Reproductive bribing and policing as evolutionary mechanisms for the suppression of within-group selfishness.

We show that a new, simple, and robust general mechanism for the social suppression of within-group selfishness follows from Hamilton's rule applied in a multilevel selection approach to asymmetrical, two-person groups: If it pays a group member to behave selfishly (i.e., increase its share of the group's reproduction, at the expense of group productivity), then its partner will virtually always be favored to provide a reproductive "bribe" sufficient to remove the incentive for the selfish behavior. The magnitude of the bribe will vary directly with the number of offspring (or other close kin) potentially gained by the selfish individual and inversely with both the relatedness r between the interactants and the loss in group productivity because of selfishness. This bribe principle greatly extends the scope for cooperation within groups. Reproductive bribing is more likely to be favored over social policing for dominants rather than subordinates and as intragroup relatedness increases. Finally, analysis of the difference between the group optimum for an individual's behavior and the individual's inclusive fitness optimum reveals a paradoxical feedback loop by which bribing and policing, while nullifying particular selfish acts, automatically widen the separation of individual and group optima for other behaviors (i.e., resolution of one conflict intensifies others).

Selfishness and altruism can coexist when help is subject to diminishing returns

Altruism and selfishness are 30–50% heritable in man in both Western and non-Western populations. This genetically based variation in altruism and selfishness requires explanation. In non-human animals, altruism is generally directed towards relatives, and satisfies the condition known as Hamilton's rule. This nepotistic altruism evolves under natural selection only if the ratio of the benefit of receiving help to the cost of giving it exceeds a value that depends on the relatedness of the individuals involved. Standard analyses assume that the benefit provided by each individual is the same but it is plausible in some cases that as more individuals contribute, help is subject to diminishing returns. We analyse this situation using a single-locus two-allele model of selection in a diploid population with the altruistic allele dominant to the selfish allele. The analysis requires calculation of the relationship between the fitnesses of the genotypes and the frequencies of the genes. The fitnesses vary not only with the genotype of the individual but also with the distribution of phenotypes amongst the sibs of the individual and this depends on the genotypes of his parents. These calculations are not possible by direct fitness or ESS methods but are possible using population genetics. Our analysis shows that diminishing returns change the operation of natural selection and the outcome can now be a stable equilibrium between altruistic and selfish alleles rather than the elimination of one allele or the other. We thus provide a plausible genetic model of kin selection that leads to the stable coexistence in the same population of both altruistic and selfish individuals. This may explain reported genetic variation in altruism in man.

Evolution of discrimination in populations at equilibrium between selfishness and altruism

Where there is genetically based variation in selfishness and altruism, as in man, altruists with an innate ability to recognise and thereby only help their altruistic relatives may evolve. Here we use diploid population genetic models to chart the evolution of genetically-based discrimination in populations initially in stable equilibrium between altruism and selfishness. The initial stable equilibria occur because help is assumed subject to diminishing returns. Similar results were obtained whether we used a model with two independently inherited loci, one controlling altruism the other discrimination, or a one locus model with three alleles. The latter is the opposite extreme to the first model, and can be thought of as involving complete linkage between two loci on the same chromosome. The introduction of discrimination reduced the benefits obtained by selfish individuals, more so as the number of discriminators increased, and selfishness was eventually eliminated in some cases. In others selfishness persisted and the evolutionary outcome was a stable equilibrium involving selfish individuals and both discriminating and non-discriminating altruists. Heritable variation in selfishness, altruism and discrimination is predicted to be particularly evident among full sibs. The suggested coexistence of these three genetic dispositions could explain widespread interest within human social groups as to who will and who will not help others. These predictions merit experimental and observational investigation by primatologists, anthropologists and psychologists. Keywords: Population genetics, Diploid, Heritability, Prosocial, Behaviour genetics

Species-level selection reduces selfishness through competitive exclusion

Adaptation does not necessarily lead to traits which are optimal for the population. This is because selection is often the strongest at the individual or gene level. The evolution of selfishness can lead to a 'tragedy of the commons', where traits such as aggression or social cheating reduce population size and may lead to extinction. This suggests that species-level selection will result whenever species differ in the incentive to be selfish. We explore this idea in a simple model that combines individual-level selection with ecology in two interacting species. Our model is not influenced by kin or trait-group selection. We find that individual selection in combination with competitive exclusion greatly increases the likelihood that selfish species go extinct. A simple example of this would be a vertebrate species that invests heavily into squabbles over breeding sites, which is then excluded by a species that invests more into direct reproduction. A multispecies simulation shows that these extinctions result in communities containing species that are much less selfish. Our results suggest that species-level selection and community dynamics play an important role in regulating the intensity of conflicts in natural populations.

Generosity is a sign of trustworthiness—the punishment of selfishness is not

Peer-punishment is an important determinant of cooperation in human groups. It has been suggested that, at the proximate level of analysis, punitive preferences can explain why humans incur costs to punish their deviant peers. How punitive preferences could have evolved in humans is still not entirely understood. A possible explanation at the ultimate level of analysis comes from signaling theory. It has been argued that the punishment of defectors can be a type-separating signal of the punisher's cooperative intent. As a result, punishers are selected more often as interaction partners in social exchange and are partly compensated for the costs they incur when punishing defectors. A similar argument has been made with regard to acts of generosity. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether the punishment of a selfish division of money in a dictator game is a sign of trustworthiness and whether punishers are more trustworthy interaction partners in a trust game than non-punishers. We distinguish between second-party and third-party punishment and compare punitive acts with acts of generosity as signs of trustworthiness. We find that punishers are not more trustworthy than non-punishers and that punishers are not trusted more than non-punishers, both in the second-party and in the third-party punishment condition. To the contrary, second-party punishers are trusted less than their non-punishing counterparts. However, participants who choose a generous division of money are more trustworthy and are trusted more than participants who choose a selfish division or participants about whom no information is available. Our results suggest that, unlike for punitive acts, the signaling benefits of generosity are to be gained in social exchange.

Matrizes clínicas e ética em Freud

O presente estudo hipotetiza que as diferentes matrizes clínicas que Freud encontrava em sua prática, e que lhe possibilitavam acréscimos teóricos, direcionaram seus distintos olhares sobre a cultura, fazendo-o privilegiar alguns elementos éticos em detrimento de outros. Desse modo, indicaremos: (1) como a histeria gerou a questão do conflito entre sexualidade e moral na civilização; (2) como a neurose obsessiva possibilitou a entrada dos temas da agressividade e do ódio como entraves contra os quais a cultura se esforça por lutar, assim como a presença marcante no psiquismo da consciência moral e do sentimento de culpa; (3) por fim, como as ditas afecções narcísicas trouxeram a Freud o papel do egoísmo e da destrutividade como inimigos da cultura. Nesse percurso nos aproximaremos das questões ligadas à problematização ética na "psicologia" freudiana e, a partir daí, do destaque que terá a dimensão moral na concepção freudiana do sujeito.

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

The evolution of unicoloniality in ant societies : recognition, dispersal and population genetic structure

Introduction Societies of ants, bees, wasps and termites dominate many terrestrial ecosystems (Wilson 1971). Their evolutionary and ecological success is based upon the regulation of internal conflicts (e.g. Ratnieks et al. 2006), control of diseases (e.g. Schmid-Hempel 1998) and individual skills and collective intelligence in resource acquisition, nest building and defence (e.g. Camazine 2001). Individuals in social species can pass on their genes not only directly trough their own offspring, but also indirectly by favouring the reproduction of relatives. The inclusive fitness theory of Hamilton (1963; 1964) provides a powerful explanation for the evolution of reproductive altruism and cooperation in groups with related individuals. The same theory also led to the realization that insect societies are subject to internal conflicts over reproduction. Relatedness of less-than-one is not sufficient to eliminate all incentive for individual selfishness. This would indeed require a relatedness of one, as found among cells of an organism (Hardin 1968; Keller 1999). The challenge for evolutionary biology is to understand how groups can prevent or reduce the selfish exploitation of resources by group members, and how societies with low relatedness are maintained. In social insects the evolutionary shift from single- to multiple queens colonies modified the relatedness structure, the dispersal, and the mode of colony founding (e.g. (Crozier & Pamilo 1996). In ants, the most common, and presumably ancestral mode of reproduction is the emission of winged males and females, which found a new colony independently after mating and dispersal flights (Hölldobler & Wilson 1990). The alternative reproductive tactic for ant queens in multiple-queen colonies (polygyne) is to seek to be re-accepted in their natal colonies, where they may remain as additional reproductives or subsequently disperse on foot with part of the colony (budding) (Bourke & Franks 1995; Crozier & Pamilo 1996; Hölldobler & Wilson 1990). Such ant colonies can contain up to several hundred reproductive queens with an even more numerous workforce (Cherix 1980; Cherix 1983). As a consequence in polygynous ants the relatedness among nestmates is very low, and workers raise brood of queens to which they are only distantly related (Crozier & Pamilo 1996; Queller & Strassmann 1998). Therefore workers could increase their inclusive fitness by preferentially caring for their closest relatives and discriminate against less related or foreign individuals (Keller 1997; Queller & Strassmann 2002; Tarpy et al. 2004). However, the bulk of the evidence suggests that social insects do not behave nepotistically, probably because of the costs entailed by decreased colony efficiency or discrimination errors (Keller 1997). Recently, the consensus that nepotistic behaviour does not occur in insect colonies was challenged by a study in the ant Formica fusca (Hannonen & Sundström 2003b) showing that the reproductive share of queens more closely related to workers increases during brood development. However, this pattern can be explained either by nepotism with workers preferentially rearing the brood of more closely related queens or intrinsic differences in the viability of eggs laid by queens. In the first chapter, we designed an experiment to disentangle nepotism and differences in brood viability. We tested if workers prefer to rear their kin when given the choice between highly related and unrelated brood in the ant F. exsecta. We also looked for differences in egg viability among queens and simulated if such differences in egg viability may mistakenly lead to the conclusion that workers behave nepotistically. The acceptance of queens in polygnous ants raises the question whether the varying degree of relatedness affects their share in reproduction. In such colonies workers should favour nestmate queens over foreign queens. Numerous studies have investigated reproductive skew and partitioning of reproduction among queens (Bourke et al. 1997; Fournier et al. 2004; Fournier & Keller 2001; Hammond et al. 2006; Hannonen & Sundström 2003a; Heinze et al. 2001; Kümmerli & Keller 2007; Langer et al. 2004; Pamilo & Seppä 1994; Ross 1988; Ross 1993; Rüppell et al. 2002), yet almost no information is available on whether differences among queens in their relatedness to other colony members affects their share in reproduction. Such data are necessary to compare the relative reproductive success of dispersing and non-dispersing individuals. Moreover, information on whether there is a difference in reproductive success between resident and dispersing queens is also important for our understanding of the genetic structure of ant colonies and the dynamics of within group conflicts. In chapter two, we created single-queen colonies and then introduced a foreign queens originating from another colony kept under similar conditions in order to estimate the rate of queen acceptance into foreign established colonies, and to quantify the reproductive share of resident and introduced queens. An increasing number of studies have investigated the discrimination ability between ant workers (e.g. Holzer et al. 2006; Pedersen et al. 2006), but few have addressed the recognition and discrimination behaviour of workers towards reproductive individuals entering colonies (Bennett 1988; Brown et al. 2003; Evans 1996; Fortelius et al. 1993; Kikuchi et al. 2007; Rosengren & Pamilo 1986; Stuart et al. 1993; Sundström 1997; Vásquez & Silverman in press). These studies are important, because accepting new queens will generally have a large impact on colony kin structure and inclusive fitness of workers (Heinze & Keller 2000). In chapter three, we examined whether resident workers reject young foreign queens that enter into their nest. We introduced mated queens into their natal nest, a foreign-female producing nest, or a foreign male-producing nest and measured their survival. In addition, we also introduced young virgin and mated queens into their natal nest to examine whether the mating status of the queens influences their survival and acceptance by workers. On top of polgyny, some ant species have evolved an extraordinary social organization called 'unicoloniality' (Hölldobler & Wilson 1977; Pedersen et al. 2006). In unicolonial ants, intercolony borders are absent and workers and queens mix among the physically separated nests, such that nests form one large supercolony. Super-colonies can become very large, so that direct cooperative interactions are impossible between individuals of distant nests. Unicoloniality is an evolutionary paradox and a potential problem for kin selection theory because the mixing of queens and workers between nests leads to extremely low relatedness among nestmates (Bourke & Franks 1995; Crozier & Pamilo 1996; Keller 1995). A better understanding of the evolution and maintenance of unicoloniality requests detailed information on the discrimination behavior, dispersal, population structure, and the scale of competition. Cryptic genetic population structure may provide important information on the relevant scale to be considered when measuring relatedness and the role of kin selection. Theoretical studies have shown that relatedness should be measured at the level of the `economic neighborhood', which is the scale at which intraspecific competition generally takes place (Griffin & West 2002; Kelly 1994; Queller 1994; Taylor 1992). In chapter four, we conducted alarge-scale study to determine whether the unicolonial ant Formica paralugubris forms populations that are organised in discrete supercolonies or whether there is a continuous gradation in the level of aggression that may correlate with genetic isolation by distance and/or spatial distance between nests. In chapter five, we investigated the fine-scale population structure in three populations of F. paralugubris. We have developed mitochondria) markers, which together with the nuclear markers allowed us to detect cryptic genetic clusters of nests, to obtain more precise information on the genetic differentiation within populations, and to separate male and female gene flow. These new data provide important information on the scale to be considered when measuring relatedness in native unicolonial populations.

Le Banquet de Platon : l'apologie d'Alcibiade ou les paradoxes d'Éros

Ce mémoire cherche à évaluer la culpabilité de Socrate face à l’échec et à la corruption d’Alcibiade, telle que la question se pose dans le Banquet de Platon. Il comprend quatre chapitres. Le premier démontre que le cadre dramatique lui-même fait occuper une place centrale à la vie et au déclin d’Alcibiade et au problème de la responsabilité de Socrate face aux accusations de corruption de la jeunesse qui ont pesé sur lui. Le deuxième chapitre interprète le discours d’Alcibiade comme une tentative de disculpation qui repose sur une critique acerbe du comportement de Socrate. Il se serait détourné de Socrate et de ses enseignements en raison de son ironie, de son arrogance et de son indifférence – de son hybris. Le troisième chapitre étudie le discours de Socrate sur l’accession à la beauté intelligible. Il expose la nature particulière de son éros, qui repose sur l’ironie et l’inversion des rôles comme moyens d’exhorter à la philosophie. Le quatrième chapitre pose la question de l’efficacité de ce type de pédagogie et de la responsabilité du philosophe vis-à-vis de ses disciples. L’étude conclut que l’amour et l’ironie de Socrate sont essentiellement des moyens d’inviter l’autre à se remettre lui-même en question et à prendre soin de son âme. Socrate n’est donc pas coupable d’avoir corrompu Alcibiade. La faute est entièrement celle du jeune homme. Il s’est montré incapable, par égocentrisme et fierté excessive, de réagir correctement à l’énigme posée par le comportement érotique de Socrate.

Los diversos rostros del poder y algunos de sus matices

El economista Boulding mostró que entre los extremos de malevolencia y benevolencia de la acción humana existen tres formas de poder: integrativo (intensivo en reciprocidad y altruismo), de intercambio (con diversos niveles de egoísmo) y de amenaza (que puede llegar a ser destructivo). También sugirió que existe un poder organizativo, imprescindible para el éxito del resto de poderes. Una lectura crítica de tal aporte permite mostrar los siguientes matices: incidencia de las motivaciones humanas, como razón, pasión e interés en el poder; interacciones sociales y límites del poder; algunos costos y beneficios de distintas formas de poder, incluyendo los atributos de la acción noviolenta. Finalmente, se sugieren interrogantes claves para desarrollar investigaciones futuras.-----Economist Boulding showed that between the human action ends of malevolence and benevolence, there are three faces of power, namely: integrative (intensive in reciprocity and altruism), exchange (with various selfishness levels), and threat (can turn into destructive). He also suggested that there is an organizational power that becomes essential in the success of the other powers. A critical reading of such contribution allows to show the following shades: incidence of human motivations such as reason, passion and interest in power, social interactions and power limits, some costs and benefits of the different power types, including non-violent action attributes. Finally, key questions are suggested for future research development.

A necessidade da formação da consciência ambiental na sociedade contemporânea: um estudo sobre as relações dialéticas entre o ser humano, a natureza e a cultura na obra de Ítalo Calvino

The present work has for objective to analyze the issue of training environmental awareness and its role in contemporary society. With the alarming scenario of degradation and environmental imbalance , political, social and non-governmental institutions have established the urgent need for an education that make changes in social behavior in relation to the environment. With this design is establishing environmental education, however the economic , financial and social scenario in which is inserted dismantles its effectiveness , since the transformations of modernity incited alienation, reification , individualization , indifference and consumerism . In this juncture it is noticed that environmental education needs to be analyzed by the perspective of a man in critical reflection of the capitalist structure. Given this need , it is proposed to reading Italo Calvino's work , since it approach the whole context of modern man , with his ailments , anxiety, exploitation , selfishness and destructive action of itself, others and the environment in living

Cell-sealing efficiency and reproductive workers in the species Melipona bicolor (Hymenoptera, Meliponini): double standard and possible rogue conduct

In many hymenopteran insect societies, selfish workers are policed, as selfishness can negatively affect the average inclusive fitness of one or both castes by reducing either the degree of average relatedness to the colony's male offspring or colony efficiency. In stingless bees, the rapid capping of brood cells could aid in controlling selfishness; to this end, we studied cell-sealing efficacy in Melipona bicolor. Execution of cell sealing was found to be both rapid and almost continuous. Comparing the performance of reproductive and non-reproductive workers, the former sealed the cells more efficiently when they contained their own eggs, but less so when the queens' eggs were involved. We argue that the occurrence of disruptions in cell sealing through self-serving reproductive workers is capable of undermining sealing efficacy as a policing instrument, thus making reproductive workers potential rogue individuals.

Editorial: The Impact of Welfare Reform on Families

On the horizon a huge wave is building, about to crash down on the poorest most hard pressed families in our country. The impact of welfare reform on families and on those who serve them will be profound The degree to which families and workers will be adversely affected is to date not fully understood. Yet as my son concluded, "...basically, if you are on welfare you had better win the lottery or learn to swim in the treacherous waters of poverty!" (C. Sallee, personal communication, November, 1996). We are also informed by looking back at the Elizabethan Poor Laws of 1601 where we find the origin of welfare reform. Orphanages, the responsibility of relatives, poorhouses and awarding relief work to the lowest private sector bidder, all introduced in the beginning of the welfare state, are key components of the current reform. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 washes away the entitlements and rights created during this country's greatest depression, leaving exposed the stark selfishness of the junk bond 1980's.