Um novo horizonte para a cooperação bilateral entre Espanha e Portugal em matéria de defesa

Os Estados Membros da UE devem assumir a responsabilidade pela sua defesa e segurança, num novo quadro com menos presença dos EUA e novas ameaças. A perda de capacidades militares desde o início da crise é evidente, tornando-se necessária uma partilha que permita manter a eficiência e a economia de meios. Nesta conjuntura, Portugal e Espanha têm definido no Tratado de Baiona (2015) o mais ambicioso quadro legal da sua história para uma necessária cooperação bilateral em defesa. Uma iniciativa que pode e deve servir de primeiro passo na integração da defesa comum europeia. O presente trabalho desenha uma estratégia de cooperação bilateral, materializada num modelo de cooperação construído sobre o Tratado de Baiona, que resulta de analisar os fins, os meios e os modos de cooperação em europa nos níveis regional (OTAN e UE) e sub-regional (bilaterais e minilaterais). Abstract: The Member States of the UE need to assume the responsibility of their defense and security, in the framework of a reduced presence of the USA and increased threats. The loss of military capabilities from the beginning of the crises appears to be evident, making necessary the establishment of a sharing procedure that ensures efficiency and economy of means. Within this situation, Portugal and Spain have defined in the Treaty of Baiona (2015) the most ambitious legal framework ever in their common history, for an enhanced bilateral defense cooperation. This initiative may and must serve as first step in the integration of an European common defense. The present work designs a strategy for bilateral cooperation, materialized in a cooperation model build upon the Treaty of Baiona, as a result of the analysis of the ends, ways and means of the European cooperation at both regional (NATO & EU) and sub-regional (bilateral & minilateral) levels.

Gap analysis of intrusion detection in smart grids

Given the recent emergence of the smart grid and smart grid related technologies, their security is a prime concern. Intrusion detection provides a second line of defense. However, conventional intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are unable to adequately address the unique requirements of the smart grid. This paper presents a gap analysis of contemporary IDSs from a smart grid perspective. This paper highlights the lack of adequate intrusion detection within the smart grid and discusses the limitations of current IDSs approaches. The gap analysis identifies current IDSs as being unsuited to smart grid application without significant changes to address smart grid specific requirements.

Broadband electromagnetic cloaking with smart metamaterials.

The ability to render objects invisible with a cloak that fits all objects and sizes is a long-standing goal for optical devices. Invisibility devices demonstrated so far typically comprise a rigid structure wrapped around an object to which it is fitted. Here we demonstrate smart metamaterial cloaking, wherein the metamaterial device not only transforms electromagnetic fields to make an object invisible, but also acquires its properties automatically from its own elastic deformation. The demonstrated device is a ground-plane microwave cloak composed of an elastic metamaterial with a broad operational band (10-12 GHz) and nearly lossless electromagnetic properties. The metamaterial is uniform, or perfectly periodic, in its undeformed state and acquires the necessary gradient-index profile, mimicking a quasi-conformal transformation, naturally from a boundary load. This easy-to-fabricate hybrid elasto-electromagnetic metamaterial opens the door to implementations of a variety of transformation optics devices based on quasi-conformal maps.

Extended-range smart conventional weapon systems : a paper /

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Defense against node compromise in sensor network security

Recent advances in electronic and computer technologies lead to wide-spread deployment of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). WSNs have wide range applications, including military sensing and tracking, environment monitoring, smart environments, etc. Many WSNs have mission-critical tasks, such as military applications. Thus, the security issues in WSNs are kept in the foreground among research areas. Compared with other wireless networks, such as ad hoc, and cellular networks, security in WSNs is more complicated due to the constrained capabilities of sensor nodes and the properties of the deployment, such as large scale, hostile environment, etc. Security issues mainly come from attacks. In general, the attacks in WSNs can be classified as external attacks and internal attacks. In an external attack, the attacking node is not an authorized participant of the sensor network. Cryptography and other security methods can prevent some of external attacks. However, node compromise, the major and unique problem that leads to internal attacks, will eliminate all the efforts to prevent attacks. Knowing the probability of node compromise will help systems to detect and defend against it. Although there are some approaches that can be used to detect and defend against node compromise, few of them have the ability to estimate the probability of node compromise. Hence, we develop basic uniform, basic gradient, intelligent uniform and intelligent gradient models for node compromise distribution in order to adapt to different application environments by using probability theory. These models allow systems to estimate the probability of node compromise. Applying these models in system security designs can improve system security and decrease the overheads nearly in every security area. Moreover, based on these models, we design a novel secure routing algorithm to defend against the routing security issue that comes from the nodes that have already been compromised but have not been detected by the node compromise detecting mechanism. The routing paths in our algorithm detour those nodes which have already been detected as compromised nodes or have larger probabilities of being compromised. Simulation results show that our algorithm is effective to protect routing paths from node compromise whether detected or not.

Defense Against Node Compromise in Sensor Network Security

Recent advances in electronic and computer technologies lead to wide-spread deployment of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). WSNs have wide range applications, including military sensing and tracking, environment monitoring, smart environments, etc. Many WSNs have mission-critical tasks, such as military applications. Thus, the security issues in WSNs are kept in the foreground among research areas. Compared with other wireless networks, such as ad hoc, and cellular networks, security in WSNs is more complicated due to the constrained capabilities of sensor nodes and the properties of the deployment, such as large scale, hostile environment, etc. Security issues mainly come from attacks. In general, the attacks in WSNs can be classified as external attacks and internal attacks. In an external attack, the attacking node is not an authorized participant of the sensor network. Cryptography and other security methods can prevent some of external attacks. However, node compromise, the major and unique problem that leads to internal attacks, will eliminate all the efforts to prevent attacks. Knowing the probability of node compromise will help systems to detect and defend against it. Although there are some approaches that can be used to detect and defend against node compromise, few of them have the ability to estimate the probability of node compromise. Hence, we develop basic uniform, basic gradient, intelligent uniform and intelligent gradient models for node compromise distribution in order to adapt to different application environments by using probability theory. These models allow systems to estimate the probability of node compromise. Applying these models in system security designs can improve system security and decrease the overheads nearly in every security area. Moreover, based on these models, we design a novel secure routing algorithm to defend against the routing security issue that comes from the nodes that have already been compromised but have not been detected by the node compromise detecting mechanism. The routing paths in our algorithm detour those nodes which have already been detected as compromised nodes or have larger probabilities of being compromised. Simulation results show that our algorithm is effective to protect routing paths from node compromise whether detected or not.

Queensland's Smart State Initiative : a successful knowledge based urban development strategy

The chapter will set out to explain the KBUD and urban policy making processes in Queensland, Australia. This chapter will draw on providing a clear understanding on policy frameworks and relevant ICT applications of the Queensland ‘Smart State’ experience. The chapter is consisted of six sections. The first section following the introduction provides background information. The second section focuses on the KBUD processes in Queensland. The third section offers a comprehensive analysis of the ‘Queensland Smart State’ initiative, and it also identifies actors and goals of the agenda of Smart State experience. The fourth section reviews knowledge based development and ICT applications and policies of the Queensland Smart State and Brisbane Smart City experiences, and their impacts on Brisbane’s successful KBUD. The fifth section discusses knowledge hubs and ICT developments within the Brisbane metropolitan area. Then the chapter concludes with future trends and conclusion sections.