A model of shadow banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, ii) intermediary assets and leverage move together as in Adrian and Shin (2010), and iii) intermediaries increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce their idiosyncratic risk through diversification, as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010). Under rational expectations, the shadow banking system is stable and improves welfare. When investors and intermediaries neglect tail risks, however, the expansion of risky lending and the concentration of risks in the intermediaries create financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity over time.

Bank versus non-bank credit in the United States, Europe and China. Bruegel Policy Contribution, 2012/07, 5 June 2013

In the wake of recent crisis developments in the US and Europe, non-bank credit channels have often been portrayed as 'shadow banking' and have been considered primarily through the lens of the risks they may pose to financial stability. However, the debate about financial system structures remains immature, in large part due to lack of reliable and comparable data. The available evidence actually points towards a correlation between the development of non-bank credit and higher resilience against systemic risk, at least in developed economies. Policy should aim at better statistical information, and at strengthening the infrastructure for the gradual development of sustainable nonbank credit provision.

Default Invariance: Naïve Category of Law and Finance

Default invariance is the idea that default does not change at any scale of law and finance. Default is a conserved quantity in a universe where fundamental principles of law and finance operate. It exists at the micro-level as part of the fundamental structure of every financial transaction, and at the macro- level, as a fixed critical point within the relatively stable phases of the law and finance cycle. A key point is that default is equivalent to maximizing uncertainty at the micro-level and at the macro-level, is equivalent to the phase transition where unbearable fluctuations occur in all forms of risk transformation, including maturity, liquidity and credit. As such, default invariance is the glue that links the micro and macro structures of law and finance. In this essay, we apply naïve category theory (NCT), a type of mapping logic, to these types of phenomena. The purpose of using NCT is to introduce a rigorous (but simple) mathematical methodology to law and finance discourse and to show that these types of structural considerations are of prime practical importance and significance to law and finance practitioners. These mappings imply a number of novel areas of investigation. From the micro- structure, three macro-approximations are implied. These approximations form the core analytical framework which we will use to examine the phenomena and hypothesize rules governing law and finance. Our observations from these approximations are grouped into five findings. While the entirety of the five findings can be encapsulated by the three approximations, since the intended audience of this paper is the non-specialist in law, finance and category theory, for ease of access we will illustrate the use of the mappings with relatively common concepts drawn from law and finance, focusing especially on financial contracts, derivatives, Shadow Banking, credit rating agencies and credit crises.

Essays on Market Frictions and Securitization

This dissertation provides a novel theory of securitization based on intermediaries minimizing the moral hazard that insiders can misuse assets held on-balance sheet. The model predicts how intermediaries finance different assets. Under deposit funding, the moral hazard is greatest for low-risk assets that yield sizable returns in bad states of nature; under securitization, it is greatest for high-risk assets that require high guarantees and large reserves. Intermediaries thus securitize low-risk assets. In an extension, I identify a novel channel through which government bailouts exacerbate the moral hazard and reduce total investment irrespective of the funding mode. This adverse effect is stronger under deposit funding, implying that intermediaries finance more risky assets off-balance sheet. The dissertation discusses the implications of different forms of guarantees. With explicit guarantees, banks securitize assets with either low information-intensity or low risk. By contrast, with implicit guarantees, banks only securitize assets with high information-intensity and low risk. Two extensions to the benchmark static and dynamic models are discussed. First, an extension to the static model studies the optimality of tranching versus securitization with guarantees. Tranching eliminates agency costs but worsens adverse selection, while securitization with guarantees does the opposite. When the quality of underlying assets in a certain security market is sufficiently heterogeneous, and when the highest quality assets are perceived to be sufficiently safe, securitization with guarantees dominates tranching. Second, in an extension to the dynamic setting, the moral hazard of misusing assets held on-balance sheet naturally gives rise to the moral hazard of weak ex-post monitoring in securitization. The use of guarantees reduces the dependence of banks' ex-post payoffs on monitoring efforts, thereby weakening monitoring incentives. The incentive to monitor under securitization with implicit guarantees is the weakest among all funding modes, as implicit guarantees allow banks to renege on their monitoring promises without being declared bankrupt and punished.

La banca en la sombra en Colombia : la utilización de la libranza como instrumento especulativo, sin la debida protección al inversionista. Análisis de las consecuencias de esta falla del mercado financiero

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Open-economy central banking: Explaining Australia's recommitment to central bank independence

Why do governments offload major instruments such as monetary policy to an independent central bank? This article answers this question in relation to the Australian case, a case which reflects wider global developments. The article challenges the methodology of quantitative approaches to explaining central bank independence and instead argues that a model of 'embedded statism' is the most fruitful explanatory approach.

Finding gold in our shadow: psychotherapy and the shadow syndrome

Drawing on the work of Carl Jung and Robert Bly, Yaro Starak explores how 'shadow work' can be used within a Gestalt group therapy environment to uncover the 'gold in our shadow bags' - hidden inner strengths and resources that we were previously unaware of that may lead to healing and transformation. (editor abstract)

The Limits of Rational Choice: New Institutionalism in the Test Bed of Central Banking Politics in Australia

This paper tests the explanatory capacities of different versions of new institutionalism by examining the Australian case of a general transition in central banking practice and monetary politics: namely, the increased emphasis on low inflation and central bank independence. Standard versions of rational choice institutionalism largely dominate the literature on the politics of central banking, but this approach (here termed RC1) fails to account for Australian empirics. RC1 has a tendency to establish actor preferences exogenously to the analysis; actors' motives are also assumed a priori; actor's preferences are depicted in relatively static, ahistorical terms. And there is the tendency, even a methodological requirement, to assume relatively simple motives and preference sets among actors, in part because of the game theoretic nature of RC1 reasoning. It is possible to build a more accurate rational choice model by re-specifying and essentially updating the context, incentives and choice sets that have driven rational choice in this case. Enter RC2. However, this move subtly introduces methodological shifts and new theoretical challenges. By contrast, historical institutionalism uses an inductive methodology. Compared with deduction, it is arguably better able to deal with complexity and nuance. It also utilises a dynamic, historical approach, and specifies (dynamically) endogenous preference formation by interpretive actors. Historical institutionalism is also able to more easily incorporate a wider set of key explanatory variables and incorporate wider social aggregates. Hence, it is argued that historical institutionalism is the preferred explanatory theory and methodology in this case.

Factores determinantes do nível de divulgação sobre instrumentos derivados de acordo com as recomendações do Basel Committee on Banking Supervision e da Organisation of Securities Commissions - evidência empírica no sector bancário português

Este estudo analisa o nível de divulgação sobre instrumentos derivados e seus factores determinantes nas entidades bancárias portuguesas. Para o efeito, foi utilizado um índice de divulgação, baseado nas recomendações emitidas pelo Basel Committee on Banking Supervision e pela Organisation of Securities Commissions, e analisados os Relatórios & Contas anuais, individuais, relativos a 2009. Conclui-se que o número de empresas que apresenta informação sobre a utilização de instrumentos derivados é bastante elevado, mas o valor médio de divulgação apresentado é bastante reduzido. Identificam-se, como factores determinantes do nível de divulgação, o tamanho da empresa, a qualidade do auditor externo e o facto de a empresa ter procedido a um aumento de capital durante o exercício económico em análise.

Grau de cumprimento com as recomendações do Basel Committee on Banking Supervision e da Organisation of Securities Commissions, sobre divulgação de informação relacionada com instrumentos derivados - evidência empírica no sector bancário português

This study analyzes the level of disclosure on derivatives, in accordance with the recommendations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Organization of Securities Commission, by Portuguese banks. We have analyzed individual annual reports related to 2009, using a disclosure index based on those recommendations. We concluded that the number of companies that provides information about derivative instruments is quite high, but the average value of disclosure is very low. The information disclosed more frequently is that related to general aspects, followed by information related to accounting and valuation methods.

Estudo do grau de cumprimento com as recomendações do Basel Committee on Banking Supervision e da Organisation of Securities Commissions, sobre divulgação de informação relacionada com instrumentos derivados, pelas entidades portuguesas pertencentes ao sector bancário

Este estudo analisa o nível de divulgação sobre instrumentos derivados, de acordo com as recomendações emitidas pelo Basel Committee on Banking Supervision e pela Organisation of Securities Commissions, pelas entidades bancárias portuguesas. Para o efeito, foi utilizado um índice de divulgação e analisados os Relatórios & Contas anuais, individuais, relativos a 2009. Conclui-se que o número de empresas que apresenta informação sobre a utilização de instrumentos derivados é bastante elevado, mas o valor médio de divulgação apresentado é bastante reduzido. A informação mais divulgada é a relativa a informações gerais, seguida da informação relacionada com contabilidade e métodos de avaliação.

Global banking: origins and evolution

This article reviews the origins and evolution of global banking and addresses the emerging patterns for the year 2000 and beyond.