Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

In 2007, countries in the Euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and lowspreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising theirdeficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and,surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocatedfrom the private to the public sectors, reducing investment and deepening the recessions evenfurther. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debtcan be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discriminationand crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereigndebt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This providesincentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowingis limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productiveinvestment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead toself-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countriesin the Eurozone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.

Causality and Contagion in EMU Sovereign Debt Markets

This paper contributes to the literature by applying the Granger causality approach and endogenous breakpoint test to offer an operational definition of contagion to examine European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries public debt behaviour. A database of yields on 10-year government bonds issued by 11 EMU countries covering fourteen years of monetary union is used. The main results suggest that the 41 new causality patterns, which appeared for the first time in the crisis period, and the intensification of causality recorded in 70% of the cases, provide clear evidence of contagion in the aftermath of the current euro debt crisis.

Causality and Contagion in EMU Sovereign Debt Markets

This paper contributes to the literature by applying the Granger causality approach and endogenous breakpoint test to offer an operational definition of contagion to examine European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries public debt behaviour. A database of yields on 10-year government bonds issued by 11 EMU countries covering fourteen years of monetary union is used. The main results suggest that the 41 new causality patterns, which appeared for the first time in the crisis period, and the intensification of causality recorded in 70% of the cases, provide clear evidence of contagion in the aftermath of the current euro debt crisis.

Causality and Contagion in EMU Sovereign Debt Markets

This paper contributes to the literature by applying the Granger causality approach and endogenous breakpoint test to offer an operational definition of contagion to examine European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries public debt behaviour. A database of yields on 10-year government bonds issued by 11 EMU countries covering fourteen years of monetary union is used. The main results suggest that the 41 new causality patterns, which appeared for the first time in the crisis period, and the intensification of causality recorded in 70% of the cases, provide clear evidence of contagion in the aftermath of the current euro debt crisis.

Reflexivity in sovereign debt markets

Finanssi-instrumentin hinta määräytyy sen fundamenttitekijöiden perusteella, eikä päinvastoin. Tämä tutkimus osoittaa, että myös instrumentin hinta voi vaikuttaa fundamenttitekijöihin. Yhteys havainnollistetaan tapaustukimuksella Kreikan velkakriisistä. Hinnan ja fundamenttien välistä yhteyttä arvioidaan ja käänteisen kausaliteetin olemassaolo testataan. Tulokset tukevat ajatusta, jonka mukaan tarvitsemme dynaamisempia valuaatiomenetelmiä, jotka ottavat huomioon myös mahdolliset itseään vahvistavat hintakierteet.

EMU sovereign debt market crisis: Fundamentals-based or pure contagion?

We empirically investigate whether the transmission of the recent crisis in euro area sovereign debt markets was due to fundamentals-based or pure contagion. To do so, we examine the behaviour of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund for a sample of both central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012. First we apply a dynamic approach to analyse the evolution of the degree of Grangercausality within the 90 pairs of sovereign bond yield spreads in our sample, in order to detect episodes of significantly increased causality between them (which we associate with contagion) and episodes of significantly reduced interconnection (which we associate with immunisation). We then use an ordered logit model to assess the determinants of the occurrence of the episodes detected. Our results suggest the importance of variables proxying market sentiment and of variables proxying macrofundamentals in determining contagion and immunisation outcomes. Therefore, our findings underline the coexistence of “pure” and “fundamentals-based contagion” during the recent European debt crisis.

EMU sovereign debt market crisis: Fundamentals-based or pure contagion?

We empirically investigate whether the transmission of the recent crisis in euro area sovereign debt markets was due to fundamentals-based or pure contagion. To do so, we examine the behaviour of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund for a sample of both central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012. First we apply a dynamic approach to analyse the evolution of the degree of Grangercausality within the 90 pairs of sovereign bond yield spreads in our sample, in order to detect episodes of significantly increased causality between them (which we associate with contagion) and episodes of significantly reduced interconnection (which we associate with immunisation). We then use an ordered logit model to assess the determinants of the occurrence of the episodes detected. Our results suggest the importance of variables proxying market sentiment and of variables proxying macrofundamentals in determining contagion and immunisation outcomes. Therefore, our findings underline the coexistence of “pure” and “fundamentals-based contagion” during the recent European debt crisis.

Causality and contagion in peripheral EMU public debt markets: a dynamic approach

Our research aims to analyze the causal relationships in the behavior of public debt issued by peripheral member countries of the European Economic and Monetary Union -EMU-, with special emphasis on the recent episodes of crisis triggered in the eurozone sovereign debt markets since 2009. With this goal in mind, we make use of a database of daily frequency of yields on 10-year government bonds issued by five EMU countries -Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain-, covering the entire history of the EMU from its inception on 1 January 1999 until 31 December 2010. In the first step, we explore the pair-wise causal relationship between yields, both for the whole sample and for changing subsamples of the data, in order to capture the possible time-varying causal relationship. This approach allows us to detect episodes of contagion between yields on bonds issued by different countries. In the second step, we study the determinants of these contagion episodes, analyzing the role played by different factors, paying special attention to instruments that capture the total national debt -domestic and foreign- in each country.

The sovereign debt crisis that isn't: Or, How to turn a lending crisis into a spending crisis and pocket the spread. ACES Cases No. 2014.1

It’s a testament to the power of ideas in politics that the ongoing policy disaster in Europe is still referred to, by academic as well as popular commentators, as the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. That there was a crisis in European sovereign debt markets in 2010 through the middle of 2012 is not in doubt. That is was a crisis of European sovereign debt markets generated by ‘too much spending’ should be very much in doubt. The ongoing European economic crisis is in fact a transmuted private sector banking crisis first exacerbated and then calmed by central bank policy, the costs of which have been asymmetrically distributed across European mass publics.

Optimal reserve management and sovereign debt

Most models currently used to determine optimal foreign reserve holdings take the level of international debt as given. However, given the sovereign`s willingness-to-pay incentive problems, reserve accumulation may reduce sustainable debt levels. In addition, assuming constant debt levels does not allow addressing one of the puzzles behind using reserves as a means to avoid the negative effects of crisis: why do not sovereign countries reduce their sovereign debt instead? To study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to a sample of emerging markets. We obtain that the reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role in this model. In fact, we find the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on the recovering from the financial crisis: Equity returns of the banking sector

This paper analyses, through a dynamic panel data model, the impact of the Financial and the European Debt crisis on the equity returns of the banking system. The model is also extended to specifically investigate the impact on countries who received rescue packages. The sample under analysis considers eleven countries from January 2006 to June 2013. The main conclusion is that there was in fact a structural change in banks’ excess returns due to the outbreak of the European Debt Crisis, when stock markets were still recovering from the Financial Crisis of 2008.

The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: Fundamentals, expectations and contagion

We offer a detailed empirical investigation of the European sovereign debt crisis based on the theoretical model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010). We find evidence of a marked shift in market pricing behaviour from a ‘convergence-trade’ model before August 2007 to one driven by macro-fundamentals and international risk thereafter. The majority of EMU countries have experienced contagion from Greece. There is no evidence of significant speculation effects originating from CDS markets. Finally, the escalation of the Greek debt crisis since November 2009 is confirmed as the result of an unfavourable shift in countryspecific market expectations. Our findings highlight the necessity of structural, competitiveness-inducing reforms in periphery EMU countries and institutional reforms at the EMU level enhancing intra-EMU economic monitoring and policy co-ordination.

The Impact of Monetary Union on EU-15 Sovereign Debt Yield Spreads

With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries' sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the size of the market.

The Impact of Monetary Union on EU-15 Sovereign Debt Yield Spreads

With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries' sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the size of the market.