837 resultados para Southeast Asia -- Foreign relations -- China.
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Phe Ihesis examines the evolution of the -policies of the People fs Jtenublie of China towards J?hail°nd, PTal ysia, Singapore, Iidonesia pad the Philip-pines, organised in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations from 1969 to 1975• 2ze first central point of this study is an *ir sumption that the foreign relations of The People's Tepublic of Chi la Towards Southeast ^sia have been motivated by a dynamic interplay of t^o main factors: (1) Farxist-Leninist ideology and ICao J^e-tung Ph^ught, which dictate to China to behave as a revolutionary Dover vhich must assist the insurgent movements in the area in their strug fle to overthrow the local governments; (2) national interest, vhich demands of China to safeguard the southern flank of her territory bordering on Southerst 'sia through Friendly relations, trade and ot*»er conventional inrtniments of diplomacy. hile the tvo main motive factors are nuTually antagonistic and exclusivet the Chinere leaders are nevertheless at te mi ting to oring them iirco a coherent policy under Mao's theory of tve {hniity of op-nosites," vhich believes that it is -possible to reconcile these co-posing tendencies into a dynamic enuibrium through vhich both opnosites could be promoted at the same time although not to the same extent* la other words, the Chinese leaders conceive the dynamic equilibrium as a continuum between them in a mix in which one or the other orientation predominates in different •periods* Bins we might see China1 s conduct motivated in one period by mostly ideological considerations at the expense of the staire-to-state relations, then ve might see her policy in the middle of the continuum and suf ering from immo bill sine and just muddling through, or finally ?fe might see her emphasising friendly ties at the expense of support of revolutionary movements at the other extreme -point of the spectrum* !fhe mechanism vhich enables Peking to move from one pole to the other of the spectrum is activated by the following elementsJ (1) the result of an internal power struggle within the leadership in Peking between ideologically radical and moderate elements, which enables the victorious faction to initiate nev policies; (2) Peking's assessment of the changing intentions and capabilities of the major powers in the area; (3) internal changes within the countries of the area and the changing attitudes of their governments towards China; (4) changing fortunes of revolutionary movements operating in the area* 'Phe second major point of this study is an assertion that while China's conduct toward Southeast *lsia after her foundation in 1949 was primarily based upon ideological considerations, the beginning of the seventies saw the national interest reasserting itself as the leading motive factor* Thus China talks with her neighbours in Southeast asia in terms of relevance of fllong historical ties," casting herself into the role of a benevolent "older brother11 who is entitled to reopect and deference in exchange for patronage and protection* Hence the traditional echoes of the past are emerging ever stronger and influencing her postures towards the region, while the open support to revolutionary moevments is underplayed at the moment.
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The 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) has recently been described as a successful example of how to manage large protracted refugee flows. However, this article revisits the circumstances surrounding the CPA used to resolve the prolonged Indo-Chinese refugee crisis to highlight that part of its development was linked to the fact that Southeast Asian states refused to engage with proposed solutions, which did not include repatriation for the majority of the Indo-Chinese asylum seekers who were deemed to be ‘non-genuine’1 ( UNGA, 1989a) refugees. This resulted in the CPA often forcibly repatriating ‘non-genuine’ refugees, particularly near the end of its program. This article reviews the CPA in order to assess whether its practices and results should be repeated.
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Despite the position of the United States as de facto global hegemon, China is a rising power in the world. As Chinese power grows, the projection of Chinese influence will be felt most acutely in Southeast Asia. Whether to accommodate, contain or resist China will depend on future developments that none can foresee, including Chinese ambitions, the policies of other international players (the U.S., Japan), and the cohesion or fragility of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). This paper argues that in deciding how best to deal with China, two factors that will influence the countries of Southeast Asia are their own long histories of bilateral relations with China and their own differing conceptions of how foreign relations should be conducted. This is to argue that history and culture are central to any understanding of the likely future shape of China-Southeast Asia relations. Only by taking history and culture into account will analysts be in a position to predict how the mainland and maritime states of Southeast Asia are likely to respond to a more powerful, confident and assertive China.
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Myanmar highly appreciates foreign direct investment (FDI) as a key solution reducing the development gap with leading ASEAN countries. Accordingly, it is welcomed by the government. Myanmar's Foreign Investment Law was enacted in 1988 soon after the adoption of a market-oriented economic system to boost the flow of FDI into the country. Foreign investors positively responded to these measures in the early years and FDI inflow into Myanmar gradually increased during the period from 1989 to 1996. However, after 1997, FDI inflow was dramatically reduced and markedly declined until 2004. In 2005, FDI inflow increased at an unprecedented rate and reached the highest level in the country's history. However, this growth was not sustainable in the subsequent years, as it declined again and turned stagnant at the previous level. In terms of source regions, ASEAN is a major investor in Myanmar, which investment is significantly exceeds the combined investment of other regions of the world. Among top ten countries, Thailand's investment alone is significantly more than combined total investments of the other nine countries. Next to Thailand in terms of investments in Myanmar are Singapore and Malaysia among ASEAN, at second and third places, respectively. The combined total FDI inflows into the power and oil and gas sector represent about 65 percent of the total investment. There are many opportunities for foreign investment in other sectors, which are not, yet exploited. ASEAN countries will certainly be source countries of Myanmar FDI in the future, and Myanmar should expand to other Asian countries like Japan, India, China, Korea, and Hong Kong where its FDI portfolio is concerned. To effectively attract FDI into the country, Myanmar needs to minimize the effect of policy while opening and encouraging other potential sectors of FDI to foreign investors in ASEAN and Asian countries.
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Reproduction of the original edition.
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Introduction. This chapter takes a closer look at the European Union (EU), China, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s respective approaches to dealing with non-traditional security (NTS) challenges by investigating their policies toward Burma/Myanmar—a source country of numerous such challenges. It argues that, although all, as members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), see the need for multilateral solutions to fight organized crime, provide disaster relief, combat terrorism, prevent drug trafficking, etc., they differ with respect to the steps to be taken to protect human security in Asia-Pacific. China, initially hesitant to join the ARF for fear that other members might try to contain it, has come to value the principal forum for NTS challenges in the Asia-Pacific region since, like many ASEAN countries, it is a big proponent of non-interventionism, non-use of force, consensus decision-making, that is, the confidence-building mechanisms commonly referred to as the ‘ASEAN way’.2 The EU, as a strong proponent of human rights and the rule of law, repeatedly, has criticized ARF members for allowing sovereignty-related norms to get in the way of the protection of human rights, but it has refrained from assuming the role of norm exporter. As will be seen in the case of Burma/Myanmar, the EU does make its opinions heard and, when necessary, will take unilateral steps not supported by the ASEAN members of the ARF but, cognizant of the history of the region, for the most part, settles for supporting economic development and aiding in capacity-building, understanding that it would be counter-productive to exert pressure on reluctant ARF members to modify the non-interference norm. The chapter then speculates about the ‘ASEAN way’s’ longevity, arguing that, increasingly, there are internal and external dynamics that seem to indicate that the ‘ASEAN way,’ at least in its current form, may not be here to stay. The conclusion looks at what might be in store for Burma/Myanmar in the years to come.
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At head of title: 91st Congress, 1st session. Committee print.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Hearings held Apr. 15-Aug. 13, 1970.
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Pub. by the institute under its earlier name: East Indies Institute of America.
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Australian foreign and security policy confronts a series of difficult challenges in coping with the emergence of an Islamic extremist threat in Southeast Asia. Australian policy makers are being drawn into unfamiliar linkages with moderate Islam, and into closer cooperation with Indonesia, the most populous Islamic nation in the world, in an attempt to offset Islamic extremists. Further, they must achieve those objectives at a time when important interests are at stake beyond Southeast Asia, when bipartisan agreement about the direction of foreign policy is waning, and when divisions over the appropriate trajectory of Australian security policy are intense. A delicacy almost unprecedented in Australian foreign policy will be required.