Agendas in legislative decision-making

Despite the wide range of agendas used in legislative decision-making, the literature has focused almost exclusively on two stylized formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. As emphasized by Ordeshook and Schwartz [1987], this focus leaves a sizable gap in our understanding of the legislative process. To help address the deficiency, I first define a very broad class of agendas (called simple agendas) whose features are common among agendas used in legislative settings. I then characterize the sophisticated (Farquharson [1969]) voting outcomes implemented by agendas in this class. By establishing a clear connection between the structure of simple agendas and the outcomes associated with them, the characterization extends our understanding of legislative decision-making well beyond the very limited scope of Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas.

Perceptions and reality: Economic voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections

One of the most influential explanations of voting behaviour is based on economic factors: when the economy is doing well, voters reward the incumbent government and when the economy is doing badly, voters punish the incumbent. This reward-punishment model is thought to be particularly appropriate at second order contests such as European Parliament elections. Yet operationalising this economic voting model using citizens' perceptions of economic performance may suffer from endogeneity problems if citizens' perceptions are in fact a function of their party preferences rather than being a cause of their party preferences. Thus, this article models a 'strict' version of economic voting in which they purge citizens' economic perceptions of partisan effects and only use as a predictor of voting that portion of citizens' economic perceptions that is caused by the real world economy. Using data on voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections for 23 European Union electorates, the article finds some, but limited, evidence for economic voting that is dependent on both voter sophistication and clarity of responsibility for the economy within any country. First, only politically sophisticated voters' subjective economic assessments are in fact grounded in economic reality. Second, the portion of subjective economic assessments that is a function of the real world economy is a significant predictor of voting only in single party government contexts where there can be a clear attribution of responsibility. For coalition government contexts, the article finds essentially no impact of the real economy via economic perceptions on vote choice, at least at European Parliament elections.

Electronic voting systems in undergraduate teaching

One of the major differences undergraduates experience during the transition to university is the style of teaching. In schools and colleges most students study key stage 5 subjects in relatively small informal groups where teacher–pupil interaction is encouraged and two-way feedback occurs through question and answer type delivery. On starting in HE students are amazed by the sizes of the classes. For even a relatively small chemistry department with an intake of 60-70 students, biologists, pharmacists, and other first year undergraduates requiring chemistry can boost numbers in the lecture hall to around 200 or higher. In many universities class sizes of 400 are not unusual for first year groups where efficiency is crucial. Clearly the personalised classroom-style delivery is not practical and it is a brave student who shows his ignorance by venturing to ask a question in front of such an audience. In these environments learning can be a very passive process, the lecture acts as a vehicle for the conveyance of information and our students are expected to reinforce their understanding by ‘self-study’, a term, the meaning of which, many struggle to understand. The use of electronic voting systems (EVS) in such situations can vastly change the students’ learning experience from a passive to a highly interactive process. This principle has already been demonstrated in Physics, most notably in the work of Bates and colleagues at Edinburgh.1 These small hand-held devices, similar to those which have become familiar through programmes such as ‘Who Wants to be a Millionaire’ can be used to provide instant feedback to students and teachers alike. Advances in technology now allow them to be used in a range of more sophisticated settings and comprehensive guides on use have been developed for even the most techno-phobic staff.

How Welfare States Shape the Democratic Public: Policy Feedback, Participation, Voting and Attitudes

This crucial volume significantly advances the study of policy feedbacks. With contributions from many subfields and methodological approaches, it offers both sophisticated theorizing and new empirical examples that show how policies make politics in a variety of ways. Innovative research designs provide more convincing inference than ever. And the normative questions engaged about welfare performance, evaluation, participation, and accountability could not be more important or timely in this era of austerity and discord over the future of welfare states.’

Abstimmen oder Schwimmen? Plebiszitarer Sport und synchronisierte Wahlen. [Sink or swim: Plebiscitary sport and synchronised voting.][In German]

This chapter starts from the observation that new sporting attributes are growing up unnoticed in popular entertainment and ‘reality’ TV. They celebrate not individual heroics but spectator-oriented teamwork which must look effortless and stylish. Instead of objective measurements – ‘faster, higher, stronger’ – winners are picked by voting and consumer choice. Sport and media are converging and integrating. As they do so, what counts as sport, why it is valued, and what it symbolises for contemporary culture, are all changing. I take these changes to be emblematic of something emergent in the culture at large as the modernist paradigm shifts towards a new consumerist paradigm. This is symbolised in new sports, of which the paradigm example is synchronised swimming. The chapter traces these changes via the career and legacy of the Australian swimming and fashion pioneer Annette Kellerman.

The Australian election survey: the tale of the rabbit-less hat. Voting behaviour in 2007

This paper examines voter attitudes and behaviour at the 2007 Australian federal election., using data from the Australian Election Study. It considers socio-demographic factors as well as the role of policy issues and voter evaluations of the party leaders. The paper concludes that issues, such as the government's WorkChoices policy, as well as health and leadership contributed to Labor's victory.

Do warnings deter rather than produce more sophisticated malingering?

Following Youngjohn, Lees-Haley, and Binder's (1999) comment on Johnson and Lesniak-Karpiak's (1997) study that warnings lead to more subtle malingering, researchers have sought to better understand warning effects. However, such studies have been largely atheoretical and may have confounded warning and coaching. This study examined the effect on malingering of a warning that was based on criminological-sociological concepts derived from the rational choice model of deterrence theory. A total of 78 participants were randomly assigned to a control group, an unwarned simulator group, or one of two warned simulator groups. The warning groups comprised low- and high-level conditions depending on warning intensity. Simulator participants received no coaching about how to fake tests. Outcome variables were scores derived from the Test of Memory Malingering and Wechsler Memory Scale-III. When the rate of malingering was compared across the four groups, a high-level warning effect was found such that warned participants were significantly less likely to exaggerate than unwarned simulators. In an exploratory follow-up analysis, the warned groups were divided into those who reported malingering and those who did not report malingering, and the performance of these groups was compared to that of unwarned simulators and controls. Using this approach, results showed that participants who were deterred from malingering by warning performed no worse than controls. However, on a small number of tests, self-reported malingerers in the low-level warning group appeared less impaired than unwarned simulators. This pattern was not observed in the high-level warning condition. Although cautious interpretation of findings is necessitated by the exploratory nature of some analyses, overall results suggest that using a carefully designed warning may be useful for reducing the rate of malingering. The combination of some noteworthy effect sizes, despite low power and the small size of some groups, suggests that further investigation of the effects of warnings needs to continue to determine their effect more fully.

Boosting the margin: A new explanation for the effectiveness of voting methods

One of the surprising recurring phenomena observed in experiments with boosting is that the test error of the generated classifier usually does not increase as its size becomes very large, and often is observed to decrease even after the training error reaches zero. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is related to the distribution of margins of the training examples with respect to the generated voting classification rule, where the margin of an example is simply the difference between the number of correct votes and the maximum number of votes received by any incorrect label. We show that techniques used in the analysis of Vapnik's support vector classifiers and of neural networks with small weights can be applied to voting methods to relate the margin distribution to the test error. We also show theoretically and experimentally that boosting is especially effective at increasing the margins of the training examples. Finally, we compare our explanation to those based on the bias-variance decomposition.