Migration across Spanish provinces: Evidence from the social security records (1978-1992)

This paper uses Social Security records to study internal migrationin Spain. This is the first paper that uses this data source, whichhas some advantages with respect to existing data sources: it includesonly job-seeking migrants and it allows to identify temporary migration. Within the framework of an extended gravity model, we estimate a Generalized Negative Binomial regression on gross migration flows between provinces. We quantify the effect of local labor market imbalances on workers' mobility and discuss the equilibrating role of internal migration in Spain. Our main results show that the effect of employment opportunities have changed after 1984; migrants seem to be more responsive to economic conditions but, consistently with previous studies for the Spanish labor market, the migration response to wage differentials is wrongly signed. Our analysis also confirms the larger internal mobility of highly qualified workers.

The accuracy of survey-reported marital status : evidence from survey records matched to social security records /

"January 1999."

The extent of use of Social Security numbers.

"OAI-06-88-00800."

Linkages with data from Social Security administrative records in the Health and Retirement Study /

"August 1999."

Social Security benefit reporting in the Survey of Income and Program Participation and in Social Security Administrative records /

"June 2002."

Chagas' disease and social security: a case-control study in an urban area, Goiás, Brazil

One hundred and twenty subjects with Chagas' cardiopathy and 120 non-infected subjects were randomly selected from first time claimants of sickness benefits in the National Institute of Social Security (INPS) in Goiás. Cases of Chagas' cardiopathy were defined based on serological test, history of residence in an endemic area and, clinical and/or electrocardiogram (ECG) alterations suggestive of Chagas' cardiomyopathy. Controls were defined as subjects with at least two negative serological tests. Case and controls were compared in the analysis for age, sex, place of birth, migration history, socio-economic level, occupation, physical exertion at work, age at affiliation and years of contribution to the social security scheme, clinical course of their disease and ECG abnormalities. Chagas' disease patients were younger than other subjects and predominantly of rural origin. Non-infected subjects presented a better socio-economic level, were performing more skilled activities and had less changes of job than cases. No important difference was observed in relation to age at affiliation to INPS. About 60% of cases have claimed for benefits within the first four years of contribution while among controls this proportion was 38.5%. Cases were involved, proportionally more than controls, in "heavy" activities. A risk of 2.3 (95%CL 1.5 - 4.6) and 1.8 (95%CL 1.2- 3.5) was obtained comparing respectively "heavy" and "moderate" physical activity against "light". A relative risk of 8.5 (95%CL 4.9 - 14.8) associated with the presence of cardiopathy was estimated comparing the initial sample of seropositive subjects and controls. A high relative risk was observed in relation to right bundle branch block (RR = 37.1 95%CL = 8.8 - 155.6) and left anterior hemiblock (RR = 4.4, 95%CL = 2.1 - 9.1).

The impacts of the Cape Verde self-employed social security scheme

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Determinants of social security pensions expenditure in Portugal

In most European countries Social Security (SS) systems are characterized as Pay-asyou- go systems. Their sustainability is being challenged with demographic changes, namely population ageing. Portugal’s population is ageing rapidly being one of the countries where this problem is more critical. With the growing debate on this topic several public choice models have been developed so as to explain SS size. In this work project there is an attempt to understand whether these models contribute to better explain Social security expenditure with pensions (SSEP) and to establish the need of finding ways to reduce present commitment with pension expenditure in Portugal.

A wave of change: Labor market and social security impacts of the EU refugee inflow

The recent massive inflow of refugees to the European Union (EU) raises a number of unanswered questions on the economic impact of this phenomenon. To examine these questions, we constructed an overlapping-generations model that describes the evolution of the skill premium and of the welfare benefit level in relevant European countries, in the aftermath of an inflow of asylum-seekers. In our simulation, relative wages of skilled workers increase between 8% and 11% in the period of the inflow; their subsequent time path is dependent on the initial skill premium. The entry of migrants creates a fiscal surplus of about 8%, which can finance higher welfare benefits in the subsequent periods. These effects are weaker in a scenario where refugees do not fully integrate into the labor market.

Topics in public finance: social security and taxation

Summary The field of public finance focuses on the spending and taxing activities of governments and their influence on the allocation of resources and distribution of income. This work covers in three parts different topics related to public finance which are currently widely discussed in media and politics. The first two parts deal with issues on social security, which is in general one of the biggest spending shares of governments. The third part looks at the main income source of governments by analyzing the perceived value of tax competition. Part one deals with the current problem of increased early retirement by focusing on Switzerland as a special case. Early retirement is predominantly considered to be the result of incentives set by social security and the tax system. But the Swiss example demonstrates that the incidence of early retirement has dramatically increased even in the absence of institutional changes. We argue that the wealth effect also plays an important role in the retirement decision for middle and high income earners. An actuarially fair, but mandatory funded system with a relatively high replacement rate may thus contribute to a low labor market participation rate of elderly workers. We provide evidence using a unique dataset on individual retirement decisions in Swiss pension funds, allowing us to perfectly control for pension scheme details. Our findings suggest that affordability is a key determinant in the retirement decisions. The higher the accumulated pension capital, the earlier men, and to a smaller extent women, tend to leave the workforce. The fact that early retirement has become much more prevalent in the last 15 years is a further indicator of the importance of a wealth effect, as the maturing of the Swiss mandatory funded pension system over that period has led to an increase in the effective replacement rates for middle and high income earners. Part two covers the theoretical side of social security. Theories analyzing optimal social security benefits provide important qualitative results, by mainly using one general type of an economy. Economies are however very diverse concerning numerous aspects, one of the most important being the wealth level. This can lead to significant quantitative benefit differences that imply differences in replacement rates and levels of labor supply. We focus on several aspects related to this fact. In a within cohort social security model, we introduce disability insurance with an imperfect screening mechanism. We then vary the wealth level of the model economy and analyze how the optimal social security benefit structure or equivalently, the optimal replacement rates, changes depending on the wealth level of the economy, and if the introduction of disability insurance into a social security system is preferable for all economies. Second, the screening mechanism of disability insurance and the threshold level at which people are defined as disabled can differ. For economies with different wealth levels, we determine for different thresholds the screening level that maximizes social welfare. Finally, part three turns to the income of governments, by adding an element to the controversy on tax competition versus tax harmonization.2 Inter-jurisdictional tax competition can generate at least two potential benefits or costs: On a public level, tax competition may result in a lower or higher efficiency in the production of public services. But there is also a more private benefit in the form of an option for individuals to move to a community with a lower tax rate in the future. To explore the value citizens attach to tax competition we analyze a unique popular vote for a complete tax harmonization between communities in the third largest Swiss canton, Vaud. Although a majority of voters would have seemingly benefited from replacing the current tax rate by a revenue-neutral average tax rate, the proposal was rejected by a large margin. Our estimates suggest that the estimated combined perceived benefit from tax competition is in the range of 10%.

The Farm, the city, and the emergence of social security

We study the social, demographic and economic origins of social security. The data for the U.S. and for a cross section of countries suggest that urbanization and industrialization are associated with the rise of social insurance. We describe an OLG model in which demographics, technology, and social security are linked together in a political economy equilibrium. In the model economy, there are two locations (sectors), the farm (agricultural) and the city (industrial) and the decision to migrate from rural to urban locations is endogenous and linked to productivity differences between the two locations and survival probabilities. Farmers rely on land inheritance for their old age and do not support a pay-as-you-go social security system. With structural change, people migrate to the city, the land loses its importance and support for social security arises. We show that a calibrated version of this economy, where social security taxes are determined by majority voting, is consistent with the historical transformation in the United States.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Social security, retirement, and the single-mindedness of the electorate

We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important featuresof social security programs around the world: (1) they redistributeincome from young to old and (2) they induce retirement. We construct avoting model that includes a political campaign or debate prior to theelection. The model incorporates single-mindedness of the groups that donot work: while the workers divide their political capital between their age concerns and occupational concerns , the retired concentrate alltheir political capital to support their age group. In our model, theelderly end up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young)and distortionary labor income taxes induce the retirement of the elderly.In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that work morewill tend to have more political power. The opposite is true fornon-occupational groups (such as the elderly). We provide some evidencethat supports these additional predictions.