Style and the “Idea” of the sophist after Plato : the impact of form typology on sophistic teaching and writing on interdisciplinary scholarly work

Resumen: Después de la primera sofística, los sofistas actuaron entre el resto de los pensadores del Mediterráneo como un grupo definido. Dado que hay muchos ejemplos que muestran que los sofistas ejercían sus prácticas y que también eran personas comprometidas en otras actividades, vamos a examinar aquí diversos casos de semejanzas y diferencias entre ellos y otros grupos de pensadores. Nuestras tres preguntas fundamentales son: qué, cómo y por qué los sofistas escribían y enseñaban. Intentaremos responder haciendo un análisis diacrónico de las principales formas y géneros de escritura que produjeron (qué). El cómo lo responderemos en su desenvolvimiento como una actividad comunicativa más allá de las fronteras de las disciplinas de la época. El por qué tendrá su respuesta al enfatizar la necesidad de la actividad de los sofistas en la socialización de la época y en la educación de la antigüedad. Al aseverar que el estilo era la idea de los sofistas, ponemos la noción de idea en Platón en el contexto de idea derivado de los sofistas contemporáneos a él y de los sofistas posteriores (segunda sofística) y centramos el foco en la función de visualidad expresada en su concepto de idea desde las obras sofísticas más tempranas en la época de Platón hasta las contribuciones posteriores.

Quæ in hoc perutili oposculo continentur : Francisci Nigri Viri diligentissimi de Grammatica libri decem ..., Georgii Valle de Orthographia opusculum consumatissimum, Libanii Sophistæ de componendis epistolis præceptiones utilissime per Philelphum traductæ

Mode of access: Internet.

Platōnos Sophistēs /

Mode of access: Internet.

A retomada da sofística em Nietzsche

Dedicamo-nos ao estudo do modo como ocorre a retomada da sofística em Nietzsche. Partimos, então, do pressuposto de que há uma ligação entre Nietzsche e os sofistas e, por isso, dialogamos com os principais estudos que aproximam Nietzsche e a sofística. Nosso objetivo é, primeiramente, apresentar a visão geral entre as investigações sobre a relação de Nietzsche com a sofística. Para, então, mostrar certos equívocos no modo habitual de relacionar a filosofia nietzschiana ao movimento sofista. Nossa principal investida é contra o modo habitual de aproximação entre Nietzsche e a doutrina do homem- medida de Protágoras. Também discutimos o lugar de Cálicles no pensamento nietzschiano, principalmente, porque na visão geral que aproxima Nietzsche e os sofistas, a doutrina de Cálicles, acerca do direito do mais forte, está relacionada à idéia nietzschiana de além-homem. Acreditamos que nem na abordagem de Protágoras nem na de Cálicles, há argumentos condizentes para uma retomada da sofística no pensamento nietzschiano. Nossa defesa é de que o sofista Górgias é a palavra-chave no entendimento da relação de Nietzsche com os sofistas. Nosso argumento tem sua base na importância do historiador Tucídides para a concepção nietzschiana de história. Defendemos uma influência da retórica sofista, cujo principal representante é Górgias, tanto na apresentação quanto no modo de investigação do trabalho tucidideano. Tal influência resultará em uma articulação entre Nietzsche, Tucídides, sofística e história. Para apresentação dessa articulação, nosso estudo expõe a importância do elemento ficcional, tanto para as reflexões nietzschianas quanto para a retórica sofística de Górgias, de modo relacionar essa importância à concepção de história de Tucídides.

La amistad cívica en Aristóteles: concordia y fraternidad

El artículo muestra la importancia de la amistad en el contexto de la filosofía política aristotélica. Esta importancia se verifica en su peso específico en comparación con la justicia, puesto que Aristóteles mismo sostiene que la amistad cívica es incluso un objetivo superior al de la búsqueda de la justicia. En concreto, el artículo se centra en la función de la concordia, como tipo especial de amistad cívica, en términos de conservación de la unidad y estabilidad de la polis. Para captar su significación, se plantea el papel de la concordia como complemento a la condición política del ser humano. La concordia es necesaria a la luz de la tendencia a la lucha entre las partes de la ciudad, entre el demos y los oligarcas. Puesto que esta lucha pone en peligro la continuidad de la polis, la concordia entre ciudadanos se convierte en un antecedente privilegiado del principio de fraternidad republicana, el cual todavía no ha gozado de una atención suficiente en el campo de la historia de la filosofía política.

Division et dialectique : évolution et unité dans les dialogues tardifs de Platon

Le présent mémoire décrit le rôle et l’application de la méthode platonicienne des divisions telle que décrite dans le Sophiste, le Politique, le Phèdre et le Philèbe. Il met en relief les différences et les similitudes du rôle et de l’application de la méthode dans ces quatre dialogues, afin d’analyser la possibilité ou bien de postuler l’unité de la doctrine platonicienne, ou bien de retracer les lieux de son évolution. Certains auteurs du siècle dernier affirment qu’il n’est pas possible de retracer quelque évolution que ce soit dans la doctrine, et estiment même que la méthode des divisions est utilisée bien au-delà de ces quatre dialogues, et que son absence des dialogues de jeunesse ne doit en aucun cas être prise pour une absence de la doctrine de l’époque. D’autres sont au contraire convaincus que la méthode des divisions est propre à un stade de la pensée de Platon qui ne peut être que postérieur à l’introduction de la théorie des Formes intelligibles, et que cette méthode incarne même, à toutes fins pratiques, la dialectique platonicienne des dialogues tardifs.

Le concept de justice et la quête du bonheur chez Thrasymaque de Chalcédoine

Thrasymaque de Chalcédoine, un sophiste de renom dans l'Athènes du Ve siècle av. J.C. est présenté comme l'interlocuteur principal de Socrate dans le livre I de la République. Il y est surtout question de la justice et des implications qui en découlent, Socrate et Thrasymaque ne s'entendant évidemment pas sur la nature de la justice. Thrasymaque, poussé par le questionnement constant de Socrate, en vient à formuler différentes thèses sur la justice, notamment : «Je soutiens, moi, que le juste n'est rien d'autre que l'intérêt du plus fort» (Rép. 338c) et «la justice et le juste constituent en réalité le bien d'un autre.» (Rép. 343c) Parallèlement, il oppose au philosophe une vision de la justice difficile à accepter, mais aussi difficile à réfuter : celui qui commet l'injustice est plus heureux que celui qui agit en fonction de la justice. Ainsi, pour Thrasymaque, l'injuste est meilleur que le juste et est plus heureux, car l'injustice est plus profitable pour soi-même. Selon cette vision, qu'est-ce donc que la justice, et en quoi n'est-elle pas profitable pour soi-même? L'objectif de ce mémoire sera de faire ressortir positivement la conception de la justice de Thrasymaque, car c'est avec elle qu'entre en conflit la recherche du bonheur. En effet, si la justice est la représentation des intérêts du dirigeant, comme l'avance le sophiste, alors être juste n'est rien d'autre qu'agir en fonction des intérêts d'autrui et non de soi-même. Cependant, dans une Cité où les individus sont sous la gouverne de la loi, il n'est pas si simple d'agir toujours selon ses propres intérêts lorsque ceux-ci sont contraires à la justice. C'est pourquoi il sera également pertinent de s'attarder aux caractéristiques et aux vertus qu'un individu doit posséder, selon Thrasymaque, pour être heureux. Nous essaierons donc de dégager de la pensée de Thrasymaque un modèle de vie à suivre : le κρείττων. En dernière analyse, nous mettrons en relief la position de Thrasymaque avec la critique platonicienne. Pour Socrate, la position voulant que l'injustice soit profitable est difficile, car il lui faudra montrer que c'est en fait la justice qui apporte le bonheur, en tant qu'elle est une vertu de l'âme.

Plato's legacy : How to do philosophy

Although it has its origins earlier, philosophy as we know it in the West took its shape from the Socrates of Plato's Dialogues. It is not implausible to regard the Dialogues as heuristic devices designed for engaging in philosophical inquiry. As such, they would model the process of philosophical inquiry as well as illustrate the common pitfalls or errors to avoid when engaging in such inquiry. So it will not be surprising to see Socrates, the character of the Dialogues, modeling questionable, even poor, inquiry techniques as well as good; admonishing other characters for poor technique and reminding them of lessons they should have learned earlier in their tuition. Plato presumably would expect students reading and role-playing a Dialogue to recognise when and where such instances occur. It is instructive then to take a close look at one of the longer dialogues featuring Socrates engaging in such inquiry, not with an untutored interlocutor, but with a professional, the sophist Protagoras, in order to identify the features of the inquiry itself. For this will reveal something of what Plato conceived to be the activity of philosophy to which we are the heirs. The Protagoras can be read as an illustration (not a definition) of how to do philosophy. And to aid this reading, I propose to focus on the logical form of the inquiry, the moves made by the characters and the techniques displayed, rather than the adequacy of the substantive arguments they mount.

Pierre Hadot (1922-2010)

Pierre Hadot, classical philosopher and historian of philosophy, is best known for his conception of ancient philosophy as a bios or way of life (manière de vivre). His work has been widely influential in classical studies and on thinkers, including Michel Foucault. According to Hadot, twentieth- and twenty-first-century academic philosophy has largely lost sight of its ancient origin in a set of spiritual practices that range from forms of dialogue, via species of meditative reflection, to theoretical contemplation. These philosophical practices, as well as the philosophical discourses the different ancient schools developed in conjunction with them, aimed primarily to form, rather than only to inform, the philosophical student. The goal of the ancient philosophies, Hadot argued, was to cultivate a specific, constant attitude toward existence, by way of the rational comprehension of the nature of humanity and its place in the cosmos. This cultivation required, specifically, that students learn to combat their passions and the illusory evaluative beliefs instilled by their passions, habits, and upbringing. To cultivate philosophical discourse or writing without connection to such a transformed ethical comportment was, for the ancients, to be as a rhetorician or a sophist, not a philosopher. However, according to Hadot, with the advent of the Christian era and the eventual outlawing, in 529 C.E., of the ancient philosophical schools, philosophy conceived of as a bios largely disappeared from the West. Its spiritual practices were integrated into, and adapted by, forms of Christian monasticism. The philosophers’ dialectical techniques and metaphysical views were integrated into, and subordinated, first to revealed theology and then, later, to the modern natural sciences. However, Hadot maintained that the conception of philosophy as a bios has never completely disappeared from the West, resurfacing in Montaigne, Rousseau, Goethe, Thoreau, Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer, and even in the works of Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Heidegger.

Hadot’s conception of ancient philosophy and his historical narrative of its disappearance in the West have provoked both praise and criticism. Hadot received a host of letters from students around the world telling him that his works had changed their lives, perhaps the most fitting tribute given the nature of Hadot’s meta-philosophical claims. Unlike many of his European contemporaries, Hadot’s work is characterized by lucid, restrained prose; clarity of argument; the near-complete absence of recondite jargon; and a gentle, if sometimes self-depreciating, humor. While Hadot was an admirer of Nietzsche and Heidegger, and committed to a kind of philosophical recasting of the history of Western ideas, Hadot’s work lacks any eschatological sense of the end of philosophy, humanism, or the West. Late in life, Hadot would report that this was because he was animated by the sense that philosophy, as conceived and practiced in the ancient schools, remains possible for men and women of his era: “from 1970 on, I have felt very strongly that it was Epicureanism and Stoicism which could nourish the spiritual life of men and women of our times, as well as my own” (PWL 280).

The Sophists (Ancient Greek)

The sophists were itinerant professional teachers and intellectuals who frequented Athens and other Greek cities in the second half of the fifth century B.C.E. In return for a fee, the sophists offered young wealthy Greek men an education in aretē (virtue or excellence), thereby attaining wealth and fame while also arousing significant antipathy. Prior to the fifth century B.C.E., aretē was predominately associated with aristocratic warrior virtues such as courage and physical strength. In democratic Athens of the latter fifth century B.C.E., however, aretē was increasingly understood in terms of the ability to influence one’s fellow citizens in political gatherings through rhetorical persuasion; the sophistic education both grew out of and exploited this shift. The most famous representatives of the sophistic movement are Protagoras, Gorgias, Antiphon, Hippias, Prodicus and Thrasymachus.

The historical and philological difficulties confronting an interpretation of the sophists are significant. Only a handful of sophistic texts have survived and most of what we know of the sophists is drawn from second-hand testimony, fragments and the generally hostile depiction of them in Plato’s dialogues.

The philosophical problem of the nature of sophistry is arguably even more formidable. Due in large part to the influence of Plato and Aristotle, the term sophistry has come to signify the deliberate use of fallacious reasoning, intellectual charlatanism and moral unscrupulousness. It is, as the article explains, an oversimplification to think of the historical sophists in these terms because they made genuine and original contributions to Western thought. Plato and Aristotle nonetheless established their view of what constitutes legitimate philosophy in part by distinguishing their own activity – and that of Socrates – from the sophists. If one is so inclined, sophistry can thus be regarded, in a conceptual as well as historical sense, as the ‘other’ of philosophy.

Perhaps because of the interpretative difficulties mentioned above, the sophists have been many things to many people. For Hegel (1995/1840) the sophists were subjectivists whose sceptical reaction to the objective dogmatism of the presocratics was synthesised in the work of Plato and Aristotle. For the utilitarian English classicist George Grote (1904), the sophists were progressive thinkers who placed in question the prevailing morality of their time. More recent work by French theorists such as Jacques Derrida (1981) and Jean Francois-Lyotard (1985) suggests affinities between the sophists and postmodernism.

This article provides a broad overview of the sophists, and indicates some of the central philosophical issues raised by their work. Section 1 discusses the meaning of the term sophist. Section 2 surveys the individual contributions of the most famous sophists. Section 3 examines three themes that have often been taken as characteristic of sophistic thought: the distinction between nature and convention, relativism about knowledge and truth and the power of speech. Finally, section 4 analyses attempts by Plato and others to establish a clear demarcation between philosophy and sophistry.