcy makers. These factors enabled policy makers to minimise some of the constraints of dependence. The faUure of Manlets strategy on the other hand, 15 iHustraUve of the problems involved tn the adoption of poUcles that work against the interest of internal and external political and economic forces. It is also tUustraUve of the consequences of the faUure 00 the part of policy makers to clarify goals, and to reconcile the values of rapid economic growth with increased self-reliance and national autonomy. These values tend to be mutuany Incompatible given the existing patterns of relations in the jnternational economy.
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The initial ‘framing’ (in the summer of 2012) of the ‘genuine EMU’ for the wider public suggested to design an entire series of ‘unions’. So many ‘unions’ are neither necessary nor desirable – only some are and their design matters. The paper critically discusses first the negative fall-out of the crisis for EMU, and subsequently assesses the fiscal and the banking unions as accomplished so far, without going into highly specific technical details. The assessment is moderately positive, although there is ample scope for further improvement and a risk for short-term turbulence once the ECB has finished its tests and reviews. What about the parade of other ’unions’ such as economic union, social union and political union? The macro-economic imbalances procedure (MIP) and possibly the ESRB have overcome the pre-crisis disregard of macro competitiveness. The three components of ‘economic union’ (single market, economic policy coordination and budgetary disciplines) have all been strengthened. The last two ‘unions’, on the other hand, would imply a fundamental change in the conferral of powers to the EU/ Eurozone, with drastic and possibly very serious long-run implications, including a break-up of the Union, if such proposals would be pushed through. The cure is worse than the disease. Whereas social union is perhaps easier to dismiss as a ‘misfit’ in the EU, the recent popularity of suggesting a ‘political union’ is seen as worrisome. Probably, nobody knows what a ‘political union’ is, or, at best, it is a highly elastic notion: it might be thought necessary for reasons of domestic economic reforms in EU countries, for a larger common budget, for some EU tax power, for (greater) risk pooling, for ‘symmetric’ macro-economic adjustment and for some ultimate control of the ECB in times of crisis. Taking each one of these arguments separately, a range of more typical EU solutions might be found without suggesting a ‘political union’. Just as ‘fiscal capacity’ was long an all-or-nothing taboo for shifting bank resolution to the EU level, now solved with a modest common Fund and carefully confined but centralised powers, the author suggests that other carefully targeted responses can be designed for the various aspects where seen as indispensable, including the political say of a lender-of-last-resort function of the ECB. Hence, neither a social nor a political union worthy of the name ought to be pursued. Yet, political legitimacy matters, both with national parliaments and the grassroots. National parliaments will have to play a larger role.
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The reduction of Greek sovereign debt by €106 billion, agreed in the second bailout package of February 2012, is the largest in history. Nevertheless, immediately after publishing the key terms of the package, doubts arose whether it would achieve its goals: to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to 120.5% in 2020 and to ensure the return of Greece to market financing by 2015. This Briefing gives a timely input to the debate as it develops an analytical framework through which the expected failure of the Greek debt reduction can be assessed. It surveys the economic literature to identify three groups of factors reducing the effectiveness of sovereign debt restructuring: (1) sovereign’s fundamentals, (2) inefficiencies inherent in the restructuring process and (3) costs of restructuring; and applies them to the case of Greece. Based on this analysis, three policy implications are formulated, with relevance to Greece and the wider eurozone. Firstly, the importance of increased policy effort by Greece to enact current structural and growth-enhancing reforms is underlined. Secondly, the introduction of uniform CACs is proposed that will reduce the market participants’ uncertainty, discipline the runs on government debt and address the holdout inefficiency. Finally, sovereign debt restructuring is not recommended as a universal solution for over- indebtedness in the EU, given the direct and reputation costs of sovereign debt restructuring and the self-fulfilling nature of sovereign debt crises.