The Benefits Planner: Improved Work Incentives in Social Security Disability Insurance Program - Changes Will Make Work More Attractive to SSDI Recipients

This newsletter will provide valuable information on how work for persons with disabilities effects government benefits, with an emphasis on the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) work incentives. Each newsletter will contribute to an ongoing dialogue on topics related to benefits and work.

Program administration review of the social security disability insurance and the supplemental security income vocational rehabilitation programs.

Report year ends Sept. 30.

Social security disability : disappointing results from SSA's efforts to improve the disability claims process warrant immediate attention : report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Social Security, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representative /

"GAO-02-322."

The Eligibility Definition Used in the Social Security Administration’s Disability Programs Needs to be Changed

In its October 2003 report on the definition of disability used by the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s) disability programs [i.e., Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for people with disabilities], the Social Security Advisory Board raises the issue of whether this definition is at odds with the concept of disability embodied in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and, more importantly, with the aspirations of people with disabilities to be full participants in mainstream social activities and lead fulfilling, productive lives. The Board declares that “the Nation must face up to the contradictions created by the existing definition of disability.” I wholeheartedly agree. Further, I have concluded that we have to make fundamental, conceptual changes to both how we define eligibility for economic security benefits, and how we provide those benefits, if we are ever to fulfill the promise of the ADA. To convince you of that proposition, I will begin by relating a number of facts that paint a very bleak picture – a picture of deterioration in the economic security of the population that the disability programs are intended to serve; a picture of programs that purport to provide economic security, but are themselves financially insecure and subject to cycles of expansion and cuts that undermine their purpose; a picture of programs that are facing their biggest expenditure crisis ever; and a picture of an eligibility determination process that is inefficient and inequitable -- one that rations benefits by imposing high application costs on applicants in an arbitrary fashion. I will then argue that the fundamental reason for this bleak picture is the conceptual definition of eligibility that these programs use – one rooted in a disability paradigm that social scientists, people with disabilities, and, to a substantial extent, the public have rejected as being flawed, most emphatically through the passage of the ADA. Current law requires eligibility rules to be based on the premise that disability is medically determinable. That’s wrong because, as the ADA recognizes, a person’s environment matters. I will further argue that programs relying on this eligibility definition must inevitably: reward people if they do not try to help themselves, but not if they do; push the people they serve out of society’s mainstream, fostering a culture of isolation and dependency; relegate many to a lifetime of poverty; and undermine their promise of economic security because of the periodic “reforms” that are necessary to maintain taxpayer support. I conclude by pointing out that to change the conceptual definition for program eligibility, we also must change our whole approach to providing for the economic security of people with disabilities. We need to replace our current “caretaker” approach with one that emphasizes helping people with disabilities help themselves. I will briefly describe features that such a program might require, and point out the most significant challenges we would face in making the transition.

Allegations of bias within the social security disability program : hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, September 22, 1992.

Shipping list no.: 93-0203-P.

Social Security disability programs : assessing the variation in allowance rates /

"August 2002."

Social security : racial difference in disability decisions warrants further investigation : report to the Ranking Minority Member, Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate /

"B-247327."

Occupational characteristics of disabled workers, 1975-1976 : analysis of social security disability benefit allowances to workers during 1975-1976 /

Bibliography: p. 149-150.

Lifetime redistributuion under the social security program: a literature synopis /

"April 1999."

Supplemental security income : disability program vulnerable to applicant fraud when middlemen are used : report to the Chairman, Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate /

"B-257888"--P. 1.

Counting the disabled : using survey self-reports to estimate medical eligibility for Social Security's disability programs /

"January 2001."

Measuring the biases in self-reported disability status : Evidence from aggregate data

Self-reported health status measures are generally used to analyse Social Security Disability Insurance's (SSDI) application and award decisions as well as the relationship between its generosity and labour force participation. Due to endogeneity and measurement error, the use of self-reported health and disability indicators as explanatory variables in economic models is problematic. We employ county-level aggregate data, instrumental variables and spatial econometric techniques to analyse the determinants of variation in SSDI rates and explicitly account for the endogeneity and measurement error of the self-reported disability measure. Two surprising results are found. First, it is shown that measurement error is the dominating source of the bias and that the main source of measurement error is sampling error. Second, results suggest that there may be synergies for applying for SSDI when the disabled population is larger. © 2011 Taylor & Francis.

Work Study and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)

This Just the Facts Series details Work Study and Supplemental Security Income.

The effects of government disability benefits, accessibility laws and rehabilitation on employment choices by individuals with spinal cord injuries

Greater inclusion of individuals with disabilities into mainstream society is an important goal for society. One of the best ways to include individuals is to actively promote and encourage their participation in the labor force. Of all disabilities, it is feasible to assume that individual with spinal cord injuries can be among the most easily mainstreamed into the labor force. However, less that fifty percent of individuals with spinal cord injuries work. ^ This study focuses on how disability benefit programs, such as Social Security Disability Insurance, and Worker's Compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and rehabilitation programs affect employment decisions. The questions were modeled using utility theory with an augmented expenditure function and indifference theory. Statically, Probit, Logit, predicted probability, and linear regressions were used to analyze these questions. Statistical analysis was done on the probability of working, ever attempting to work after injury, and on the number of years after injury that work was first attempted and the number of hours worked per week. The data utilized were from the National Spinal Cord Injury Database and the Spinal Cord Injuries and Labor Database. The Spinal Cord Injuries and Labor Database was created specifically for this study by the author. Receiving disability benefits decreased the probability of working, of ever attempting to work, increased the number of years after injury before the first work attempt was made, and decreased the number of hours worked per week for those individuals working. These results were all statistically significant. The Americans with Disabilities Act decrease the number of years before an individual made a work attempt. The decrease is statistically significant. The amount of rehabilitation had a significant positive effect for male individuals with low paraplegia, and significant negative effect for individuals with high tetraplegia. For women, there were significant negative effects for high tetraplegia and high paraplegia. ^ This study finds that the financial disincentives of receiving benefits are the major determinants of whether an individual with a spinal cord injury returns to the labor force. Policies are recommended that would decrease the disincentive. ^

The effects of government disability benefits, accessibility laws and rehabilitation on employment choices by individuals with spinal cord injuries

Greater inclusion of individuals with disabilities into mainstream society is an important goal for society. One of the best ways to include individuals is to actively promote and encourage their participation in the labor force. Of all disabilities, it is feasible to assume that individual with spinal cord injuries can be among the most easily mainstreamed into the labor force. However, less that fifty percent of individuals with spinal cord injuries work. This study focuses on how disability benefit programs, such as Social Security Disability Insurance, and Worker's Compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and rehabilitation programs affect employment decisions. The questions were modeled using utility theory with an augmented expenditure function and indifference theory. Statically, Probit, Logit, predicted probability, and linear regressions were used to analyze these questions. Statistical analysis was done on the probability of working, ever attempting to work after injury, and on the number of years after injury that work was first attempted and the number of hours worked per week. The data utilized were from the National Spinal Cord Injury Database and the Spinal Cord Injuries and Labor Database. The Spinal Cord Injuries and Labor Database was created specifically for this study by the author. Receiving disability benefits decreased the probability of working, of ever attempting to work, increased the number of years after injury before the first work attempt was made, and decreased the number of hours worked per week for those individuals working. These results were all statistically significant. The Americans with Disabilities Act decrease the number of years before an individual made a work attempt. The decrease is statistically significant. The amount of rehabilitation had a significant positive effect for male individuals with low paraplegia, and significant negative effect for individuals with high tetraplegia. For women, there were significant negative effects for high tetraplegia and high paraplegia. This study finds that the financial disincentives of receiving benefits are the major determinants of whether an individual with a spinal cord injury returns to the labor force. Policies are recommended that would decrease the disincentive.