23 resultados para Sophists
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The sophists were itinerant professional teachers and intellectuals who frequented Athens and other Greek cities in the second half of the fifth century B.C.E. In return for a fee, the sophists offered young wealthy Greek men an education in aretē (virtue or excellence), thereby attaining wealth and fame while also arousing significant antipathy. Prior to the fifth century B.C.E., aretē was predominately associated with aristocratic warrior virtues such as courage and physical strength. In democratic Athens of the latter fifth century B.C.E., however, aretē was increasingly understood in terms of the ability to influence one’s fellow citizens in political gatherings through rhetorical persuasion; the sophistic education both grew out of and exploited this shift. The most famous representatives of the sophistic movement are Protagoras, Gorgias, Antiphon, Hippias, Prodicus and Thrasymachus.
The historical and philological difficulties confronting an interpretation of the sophists are significant. Only a handful of sophistic texts have survived and most of what we know of the sophists is drawn from second-hand testimony, fragments and the generally hostile depiction of them in Plato’s dialogues.
The philosophical problem of the nature of sophistry is arguably even more formidable. Due in large part to the influence of Plato and Aristotle, the term sophistry has come to signify the deliberate use of fallacious reasoning, intellectual charlatanism and moral unscrupulousness. It is, as the article explains, an oversimplification to think of the historical sophists in these terms because they made genuine and original contributions to Western thought. Plato and Aristotle nonetheless established their view of what constitutes legitimate philosophy in part by distinguishing their own activity – and that of Socrates – from the sophists. If one is so inclined, sophistry can thus be regarded, in a conceptual as well as historical sense, as the ‘other’ of philosophy.
Perhaps because of the interpretative difficulties mentioned above, the sophists have been many things to many people. For Hegel (1995/1840) the sophists were subjectivists whose sceptical reaction to the objective dogmatism of the presocratics was synthesised in the work of Plato and Aristotle. For the utilitarian English classicist George Grote (1904), the sophists were progressive thinkers who placed in question the prevailing morality of their time. More recent work by French theorists such as Jacques Derrida (1981) and Jean Francois-Lyotard (1985) suggests affinities between the sophists and postmodernism.
This article provides a broad overview of the sophists, and indicates some of the central philosophical issues raised by their work. Section 1 discusses the meaning of the term sophist. Section 2 surveys the individual contributions of the most famous sophists. Section 3 examines three themes that have often been taken as characteristic of sophistic thought: the distinction between nature and convention, relativism about knowledge and truth and the power of speech. Finally, section 4 analyses attempts by Plato and others to establish a clear demarcation between philosophy and sophistry.
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Greek and English on opposite pages.
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Resumen: Después de la primera sofística, los sofistas actuaron entre el resto de los pensadores del Mediterráneo como un grupo definido. Dado que hay muchos ejemplos que muestran que los sofistas ejercían sus prácticas y que también eran personas comprometidas en otras actividades, vamos a examinar aquí diversos casos de semejanzas y diferencias entre ellos y otros grupos de pensadores. Nuestras tres preguntas fundamentales son: qué, cómo y por qué los sofistas escribían y enseñaban. Intentaremos responder haciendo un análisis diacrónico de las principales formas y géneros de escritura que produjeron (qué). El cómo lo responderemos en su desenvolvimiento como una actividad comunicativa más allá de las fronteras de las disciplinas de la época. El por qué tendrá su respuesta al enfatizar la necesidad de la actividad de los sofistas en la socialización de la época y en la educación de la antigüedad. Al aseverar que el estilo era la idea de los sofistas, ponemos la noción de idea en Platón en el contexto de idea derivado de los sofistas contemporáneos a él y de los sofistas posteriores (segunda sofística) y centramos el foco en la función de visualidad expresada en su concepto de idea desde las obras sofísticas más tempranas en la época de Platón hasta las contribuciones posteriores.
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Dedicamo-nos ao estudo do modo como ocorre a retomada da sofística em Nietzsche. Partimos, então, do pressuposto de que há uma ligação entre Nietzsche e os sofistas e, por isso, dialogamos com os principais estudos que aproximam Nietzsche e a sofística. Nosso objetivo é, primeiramente, apresentar a visão geral entre as investigações sobre a relação de Nietzsche com a sofística. Para, então, mostrar certos equívocos no modo habitual de relacionar a filosofia nietzschiana ao movimento sofista. Nossa principal investida é contra o modo habitual de aproximação entre Nietzsche e a doutrina do homem- medida de Protágoras. Também discutimos o lugar de Cálicles no pensamento nietzschiano, principalmente, porque na visão geral que aproxima Nietzsche e os sofistas, a doutrina de Cálicles, acerca do direito do mais forte, está relacionada à idéia nietzschiana de além-homem. Acreditamos que nem na abordagem de Protágoras nem na de Cálicles, há argumentos condizentes para uma retomada da sofística no pensamento nietzschiano. Nossa defesa é de que o sofista Górgias é a palavra-chave no entendimento da relação de Nietzsche com os sofistas. Nosso argumento tem sua base na importância do historiador Tucídides para a concepção nietzschiana de história. Defendemos uma influência da retórica sofista, cujo principal representante é Górgias, tanto na apresentação quanto no modo de investigação do trabalho tucidideano. Tal influência resultará em uma articulação entre Nietzsche, Tucídides, sofística e história. Para apresentação dessa articulação, nosso estudo expõe a importância do elemento ficcional, tanto para as reflexões nietzschianas quanto para a retórica sofística de Górgias, de modo relacionar essa importância à concepção de história de Tucídides.
Filozofia antyczna wobec problemu interpretacji. Rozwój alegorezy od przedsokratyków do Arystotelesa
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The present work examines the beginnings of ancient hermeneutics. More specifically, it discusses the connection between the rise of the practice of allegoresis, on the one hand, and the emergence of the first theory of figurative language, on the other. Thus, this book investigates the specific historical and cultural circumstances that enabled the ancient Greeks not only to discover the possibility of allegorical interpretation, but also to treat figurative language as a philosophical problem. By posing difficulties in understanding the enigmatic sense of various esoteric doctrines, poems, oracles and riddles, figurative language created the context for theoretical reflection on the meaning of these “messages”. Hence, ancient interpreters began to ponder over the nature and functions of figurative (“enigmatic”) language as well as over the techniques of its proper use and interpretation. Although the practice of allegorical interpretation was closely linked to the development of the whole of ancient philosophy, the present work covers only the period from the 6th to the 4th century B.C. It concentrates, then, on the philosophical and cultural consequences of allegoresis in the classical age. The main thesis advocated here has it that the ancient Greeks were in-clined to regard allegory as a cognitive problem rather than merely as a stylistic or a literary one. When searching for the hidden meanings of various esoteric doc-trines, poems, oracles and riddles, ancient interpreters of these “messages” assumed allegory to be the only tool suitable for articulating certain matters. In other words, it was their belief that the use of figurative language resulted from the necessity of expressing things that were otherwise inexpressible. The present work has been organized in the following manner. The first part contains historical and philological discussions that provide the point of departure for more philosophical considerations. This part consists of two introductory chapters. Chapter one situates the practice of allegorical interpretation at the borderline of two different traditions: the rhetorical-grammatical and the hermeneutical. In order to clearly differentiate between the two, chapter one distinguishes between allegory and allegoresis, on the one hand, and allegoresis and exegesis, on the other. While pointing to the conventionality (and even arbitrariness) of such distinctions, the chapter argues, nevertheless, for their heuristic usefulness. The remaining part of chapter one focuses on a historical and philological reconstruction of the most important conceptual tools of ancient hermeneutics. Discussing the semantics of such terms as allēgoría, hypónoia, ainigma and symbolon proves important for at least two crucial reasons. Firstly, it reveals the mutual affinity between allegoresis and divination, i.e., practices that are inherently connected with the need to discover the latent meaning of the “message” in question (whether poem or oracle). Secondly, these philological analyses bring to light the specificity of the ancient understanding of such concepts as allegory or symbol. It goes without saying that antiquity employed these terms in a manner quite disparate from modernity. Chapter one concludes with a discussion of ancient views on the cognitive value of figurative (“enigmatic”) language. Chapter two focuses on the role that allegoresis played in the process of transforming mythos into logos. It is suggested here that it was the practice of allegorical interpretation that made it possible to preserve the traditional myths as an important point of reference for the whole of ancient philosophy. Thus, chapter two argues that the existence of a clear opposition between mythos into logos in Preplatonic philosophy is highly questionable in light of the indisputable fact that the Presocratics, Sophists and Cynics were profoundly convinced about the cognitive value of mythos (this conviction was also shared by Plato and Aristotle, but their attitude towards myth was more complex). Consequently, chapter two argues that in Preplatonic philosophy, myth played a function analogous to the concepts discussed in chapter one (i.e., hidden meanings, enigmas and symbols), for in all these cases, ancient interpreters found tools for conveying issues that were otherwise difficult to convey. Chapter two concludes with a classification of various types of allegoresis. Whilst chapters one and two serve as a historical and philological introduction, the second part of this book concentrates on the close relationship between the development of allegoresis, on the one hand, and the flowering of philosophy, on the other. Thus, chapter three discusses the crucial role that allegorical interpretation came to play in Preplatonic philosophy, chapter four deals with Plato’s highly complex and ambivalent attitude to allegoresis, and chapter five has been devoted to Aristotle’s original approach to the practice of allegorical interpretation. It is evident that allegoresis was of paramount importance for the ancient thinkers, irrespective of whether they would value it positively (Preplatonic philosophers and Aristotle) or negatively (Plato). Beginning with the 6th century B.C., the ancient practice of allegorical interpretation is motivated by two distinct interests. On the one hand, the practice of allegorical interpretation reflects the more or less “conservative” attachment to the authority of the poet (whether Homer, Hesiod or Orpheus). The purpose of this apologetic allegoresis is to exonerate poetry from the charges leveled at it by the first philosophers and, though to a lesser degree, historians. Generally, these allegorists seek to save the traditional paideia that builds on the works of the poets. On the other hand, the practice of allegorical interpretation reflects also the more or less “progressive” desire to make original use of the authority of the poet (whether Homer, Hesiod or Orpheus) so as to promote a given philosophical doctrine. The objective of this instrumental allegoresis is to exculpate philosophy from the accusations brought against it by the more conservative circles. Needless to say, these allegorists significantly contribute to the process of the gradual replacing of the mythical view of the world with its more philosophical explanation. The present book suggests that it is the philosophy of Aristotle that should be regarded as a sort of acme in the development of ancient hermeneutics. The reasons for this are twofold. On the one hand, the Stagirite positively values the practice of allegoresis, rehabilitating, thus, the tradition of Preplatonic philosophy against Plato. And, on the other hand, Aristotle initiates the theoretical reflection on figurative (“enigmatic”) language. Hence, in Aristotle we encounter not only the practice of allegoresis, but also the theory of allegory (although the philosopher does not use the term allēgoría). With the situation being as it is, the significance of Aristotle’s work cannot be overestimated. First of all, the Stagirite introduces the concept of metaphor into the then philosophical considerations. From that moment onwards, the phenomenon of figurative language becomes an important philosophical issue. After Aristo-tle, the preponderance of thinkers would feel obliged to specify the rules for the appropriate use of figurative language and the techniques of its correct interpretation. Furthermore, Aristotle ascribes to metaphor (and to various other “excellent” sayings) the function of increasing and enhancing our knowledge. Thus, according to the Stagirite, figurative language is not only an ornamental device, but it can also have a significant explanatory power. Finally, Aristotle observes that figurative expressions cause words to become ambiguous. In this context, the philosopher notices that ambiguity can enrich the language of a poet, but it can also hinder a dialectical discussion. Accordingly, Aristotle is inclined to value polysemy either positively or negatively. Importantly, however, the Stagirite is perfectly aware of the fact that in natural languages ambiguity is unavoidable. This is why Aristotle initiates a syste-matic reflection on the phenomenon of ambiguity and distinguishes its various kinds. In Aristotle, ambiguity is, then, both a problem that needs to be identified and a tool that can help in elucidating intricate philosophical issues. This unique approach to ambiguity and figurative (“enigmatic”) language enabled Aristotle to formulate invaluable intuitions that still await appropriate recognition.
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The aim of the present paper is to investigate the connection between ancient medicine and sophistry at the end of 5th century B.C. Beginning with analyses of some passages from the De vetere medicina (VM), De natura hominis (NH) and De arte, the article identifies many similarities between these treatises, on the one hand, and the sophistic doctrines, on the other: these concern primarily perceptual/intellectual knowledge and the interaction between reality, knowledge and language. Among the Sophists, Gorgias was particularly followed and imitated, as he was admired not only for his tremendous rhetorical skills, but also for his philosophically significant work On not being, which probably influenced various discussions in the Hippocratic treatises. However, if Gorgias argues in favor of language as dynastēs megas, the authors of VM, NH and De arte consider knowledge to be far more relevant and reliable than logos. These Hippocratic treatises criticize the philosophical thesis and the resulting kind of reductionism. Above all they defend the supremacy of medicine over any other art. By using the same argumentative and rhetorical strategies that were employed by Gorgias, these treatises reverse the thought of those Sophists who exalted only the technē tōn logōn.
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The 2001 Handbook of Public Relations edited by Robert Heath contains a prominent article advocating the use of rhetorical theory or ‘rhetorical enactment rational’ as a fruitful way of advancing theoretical understandings of public relations. In 2004 Heath and Dan Millar edited: Responding to Crisis: A Rhetorical Approach to Crisis Communication. These are the latest excursions into a perspective on public relations reflecting the extensive study of rhetoric in North America. Other examples are Public Relations Inquiry as Rhetorical Criticism (Elwood, 1995); Rhetorical and Critical Approaches to Public Relations (Toth and Heath, 1992); and a chapter Public Relations? No, Relations with Publics: A Rhetorical-Organisational Approach to Contemporary Corporate Communication (Cheney and Dionisopoulos, in Botan and Hazleton (Eds.) 1989).
The conventional notion of rhetoric is argumentation and persuasion stemming from the ancient Greek sophists, such as Aristotle, and from the Romans, particularly Cicero and Quintillion. Rhetoric became a fundamental plank of the trivium of ancient and medieval education: grammar, logic and rhetoric. Then in the 20th century Kenneth Burke, Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca extended Aristotle’s suggestion that: “Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic” Aristotle (trans. 1991). To use the rhetorical approach to argue that rational discourse cannot describe the world on its own. Instead living, enculturated human beings have to perceive ‘their’ truths. They take a perceptual ‘position’ on reason.
Public relations, is an industry for influencing perceptual ‘positions’. But the study of perception and attempts to influence perception cannot be claimed by rhetorical scholars alone. Semioticians and linguists who take the perspective of linguistic pragmatics also claim this field. This paper takes the example of ‘public relations’ as a focus for the confluence of rhetorical, semiotic and pragmatism approaches to the ‘problematic’ of understanding and truth.
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This paper looks at Web 2.0 as a new form of discursive art which may be changing human subjectivity - which may be producing new kinds of people. It casts the Web 2.0 era as the 'Third Sophistic' in comparison to the two other sophistics: (1) the period from the Ancient Greek Enlightenment when grammar, rhetoric and dialectic were invented by the original pre-Socratic sophists up until the times of Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates; and (2) the Second Sophistic in the early centuries of the Common Era when 'epideictic,' that is subtle, artistic rhetoric was perfected. These sophistics marked alterations in the possibilities for human cultural expression and conception. Are we experiencing a 'Sophistic 3.0'? If so what are the likely consequences for contemporary discourse and its media?
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Some of the most important reflections on rhetorical theory associated with public relations appear in: L’Etang (1996); Toth (1999); and various Robert Heath contributions. This paper will reflect on the importance of that work by briefly scouring the origin of rhetoric among the ancient founders of persuasive communication: the pre-Socratic sophists. The paper will then relate the approaches of the above theorists, as well as Kevin Moloney and James Grunig, to the original meaning of sophistry. The last part of the paper will discuss the confluence of rhetorical and semiotic approaches. The rhetoricsemiotics link has been present since the semiotics of St Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE). Augustine was a professor of rhetoric in his earlier career. The last part of the paper summarises how rhetorical theory, Peircean semiotics and post modern approaches can avoid accusations of relativism and infinite semiosis when they are fitted into a theory of public relations.
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This paper unites Deely’s call for a better understanding of semiotics with Jaeger’s insight into the sophists and the cultural history of the Ancient Greeks. The two bodies of knowledge are brought together to try to better understand the importance of rhetorical processes to political forms such as democracy. Jaeger explains how cultural expression, particularly poetry, changed through the archaic and classical eras to deliver, or at least to be commensurate with contemporary politics and ideologies. He explains how Plato (429-347 BCE) struggled against certain poetry and prose manifestations in his ambition to create a ‘perfect man’ – a humanity which would think in a way which would enable the ideal Republic to flourish. Deely’s approach based on Poinsot and Peirce presents a theoretical framework by means of which we can think of the struggle to influence individual and communal conceptualisation as a struggle within semiotics. This is a struggle over the ways reality is signified by signs. Signs are physical and mental indications which, in the semiotic tradition, are taken to produce human subjectivity – human ‘being’. Deely’s extensive body of work is about how these signs are the building blocks of realist constructions of understanding. This paper is concerned with the deliberate use of oral and written signs in rhetorical activity which has been deliberately crafted to change subjectivity. We discuss: (1) what thought and culture is in terms of semiotics and (2) Jaeger’s depiction of Ancient Greece as an illustration of the conjunction between culture and subjectivity. These two fields are brought together in order to make the argument that rhetoric can be theorised as the deliberate harnessing of semiotic affects. The implication is that the same semiotic, subjectivity-changing potency holds for 21st century rhetoric. However fourth century BCE Athens is the best setting for a preliminary discussion of rhetoric as deliberate semiotic practice because this was when rhetoric was most clearly understood for what it is. By contrast a discussion concentrating on modern rhetoric: public relations; advertising; lobbying; and public affairs would open wider controversies requiring considerably more complex explanation.
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This paper argues that a better understanding of public relations would help us to get an urgently needed better understanding of people. It explains why public relations should be considered the contemporary manifestation of the millennia-old art of rhetoric which in turn should be considered the basis of, at least western culture. This article introduces a thesis that understanding rhetoric properly will lead to the best way of understanding public relations properly. It will critique existing writers about the rhetoric to public relations nexus to suggest that there is a crucial need to more carefully consider the true relevance
of massively organised deliberate persuasive discourse. The urgency is because few of these commentators quite capture the extent to which public relations and related activities are creating us. It will explain why we are almost unconscious of this process and it will point out that by contrast ancient sophists and the more accomplished pre-modern rhetoricians have always been aware of this ‘construction of people process’. The approach of this paper is premised on the observation of classicist Werner Jaeger who explains that rhetoric is at the centre of being human. When explaining the use of grammar, rhetoric and dialectic by Greek Enlightenment sophists he writes that: “This educational technique is one of the greatest discoveries which the mind of man has ever made: it was not until it explored these three of its activities that the mind apprehended the hidden law of its own structure.” (Jaeger, 1947:314)
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Pós-graduação em História - FCHS
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In Plato’s dialogues, the Phaedo, Laches, and Republic, Socrates warns his interlocutors about the dangers of misology. Misology is explained by analogy with misanthropy, not as the hatred of other human beings, but as the hatred of the logos or reasonable discourse. According to Socrates, misology arises when a person alternates between believing an argument to be correct, and then refuting it as false. If Socrates is right, then misanthropy is sometimes instilled when a person goes from trusting people to learning that others sometimes betray our reliance and expectations, and finally not to placing any confidence whatsoever in other people, or, in the case of misology, in the correctness or trustworthiness of arguments. A cynical indifference to the soundness of arguments generally is sometimes associated with Socrates’ polemical targets, the Sophists, at least as Plato represents Socrates’ reaction to these itinerant teachers of rhetoric, public speaking and the fashioning of arguments suitable to any occasion. Socrates’ injunctions against misology are largely moral, pronouncing it ‘shameful’ and ‘very wicked’, and something that without further justification we must ‘guard against’, maintaining that we will be less excellent persons if we come to despise argument as lacking the potential of leading to the truth. I examine Socrates’ moral objections to misology which I show to be inconclusive. I consider instead the problem of logical coherence in the motivations supposedly underlying misology, and conclude that misology as Socrates intends the concept is an emotional reaction to argumentation on the part of persons who have not acquired the logical dialectical skills or will to sort out good from bad arguments. We cannot dismiss argument as directed toward the truth unless we have a strong reason for doing so, and any such argument must itself presuppose that at least some reasoning can be justified in discovering and justifying belief in interesting truths. The relevant passages from Socrates’ discussion of the soul’s immortality in the Phaedo are discussed in detail, and set in scholarly background against Socrates’ philosophy more generally, as represented by Plato’s dialogues. I conclude by offering a suggestive list of practical remedies to avoid the alienation from argument in dialectic with which Socrates is concerned.
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La enseñanza de la filosofía ha sido históricamente escenario de agón y competencia, no sólo de cooperación. Quisiera llamar la atención sobre el modo en que Platón alude, en el libro VI de la República, a una lucha que se ha entablado en Atenas por dirimir cuál es la legítima forma de transmitir y ejercitar la filosofía. Ofreceré argumentos para mostrar que en las provocadoras respuestas que ofrece Sócrates a los dos reproches que se le hacen a la filosofía -su inutilidad y el carácter raro y perverso de los filósofos- se objeta implícitamente el modo en que Isócrates concibe la filosofía, su función social y su transmisión. Contrastaré esas respuestas con algunas posiciones de Contra sofistas. Aunque las opiniones de Isócrates sobre este tema se desarrollan en varios escritos me concentraré en Contra sofistas para trazar una correspondencia 'agónica' no sólo filológica y especulativamente plausible sino también cronológicamente viable
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La enseñanza de la filosofía ha sido históricamente escenario de agón y competencia, no sólo de cooperación. Quisiera llamar la atención sobre el modo en que Platón alude, en el libro VI de la República, a una lucha que se ha entablado en Atenas por dirimir cuál es la legítima forma de transmitir y ejercitar la filosofía. Ofreceré argumentos para mostrar que en las provocadoras respuestas que ofrece Sócrates a los dos reproches que se le hacen a la filosofía -su inutilidad y el carácter raro y perverso de los filósofos- se objeta implícitamente el modo en que Isócrates concibe la filosofía, su función social y su transmisión. Contrastaré esas respuestas con algunas posiciones de Contra sofistas. Aunque las opiniones de Isócrates sobre este tema se desarrollan en varios escritos me concentraré en Contra sofistas para trazar una correspondencia 'agónica' no sólo filológica y especulativamente plausible sino también cronológicamente viable