The Soviet Union, Finland and the Cold War : The Finnish Card in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1956-1959

From the Soviet point of view the actual substance of Soviet-Finnish relations in the second half of 1950s clearly differed from the contemporary and later public image, based on friendship and confidence rhetoric. As the polarization between the right and the left became more underlined in Finland in the latter half of the 1950s, the criticism towards the Soviet Union became stronger, and the USSR feared that this development would have influence on Finnish foreign policy. From the Soviet point of view, the security commitments of FCMA-treaty needed additional guarantees through control of Finnish domestic politics and economic relations, especially during international crises. In relation to Scandinavia, Finland was, from the Soviet point of view, the model country of friendship or neutrality policy. The influence of the Second Berlin Crisis or the Soviet-Finnish Night Frost Crisis in 1958-1959 to Soviet policy towards Scandinavia needs to be observed from this point of view. The Soviet Union used Finland as a tool, in agreement with Finnish highest political leadership, for weakening of the NATO membership of Norway and Denmark, and for maintaining Swedish non-alliance. The Finnish interest to EFTA membership in the summer of 1959, at the same time with the Scandinavian countries, seems to have caused a panic reaction in the USSR, as the Soviets feared that these economic arrangements would reverse the political advantages the country had received in Finland after the Night Frost Crisis. Together with history of events, this study observes the interaction of practical interests and ideologies, both in individuals and in decision-making organizations. The necessary social and ideological reforms in the Soviet Union after 1956 had influence both on the legitimacy of the regime, and led to contradictions in the argumentation of Soviet foreign policy. This was observed both in the own camp as well as in the West. Also, in Finland a breakthrough took place in the late 1950's: as the so-called counter reaction lost to the K-line, "a special relationship" developed with the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the Night Frost Crisis the Soviet relationship became a factor decisively defining the limits of domestic politics in Finland, a part of Finnish domestic political argumentation. Understood from this basis, finlandization is not, even from the viewpoint of international relations, a special case, but a domestic political culture formed by the relationship between a dominant state, a superpower, and a subordinate state, Finland.

Socialist Realism instead of Formalism : the Formation and Development of the Soviet Music Control System 1932-1950

Whereas it has been widely assumed in the public that the Soviet music policy system had a “top-down” structure of control and command that directly affected musical creativity, in fact my research shows that the relations between the different levels of the music policy system were vague, and the viewpoints of its representatives differed from each other. Because the representatives of the party and government organs controlling operas could not define which kind of music represented Socialist Realism, the system as it developed during the 1930s and 1940s did not function effectively enough in order to create such a centralised control of Soviet music, still less could Soviet operas fulfil the highly ambiguous aesthetics of Socialist Realism. I show that musical discussions developed as bureaucratic ritualistic arenas, where it became more important to reveal the heretical composers, making scapegoats of them, and requiring them to perform self-criticism, than to give directions on how to reach the artistic goals of Socialist Realism. When one opera was found to be unacceptable, this lead to a strengthening of control by the party leadership, which lead to more operas, one after the other, to be revealed as failures. I have studied the control of the composition, staging and reception of the opera case-studies, which remain obscure in the West despite a growing scholarly interest in them, and have created a detailed picture of the foundation and development of the Soviet music control system in 1932-1950. My detailed discussion of such case-studies as Ivan Dzerzhinskii’s The Quiet Don, Dmitrii Shostakovich’s Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk District, Vano Muradeli’s The Great Friendship, Sergei Prokofiev’s Story of a Real Man, Tikhon Khrennikov’s Frol Skobeev and Evgenii Zhukovskii’s From All One’s Heart backs with documentary precision the historically revisionist model of the development of Soviet music. In February 1948, composers belonging to the elite of the Union of Soviet Composers, e.g. Dmitri Shostakovich and Sergei Prokofiev, were accused in a Central Committee Resolution of formalism, as been under the influence of western modernism. Accusations of formalism were connected to the criticism of the conciderable financial, material and social privileges these composers enjoyed in the leadership of the Union. With my new archival findings I give a more detailed picture of the financial background for the 1948 campaign. The independent position of the music funding organization of the Union of Soviet Composers (Muzfond) to decide on its finances was an exceptional phenomenon in the Soviet Union and contradicted the strivings to strengthen the control of Soviet music. The financial audits of the Union of Soviet Composers did not, however, change the elite status of some of its composers, except for maybe a short duration in some cases. At the same time the independence of the significal financial authorities of Soviet theatres was restricted. The cuts in the governmental funding allocated to Soviet theatres contradicted the intensified ideological demands for Soviet operas.

Elite Bargaining and the Evolution of Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Russia : A Comparative Analysis

This work is concerned with presenting a modified theoretical approach to the study of centre-periphery relations in the Russian Federation. In the widely accepted scientific discourse, the Russian federal system under the Yeltsin Administration (1991-2000) was asymmetrical; largely owing to the varying amount of structural autonomy distributed among the federation s 89 constituent units. While providing an improved understanding as to which political and socio-economic structures contributed to federal asymmetry, it is felt that associated large N-studies have underemphasised the role played by actor agency in re-shaping Russian federal institutions. It is the main task of this thesis to reintroduce /re-emphasise the importance of actor agency as a major contributing element of institutional change in the Russian federal system. By focusing on the strategic agency of regional elites simultaneously within regional and federal contexts, the thesis adopts the position that political, ethnic and socio-economic structural factors alone cannot fully determine the extent to which regional leaders were successful in their pursuit of economic and political pay-offs from the institutionally weakened federal centre. Furthermore, this work hypothesises that under conditions of federal institutional uncertainty, it is the ability of regional leaders to simultaneously interpret various mutable structural conditions then translate them into plausible strategies which accounts for the regions ability to extract variable amounts of economic and political pay-offs from the Russian federal system. The thesis finds that while the hypothesis is accurate in its theoretical assumptions, several key conclusions provide paths for further inquiry posed by the initial research question. First, without reliable information or stable institutions to guide their actions, both regional and federal elites were forced into ad-hoc decision-making in order to maintain their core strategic focus: political survival. Second, instead of attributing asymmetry to either actor agency or structural factors exclusively, the empirical data shows that both agency and structures interact symbiotically in the strategic formulation process, thus accounting for the sub-optimal nature of several of the actions taken in the adopted cases. Third, as actor agency and structural factors mutate over time, so, too do the perceived payoffs from elite competition. In the case of the Russian federal system, the stronger the federal centre became, the less likely it was that regional leaders could extract the high degree of economic and political pay-offs that they clamoured for earlier in the Yeltsin period. Finally, traditional approaches to the study of federal systems which focus on institutions as measures of federalism are not fully applicable in the Russian case precisely because the institutions themselves were a secondary point of contention between competing elites. Institutional equilibriums between the regions and Moscow were struck only when highly personalised elite preferences were satisfied. Therefore the Russian federal system is the product of short-term, institutional solutions suited to elite survival strategies developed under conditions of economic, political and social uncertainty.

Peeking through the Iron Curtain: Memories of Watching Finnish Television in Estonia during Soviet Occupation

The present study analyses the memories of watching Finnish television in Estonia during the last decades of the Soviet occupation from the late 1960s until the beginning of 1990s. The study stems from a culturalist approach, perceiving television as a relevant aspect in the audiences’ everyday lives. It explores the significance of Finnish television on the society of occupied Estonia from the point of view of its historical audiences. The literature review concentrates on concepts such as the power of television, transnational media, historical audience reception and memory as an object of research. It also explains the concept of spillover, which refers to the unintentional bilateral flow of television signals from one country to another. Despite the numerous efforts of the Soviet authorities to prevent the viewing of the "bourgeois television", there still remained a small gap in the Iron Curtain. The study describes the phenomenon of watching Finnish television in Estonia. It provides understanding about the significance of watching Finnish television in Soviet Estonia through the experiences of its former audience. In addition, it explores what do people remember about watching Finnish television, and why. The empirical data was acquired from peoples’ personal memories through the analysis of private interviews and written responses during the period from February 2010 to February 2011. A total of 85 responses (5 interviews and 83 written responses) were analysed. The research employed the methods of oral history and memory studies. The main theoretical sources of the study include the works of Mati Graf and Heikki Roiko-Jokela, Hagi Šein, Sonia Livingstone, Janet Staiger and Emily Keightley. The study concludes that besides fulfilling the role of an entertainer and an informer, Finnish television enabled its Estonian audiences to gain entry into the imaginary world. Access to this imaginary world was so important, that the viewers engaged in illegal activities and gained special skills, whereby a phenomenon of "television tourism" developed. Most of the memories about Finnish television are vivid and similar. The latter indicates both the reliability and the collectiveness of such memories, which in return give shape to collective identities. Thus, for the Estonian viewers, the experience of watching Finnish television during the Soviet occupation has became part of their identity.

Soviet-American Cooperative Research on Marine Mammals. Volume 1- Pinnipeds: Under Project V.6. Marine Mammals, of the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection

Some 25 to 30 yr ago, when we as students were beginning our respective careers and were developing for the first time our awareness of marine mammals in the waters separating western North America from eastern Asia, we had visions of eventually bridging the communication gap which existed between our two countries at that time. Each of us was anxious to obtain information on the distribution, biology, and ecological relations of "our" seals and walruses on "the other side," beyond our respective political boundari~s where we were not permitted to go to study them. We were concerned that the resource management practices on the other side of the Bering and Chukchi Seas, implemented in isolation, on a purely unilateral basis, might endanger the species which we had come to know and were striving to conserve. At once apparent to both of us was the need for free exchange of biological information between our two countries and, ultimately, joint management of our shared resources. In a small way, we and others made some initial efforts to generate that exchange by personal correspondence and through vocal interchange at the annual meetings of the North Pacific Fur Seal Commission. By the enabling Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, reached between our two countries in 1972, our earlier visions at last came true. Since that time, within the framework of the Marine Mammal Project under Area V of that Agreement, we and our colleagues have forged a strong bond of professional accord and respect, in an atmosphere of free intercommunication and mutual understanding. The strength and utility of this arrangement from the beginning of our joint research are reflected in the reports contained in this, the first compendium of our work. The need for a series of such a compendia became apparent to us in 1976, and its implementation was agreed on by the regular meeting of the Project in La Jolla, Calif., in January 1977. Obviously, the preparation and publication of this first volume has been excessively delayed, in part by continuing political distrust between our governments but mainly by increasing demands placed on the time of the contributors. In this period of growing environmental concern in both countries, we and our colleagues have been totally immersed in other tasks and have experienced great difficulty in drawing together the works presented here. Much of the support for doing so was provided by the State of Alaska, through funding for Organized Research at the University of Alaska-Fairbanks. For its ultimate completion in publishable form we wish to thank Helen Stockholm, Director of Publications, Institute of Marine Science, University of Alaska, and her staff, especially Ruth Hand, and the numerous referees narned herein who gave willingly oftheir time to review each ofthe manuscripts critically and to provide a high measure of professionalism to the final product. (PDF file contains 110 pages.)

On distribution of pollen in lakes. [Translation from: Palynology in geological research in the Baltic Soviet Republics p113-119. Vilnius, 1973.]

Systematic investigations of the distribution of pollen in stationary water bodies until now have hardly been conducted. For clarification of the problem of how the pollen of different plants which falls into a lake is deposited in relation to its physical properties, the character of the lake, wind currents and other factors, pollen analyses were carried out of surface samples of the bottom sediments of 13 Lithuanian lakes. Lakes were selected of different sizes (areas from 2333 ha. to 8 ha.) and different depths, not uniformly overgrown, situated in different physico-geographic regions of Lithuania. As a result of the investigation, it was established that in the surface layer of the sediments of the lakes of Lithuania pollen of woody species predominates.

Joint Anglo-Soviet biological surveillance exercise on River Dnieper

As one part of an on-going programme concerned with environmental protection as provided for under the terms of a UK/USSR Joint Environmental Protection Agreement signed in London, 21 May 1974, a seminar — ”The elaboration of the scientific basis for monitoring the quality of surface water by hydrobiological indices” was held at Valdai in Russia 12—14 July, 1976. As a continuation of this theme it was agreed that delegations of hydrobiologists from each side should carry out reciprocal visits to carry out comparative field tests on selected systems of biological surveillance in use in the respective countries. In May 1978 a team of British hydrobiologists visited the USSR, under the auspices of the Department of Environment, to carry out joint exercises on the River Dnieper and some tributaries. This paper reports the results of selected methods used by the British side when applied to the conditions found in the River Dnieper.

Comparison of systems of biological indication approved during the course of the joint Anglo-Soviet investigations held under the auspices of the Institute of Hydrobiology of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR

In accordance with the plan for joint Anglo-Soviet scientific and technical collaboration on environmental problems, the comparative evaluation of systems of hydrobiological analysis of the surface water quality started in 1977 at the Regional Laboratory of the Severn-Trent Water Authority in Nottingham were continued in the spring of 1978. The investigations were carried out under the auspices of the Institute of Hydrobiology of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. Hydrobiological and hydrochemical samples were collected by Soviet and British specialists from the Kiev reservoir and the rivers Dnieper, Sozh, Desna and Snov. The samples were processed on the expedition ships and in the Laboratory for the Hydrobiology of Small Water Bodies of the Institute of Hydrobiology of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. The possible approved methods to be adopted were evaluated from the samples using the phytoperiphyton, phytoplankton, zooplankton and zoobenthos against a background of hydrochemical characteristics. The study concludes that weather conditions complicated the work on testing the systems of biological indication of water quality and made it inadvisable to use those methods of comparison which were used when similar work was carried out in Nottingham.

Soviet Illegal Whaling: The Devil and the Details

In 1948, the U.S.S.R. began a global campaign of illegal whaling that lasted for three decades and, together with the poorly managed “legal” whaling of other nations, seriously depleted whale populations. Although the general story of this whaling has been told and the catch record largely corrected for the Southern Hemisphere, major gaps remain in the North Pacific. Furthermore, little attention has been paid to the details of this system or its economic context. Using interviews with former Soviet whalers and biologists as well as previously unavailable reports and other material in Russian, our objective is to describe how the Soviet whaling industry was structured and how it worked, from the largest scale of state industrial planning down to the daily details of the ways in which whales were caught and processed, and how data sent to the Bureau of International Whaling Statistics were falsified. Soviet whaling began with the factory ship Aleut in 1933, but by 1963 the industry had a truly global reach, with seven factory fleets (some very large). Catches were driven by a state planning system that set annual production targets. The system gave bonuses and honors only when these were met or exceeded, and it frequently increased the following year’s targets to match the previous year’s production; scientific estimates of the sustainability of the resource were largely ignored. Inevitably, this system led to whale populations being rapidly reduced. Furthermore, productivity was measured in gross output (weights of whales caught), regardless of whether carcasses were sound or rotten, or whether much of the animal was unutilized. Whaling fleets employed numerous people, including women (in one case as the captain of a catcher boat). Because of relatively high salaries and the potential for bonuses, positions in the whaling industry were much sought-after. Catching and processing of whales was highly mechanized and became increasingly efficient as the industry gained more experience. In a single day, the largest factory ships could process up to 200 small sperm whales, Physeter macrocephalus; 100 humpback whales, Megaptera novaeangliae; or 30–35 pygmy blue whales, Balaenoptera musculus brevicauda. However, processing of many animals involved nothing more than stripping the carcass of blubber and then discarding the rest. Until 1952, the main product was whale oil; only later was baleen whale meat regularly utilized. Falsified data on catches were routinely submitted to the Bureau of International Whaling Statistics, but the true catch and biological data were preserved for research and administrative purposes. National inspectors were present at most times, but, with occasional exceptions, they worked primarily to assist fulfillment of plan targets and routinely ignored the illegal nature of many catches. In all, during 40 years of whaling in the Antarctic, the U.S.S.R. reported 185,778 whales taken but at least 338,336 were actually killed. Data for the North Pacific are currently incomplete, but from provisional data we estimate that at least 30,000 whales were killed illegally in this ocean. Overall, we judge that, worldwide, the U.S.S.R. killed approximately 180,000 whales illegally and caused a number of population crashes. Finally, we note that Soviet illegal catches continued after 1972 despite the presence of international observers on factory fleets.

Catches of Humpback Whales, Megaptera novaeangliae, by the Soviet Union and Other Nations in the Southern Ocean, 1947–1973

From 1947 to 1973, the U.S.S.R. conducted a huge campaign of illegal whaling worldwide. We review Soviet catches of humpback whales, Megaptera novaeangliae, in the Southern Ocean during this period, with an emphasis on the International Whaling Commission’s Antarctic Management Areas IV, V, and VI (the principal regions of illegal Soviet whaling on this species, south of Australia and western Oceania). Where possible, we summarize legal and illegal Soviet catches by year, Management Area, and factory fleet, and also include information on takes by other nations. Soviet humpback catches between 1947 and 1973 totaled 48,702 and break down as follows: 649 (Area I), 1,412 (Area II), 921 (Area III), 8,779 (Area IV), 22,569 (Area V), and 7,195 (Area VI), with 7,177 catches not currently assignable to area. In all, at least 72,542 humpback whales were killed by all operations (Soviet plus other nations) after World War II in Areas IV (27,201), V (38,146), and VI (7,195). More than one-third of these (25,474 whales, of which 25,192 came from Areas V and VI) were taken in just two seasons, 1959–60 and 1960–61. The impact of these takes, and of those from Area IV in the late 1950’s, is evident in the sometimes dramatic declines in catches at shore stations in Australia, New Zealand, and at Norfolk Island. When compared to recent estimates of abundance and initial population size, the large removals from Areas IV and V indicate that the populations in these regions remain well below pre-exploitation levels despite reported strong growth rates off eastern and western Australia. Populations in many areas of Oceania continue to be small, indicating that the catches from Area VI and eastern Area V had long-term impacts on recovery.

The Truth About Soviet Whaling: A Memoir

In November 1993, Professor Alexei Yablokov, who at the time was the Science Advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, stood on a podium in Galveston, Tex., and delivered a speech to the Society for Marine Mammalogy’s biennial conference, the premier international event in the field of marine mammal science. Addressing the 1,500 scientists present, he made what amounted to a national confession: that, beginning in 1948, the U.S.S.R. had begun a huge campaign of illegal whaling. Despite being a signatory to the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling (signed in Washington, D.C., just 2 years before in 1946), the Soviets set out to pillage the world’s ocean

The Truth About Soviet Whaling

I have always condemned (and to do anything more was not within our power or abilities) the illegal and sometimes destructive whaling by the Soviet Union. This opinion was expressed in numerous documents, including reports and records of presentations at scientific and other meetings; these documents are the witnesses to this condemnation. However, none of these documents ever saw the light of day: all of them were marked with the sinister stamp “secret.” When necessary in this memoir, my opinion of the whaling will be supported by data drawn from these docume