The impact of tax morale and institutional quality on the shadow economy

This paper uses a multivariate analysis to examine how countries‘ tax morale and institutional quality affect the shadow economy. The literature strongly emphasizes the quantitative importance of these factors in understanding the level of and changes in the shadow economy. Newly available data sources offer the unique opportunity to further illuminate a topic that has received increased attention. After controlling for a variety of potential factors, we find strong support that a higher tax morale and a higher institutional quality lead to a smaller shadow economy.

Local autonomy, tax morale, and the shadow economy

Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is an alternative bottom-up approach that decentralises political power to those who are close to the problems. This paper analyses the relationship with local autonomy. We use data on tax morale at the individual level and macro data on the size of the shadow economy to analyse the relevance of local autonomy and compliance in Switzerland. The findings suggest that there is a positive (negative) relationship between local autonomy and tax morale (size of the shadow economy).

Money laundering and the shadow economy in Kazakhstan

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to assess and highlight the approach taken towards the legal control of illicit money laundering taken in the Republic of Kazakhstan, in particular, the role played by an amnesty on the legalisation of illicit funds. This is particularly important as a basis for a wider discussion about the proper limits of the “criminalising” approaches commonly taken in anti-money laundering regulations. Design/methodology/approach The discussion and evaluation in the paper is based upon a conceptual analysis of the money laundering regime in Kazakhstan, in particular, the legal framework and policies of implementation adopted. Findings The paper demonstrates that the problems that are posed by the shadow economy in post-Soviet transition societies can make the blanket criminalisation of money laundering a self-defeating approach, unless accompanied by measures which allow for the achievement of “market-constituting” effects. Research limitations/implications The paper draws on experience and practice in one jurisdiction only (Kazakhstan); it also limits its focus to one particular example of a money laundering amnesty policy. Both of these limitations, therefore, suggest avenues for further comparative research. Originality/value The paper’s conclusions about the interactions between the shadow economies of transitional societies and the global anti-money laundering agenda have wider application in assessments of international law in this area.

The shadow economy as an equilibrium outcome

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of tax evasion where agents choose to report some of their income. Unreported income requires using a payment method that avoids recordkeeping in some markets-cash. Trade using cash to avoid taxes is the 'shadow economy' in our model. We then calibrate our model using money, interest rate and GDP data to back out the size of the shadow economy for a sample of countries and compare our measures to traditional reduced form estimates. © 2014 Elsevier B.V.

Shedding light on the shadow economy : a nighttime light approach

Measuring the shadow economy is inherently difficult, but critical for understanding economic development. Using census data on formal and informal sectors in Cambodia, we document that 96.6% of non-farm establishments do not formally register with the government, and their sales accounted for 76.6% of total sales in 2011. We estimate a relationship between nighttime light and sales across regions separately for formal and informal firms for 2011, and estimate their past sales from changes in nighttime light for 1993-2010. Both formal and informal firms increased their estimated sales, and the share of informal sales increased from 68.8% in 1993 to 76.6% in 2011, suggesting that the informal sector increased quantitatively in both absolute and relative terms throughout the economic development of the Cambodian economy.

Shadow economy and entrepreneurial entry

We analyze theoretically and empirically the impact of the shadow economy on entrepreneurial entry, utilising 1998-2005 individual-level Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data merged with macro level variables. A simple correlation coefficient suggests a positive linear link between the size of the shadow economy and entrepreneurial entry. However, this masks more complex relationships. With appropriate controls and instrumenting for potential endogeneity where required, the impact of the shadow economy on entry is found to be negative, based on a linear specification. Moreover, there is also evidence of nonlinearity: entrepreneurial entry is least likely when the shadow economy is of medium size. We attribute the negative effects of shadow economy on entry to perceived strong competition faced by new entrants when the shadow economy is widespread. At the individual level, an extensive shadow economy has a more negative impact on respondents who are risk averse. In addition, in the economies where property rights are strong, the negative impact of the shadow economy is weaker.

Shadow economy and entrepreneurial entry

The impact of the shadow economy on entrepreneurial entry across countries is analyzed utilising 1998-2005 individual-level Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data and national macro-economic variables. A simple correlation coefficient suggests a positive relationship between the size of the shadow economy and the likelihood of entrepreneurial entry. However, this masks more complex relationships, if, as argued, the shadow economy is an embedded social phenomenon. With appropriate controls and instrumenting for potential endogeneity, the impact of the shadow economy on entry in a linear specification is found to be negative. Further, there is evidence of a U-shaped relationship: entrepreneurial entry is least likely when the shadow economy amounts to about a quarter of gross domestic product (GDP). At the individual level, an extensive shadow economy has a more negative impact on respondents who are risk averse. In addition, in the economies where property rights are stronger, the negative impact of the shadow economy is weaker. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

From Shadow to Green: Linking Environmental Fiscal Reforms and the Informal Economy

47 p.

Essays on Illegal Activities, Institutions and Economic Growth

In public economics, two extremist views on the functions of a government compete: one emphasizes government working for the public interest to provide value for the citizens, while another regards government mainly as a workhorse for private interests. Moreover, as the sole legitimate authority, the government has the right to define the rules and laws as well as to enforce them. With respect to regulation, two extremes arise: from too little regulation to too much of it. If the government does not function or ceases to exist, the state falls into anarchy or chaos (Somalia). If it regulates too much, it will completely suffocate private activities, which might be considered extralegal (the former Soviet Union). In this thesis I scrutinize the government s interventionist policies and evaluate the question of how to best promote economic well-being. The first two essays assume that the government s policies promote illegal activity. The first paper evaluates the interaction between the government and the mafia, and pays attention to the law enforcement of underground production. We show that the revenue-maximizing government will always monitor the shadow economy, as monitoring contributes to the government s revenue. In general, both legal and illegal firms are hurt by the entry of the mafia. It is, however, plausible that legal firms might benefit by the entry of the mafia if it competes with the government. The second paper tackles the issue of the measurement of the size of the shadow economy. To formulate policies it is essential to know what drives illegal economic activity; is it the tax burden, excess regulation, corruption or a weak legal environment? In this paper we propose an additional explanation for tax evasion and shadow production, namely cultural factors as manifested by religion as determinants of tax morality. According to our findings, Catholic and Protestant countries do not differ in their tax morale. The third paper contributes to the literature discussing the role of the government in promoting economic and productivity growth. Our main result is that, given the complex relationship between economic growth and economic freedom, marketization has not necessarily been beneficial in terms of growth. The last paper builds on traditional growth literature and revisits the debate on convergence clubs arising from demographic transition. We provide new evidence against the idea that countries within a club would converge over time. Instead, we propose that since the demographic transition is a dynamic process, one can expect countries to enter the last regime of stable, modern growth in stages.

Environmental fiscal reform and unemployment in Spain in the presence of an informal sector

4 p.