The British Intervention in South Russia 1918-1920

Soon after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, a three-year civil war broke out in Russia. As in many other civil wars, foreign powers intervened in the conflict. Britain played a leading role in this intervention and had a significant effect on the course of the war. Without this intervention on the White side, the superiority of numbers in manpower and weaponry of the Bolsheviks would have quickly overwhelmed their opponents. The aim of this dissertation is to explain the nature and role of the British intervention on the southern, and most decisive, front of the Civil War. The political decision making in London is studied as a background, but the focus of the dissertation is on the actual implementation of the British policy in Russia. The British military mission arrived in South Russia in late 1918, and started to provide General Denikin s White army with ample supplies. General Denikin would have not been able to build his army of more than 200,000 men or to make his operation against Moscow without the British matériel. The British mission also organized the training and equipping of the Russian troops with British weapons. This made the material aid much more effective. Many of the British instructors took part in fighting the Bolsheviks despite the orders of their government. The study is based on primary sources produced by British departments of state and members of the British mission and military units in South Russia. Primary sources from the Whites, including the personal collections of several key figures of the White movement and official records of the Armed Forces of South Russia are also used to give a balanced picture of the course of events. It is possible to draw some general conclusions from the White movement and reasons for their defeat from the study of the British intervention. In purely material terms the British aid placed Denikin s army in a far more favourable position than the Bolsheviks in 1919, but other military defects in the White army were numerous. The White commanders were unimaginative, their military thinking was obsolete, and they were incapable of organizing the logistics of their army. There were also fundamental defects in the morale of the White troops. In addition to all political mistakes of Denikin s movement and a general inability to adjust to the complex situation in Revolutionary Russia, the Whites suffered a clear military defeat. In South Russia the Whites were defeated not because of the lack of British aid, but rather in spite of it.

Stalin and the Soviet Union : the USSR 1924-1953.

Los años 1924-1953 estuvieron dominados por la figura de Stalin, el culto a su figura y su lucha por el poder en el Partido Comunista. Se describen los planes quinquenales de desarrollo de la economía soviética, así como las purgas y los juicios de la década de 1930. Por último, se examina la manera en que la URSS reaccionó a la amenaza de los países capitalistas durante los años 1920 y 1930 y en la forma en que luchó por la supervivencia contra la Alemania nazi durante la segunda guerra mundial.Incluye fragmentos de fuentes históricas originales, así como, material de aprendizaje activo: ejercicios, preguntas, y pruebas.

Russia and the Soviet Union, a modern history.

Mode of access: Internet.

The Soviet Union, Finland and the Cold War : The Finnish Card in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1956-1959

From the Soviet point of view the actual substance of Soviet-Finnish relations in the second half of 1950s clearly differed from the contemporary and later public image, based on friendship and confidence rhetoric. As the polarization between the right and the left became more underlined in Finland in the latter half of the 1950s, the criticism towards the Soviet Union became stronger, and the USSR feared that this development would have influence on Finnish foreign policy. From the Soviet point of view, the security commitments of FCMA-treaty needed additional guarantees through control of Finnish domestic politics and economic relations, especially during international crises. In relation to Scandinavia, Finland was, from the Soviet point of view, the model country of friendship or neutrality policy. The influence of the Second Berlin Crisis or the Soviet-Finnish Night Frost Crisis in 1958-1959 to Soviet policy towards Scandinavia needs to be observed from this point of view. The Soviet Union used Finland as a tool, in agreement with Finnish highest political leadership, for weakening of the NATO membership of Norway and Denmark, and for maintaining Swedish non-alliance. The Finnish interest to EFTA membership in the summer of 1959, at the same time with the Scandinavian countries, seems to have caused a panic reaction in the USSR, as the Soviets feared that these economic arrangements would reverse the political advantages the country had received in Finland after the Night Frost Crisis. Together with history of events, this study observes the interaction of practical interests and ideologies, both in individuals and in decision-making organizations. The necessary social and ideological reforms in the Soviet Union after 1956 had influence both on the legitimacy of the regime, and led to contradictions in the argumentation of Soviet foreign policy. This was observed both in the own camp as well as in the West. Also, in Finland a breakthrough took place in the late 1950's: as the so-called counter reaction lost to the K-line, "a special relationship" developed with the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the Night Frost Crisis the Soviet relationship became a factor decisively defining the limits of domestic politics in Finland, a part of Finnish domestic political argumentation. Understood from this basis, finlandization is not, even from the viewpoint of international relations, a special case, but a domestic political culture formed by the relationship between a dominant state, a superpower, and a subordinate state, Finland.

Conservatism and Revolution: The All-Russian Union of Landowners, 1916-1918

Rendle, Matthew, 'Conservatism and Revolution: The All-Russian Union of Landowners, 1916-1918', Slavonic and East European Review (2006) 84(3) pp.481-507 RAE2008

Russia and the western world; the place of the Soviet union in the comity of nations,

"First printing."

The civil war of ideas: Ayn Rand, intellectual freedom, and the regulation of thought in the Soviet Union and United States, 1905-1943

The philosopher and novelist Ayn Rand (1905–1982) is an icon of American culture. That culture misunderstands her, however. It perceives her solely as a pure market conservative. In the first forty years of her life, Rand's individualism was intellectual and served as a defense for the free trade of ideas. It originated in the Russian Revolution. In 1926, when Rand left the Soviet Union, she developed her individualism into an American philosophy. Her ideas of the individual in society belonged to a debate where intellectuals intended to abolish the State and free man and woman from its intellectual snares. To present Rand as a freethinker allows me to examine her anticommunism as a reaction against Leninism and to consider the relation of her ideas to Marxism. This approach stresses that Rand, as Marx, opposed the State and argued for the historical importance of a capitalist revolution. For Rand the latter, however, depended on an entrepreneurial class that rejected Protestantism as ideology – which she contended threatened its interests because Christianity had lost its historical significance. This exposes the nature of Rand's intellectual individualism in American society, where the majority on the entire political spectrum still identified with the teachings of Christ. It also reveals the dynamics of her anticommunism. From 1926 to 1943, Rand remodeled American individualism and as she did so, she determined her opposition first to the New Deal liberals and second business conservatives. To these ends, Marxism and Protestantism served Rand's individualism and made her an American icon of the twentieth century.

Catches of Humpback Whales, Megaptera novaeangliae, by the Soviet Union and Other Nations in the Southern Ocean, 1947–1973

From 1947 to 1973, the U.S.S.R. conducted a huge campaign of illegal whaling worldwide. We review Soviet catches of humpback whales, Megaptera novaeangliae, in the Southern Ocean during this period, with an emphasis on the International Whaling Commission’s Antarctic Management Areas IV, V, and VI (the principal regions of illegal Soviet whaling on this species, south of Australia and western Oceania). Where possible, we summarize legal and illegal Soviet catches by year, Management Area, and factory fleet, and also include information on takes by other nations. Soviet humpback catches between 1947 and 1973 totaled 48,702 and break down as follows: 649 (Area I), 1,412 (Area II), 921 (Area III), 8,779 (Area IV), 22,569 (Area V), and 7,195 (Area VI), with 7,177 catches not currently assignable to area. In all, at least 72,542 humpback whales were killed by all operations (Soviet plus other nations) after World War II in Areas IV (27,201), V (38,146), and VI (7,195). More than one-third of these (25,474 whales, of which 25,192 came from Areas V and VI) were taken in just two seasons, 1959–60 and 1960–61. The impact of these takes, and of those from Area IV in the late 1950’s, is evident in the sometimes dramatic declines in catches at shore stations in Australia, New Zealand, and at Norfolk Island. When compared to recent estimates of abundance and initial population size, the large removals from Areas IV and V indicate that the populations in these regions remain well below pre-exploitation levels despite reported strong growth rates off eastern and western Australia. Populations in many areas of Oceania continue to be small, indicating that the catches from Area VI and eastern Area V had long-term impacts on recovery.