Arms control : Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty implementation : report to the chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate /

"B-241519."

Oversight of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and the federal drug strategy [microform] : hearing before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, first session, December 8, 1987.

"SCNAC-100-1-19."

Catches of Humpback Whales, Megaptera novaeangliae, by the Soviet Union and Other Nations in the Southern Ocean, 1947–1973

From 1947 to 1973, the U.S.S.R. conducted a huge campaign of illegal whaling worldwide. We review Soviet catches of humpback whales, Megaptera novaeangliae, in the Southern Ocean during this period, with an emphasis on the International Whaling Commission’s Antarctic Management Areas IV, V, and VI (the principal regions of illegal Soviet whaling on this species, south of Australia and western Oceania). Where possible, we summarize legal and illegal Soviet catches by year, Management Area, and factory fleet, and also include information on takes by other nations. Soviet humpback catches between 1947 and 1973 totaled 48,702 and break down as follows: 649 (Area I), 1,412 (Area II), 921 (Area III), 8,779 (Area IV), 22,569 (Area V), and 7,195 (Area VI), with 7,177 catches not currently assignable to area. In all, at least 72,542 humpback whales were killed by all operations (Soviet plus other nations) after World War II in Areas IV (27,201), V (38,146), and VI (7,195). More than one-third of these (25,474 whales, of which 25,192 came from Areas V and VI) were taken in just two seasons, 1959–60 and 1960–61. The impact of these takes, and of those from Area IV in the late 1950’s, is evident in the sometimes dramatic declines in catches at shore stations in Australia, New Zealand, and at Norfolk Island. When compared to recent estimates of abundance and initial population size, the large removals from Areas IV and V indicate that the populations in these regions remain well below pre-exploitation levels despite reported strong growth rates off eastern and western Australia. Populations in many areas of Oceania continue to be small, indicating that the catches from Area VI and eastern Area V had long-term impacts on recovery.

The Global Plankton Database: an inventory and data from the Former Soviet Union expeditions

At present time, there is a lack of knowledge on the interannual climate-related variability of zooplankton communities of the tropical Atlantic, central Mediterranean Sea, Caspian Sea, and Aral Sea, due to the absence of appropriate databases. In the mid latitudes, the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) is the dominant mode of atmospheric fluctuations over eastern North America, the northern Atlantic Ocean and Europe. Therefore, one of the issues that need to be addressed through data synthesis is the evaluation of interannual patterns in species abundance and species diversity over these regions in regard to the NAO. The database has been used to investigate the ecological role of the NAO in interannual variations of mesozooplankton abundance and biomass along the zonal array of the NAO influence. Basic approach to the proposed research involved: (1) development of co-operation between experts and data holders in Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, UK, and USA to rescue and compile the oceanographic data sets and release them on CD-ROM, (2) organization and compilation of a database based on FSU cruises to the above regions, (3) analysis of the basin-scale interannual variability of the zooplankton species abundance, biomass, and species diversity.

Former Soviet Union : information on U.S. bilateral program funding : report to Congressional committees /

"B-265948"--P. 1.

Former Soviet Union : an update on coordination of U.S. assistance and economic cooperation programs : report to Congressional committees /

"B-270020"--P. 1.

Conference report : International Conference on Destination Branding and Marketing for Regional Tourism Development. December 8-10 2005. Macau.

It has been over 50 years since the topic of branding first appeared in the marketing literature. Research relating to destination branding has however emerged only since the late 1990s, with the first journal article published in 1998 (see Pritchard & Morgan, 1998) and the first book published in 2002 (see Morgan, Pritchard, & Pride, 2002). While a growing number of academic tourism conferences have focused on ‘destination marketing’ as a theme during the past decade (for a list of proceedings see Pike, 2004), Gnoth (1998) claimed the special track he convened at the 1997 American Marketing Science conference, represented the first meeting of practitioners and academics on the topic of destination branding. The initiative of Macau's Instituto De Formacao Turistica (IFT), in conjunction with Perdue University, to convene the first conference on destination branding, was thus new territory and a test of academic interest in the topic. Ultimately the decision was justified with around 100 delegates from 22 countries, including destination branding pioneers Pritchard & Morgan, travelling to the inaugural meeting...

The Soviet Union, Finland and the Cold War : The Finnish Card in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1956-1959

From the Soviet point of view the actual substance of Soviet-Finnish relations in the second half of 1950s clearly differed from the contemporary and later public image, based on friendship and confidence rhetoric. As the polarization between the right and the left became more underlined in Finland in the latter half of the 1950s, the criticism towards the Soviet Union became stronger, and the USSR feared that this development would have influence on Finnish foreign policy. From the Soviet point of view, the security commitments of FCMA-treaty needed additional guarantees through control of Finnish domestic politics and economic relations, especially during international crises. In relation to Scandinavia, Finland was, from the Soviet point of view, the model country of friendship or neutrality policy. The influence of the Second Berlin Crisis or the Soviet-Finnish Night Frost Crisis in 1958-1959 to Soviet policy towards Scandinavia needs to be observed from this point of view. The Soviet Union used Finland as a tool, in agreement with Finnish highest political leadership, for weakening of the NATO membership of Norway and Denmark, and for maintaining Swedish non-alliance. The Finnish interest to EFTA membership in the summer of 1959, at the same time with the Scandinavian countries, seems to have caused a panic reaction in the USSR, as the Soviets feared that these economic arrangements would reverse the political advantages the country had received in Finland after the Night Frost Crisis. Together with history of events, this study observes the interaction of practical interests and ideologies, both in individuals and in decision-making organizations. The necessary social and ideological reforms in the Soviet Union after 1956 had influence both on the legitimacy of the regime, and led to contradictions in the argumentation of Soviet foreign policy. This was observed both in the own camp as well as in the West. Also, in Finland a breakthrough took place in the late 1950's: as the so-called counter reaction lost to the K-line, "a special relationship" developed with the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the Night Frost Crisis the Soviet relationship became a factor decisively defining the limits of domestic politics in Finland, a part of Finnish domestic political argumentation. Understood from this basis, finlandization is not, even from the viewpoint of international relations, a special case, but a domestic political culture formed by the relationship between a dominant state, a superpower, and a subordinate state, Finland.

The Soviet Union and the International Brigades, 1936-1939

The International Brigades are typically viewed as a fighting force whose impetus came from the Comintern, and thus from within the walls of the Kremlin. If the assumption is essentially correct, the broader relation between Stalin’s USSR and the IB has received little attention. This chapter constitutes an empirically-based study of the Soviet role not only in the formation of the IB, but of the Red Army’s collaboration with IB units, and Moscow’s role in the climax and denouement of the brigadistas’ Spanish experience. This study’s principal conclusion is twofold: First, that the creation and sustenance of the IB was part of Stalin’s goal of linking the Loyalist cause with that of the Soviet Union and international communism, a component of a larger geo-strategic gamble which sought to create united opposition to the fascist menace, one which might eventually bring Moscow and the West into a closer alliance. The second conclusion is that the IB, like the broader projection of Soviet power and influence into the Spanish theater, was an overly ambitious operational failure whose abortive retreat is indicative of the basic weakness of the Stalinist regime in the years prior to the Second World War.