Seigniorage-maximizing inflation

What is the seigniorage-maximizing level of inflation? Four models formulae for the seigniorage maximizing inflation rate (SMIR) are compared. Two sticky-price models arrive at very different quantitative recommendations although both predict somewhat lower SMIRs than Cagan’s formula and a variant of a .ex-price model due to Kimbrough (2006). The models differ markedly in how inflation distorts the labour market: The Calvo model implies that inflation and output are negatively related and that output is falling in price stickiness whilst the Rotemberg cost-of-price-adjustment model implies exactly the opposite. Interestingly, if our version of the Calvo model is to be believed, the level of inflation experienced recently in advanced economies such as the USA and the UK may be quite close to the SMIR.

The Effects of Corruption and Seigniorage on Growth and Inflation

In the last two decades, cases of corruption have been unveiled in different countries, raising public awareness and reinforcing a trend in which society expects more from their leaders. Our objective in this paper is to examine the effects of corruption and seigniorage on inflation and growth rates. The model used in this article is an extension of the model used by Huang and Wei (2006). We find interesting results and one of them is that, under some conditions, corruption has a positive impact on the growth rate. JEL classification : D73, E52, E58, E62. Keywords : Corruption; Fiscal Policy; Growth; Monetary Policy; Seigniorage.

Public debt sustainability and endogenous seigniorage in Brazil: time-series evidence from 1947-92: revised version

Using national accounts data for the revenue-GDP and expenditureGDP ratios from 1947 to 1992, we examine three central issues in public finance. First, was the path of public debt sustainable during this period? Second, if debt is sustainable, how has the government historically balanced the budget after shocks to either revenues or expenditures? Third, are expenditures exogenous? The results show that (i) public deficit is stationary (bounded asymptotic variance), with the budget in Brazil being balanced almost entirely through changes in taxes, regardless of the cause of the initial imbalance. Expenditures are weakly exogenous, but tax revenues are not; (ii) the behavior of a rational Brazilian consumer may be consistent with Ricardian Equivalence; (iii) seigniorage revenues are critical to restore intertemporal budget equilibrium, since, when we exclude them from total revenues, debt is not sustainable in econometric tests.

Individual and aggregate money demands

I construct a model in which money and bond holdings are consistent with individual decisions and aggregate variables such as production and interest rates. The agents are infinitely-lived, have constant-elasticity preferences, and receive a fraction of their income in money. Each agent solves a Baumol-Tobin money management problem. Markets are segmented because financial frictions make agents trade bonds for money at different times. Trading frequency, consumption, government decisions and prices are mutually consistent. An increase in inflation, for example, implies higher trading frequency, more bonds sold to account for seigniorage, and lower real balances.

Stable sunspot equilibria in a cash-in-advance economy

We analyze a monetary model with flexible labor supply, cash-inadvance constraints and seigniorage-financed government deficits. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor is greater than one, there are two steady states, one determinate and the other indeterminate. If the elasticity is less than one, there is a unique steady state, which can be indeterminate. Only in the latter case do there exist sunspot equilibria that are stable under adaptive learning. A sufficient reduction in government purchases can in many cases eliminate the sunspot equilibria while raising consumption/labor taxes even enough to balance the budget may fail to achieve determinacy.

The Conservativeness of the Central Bank when Institutional Quality is Poor

We propose an extension of Alesina and Tabellini 's model (1987) to include corruption, which is understood as the presence of weak institutions collecting revenue through formal tax channels. This paper analyses how conservative should an independent central bank be when the institutional quality is poor. When there are no political distortions, we show that the central bank has to be more conservative than the government, except with complete corruption. In this particular case, the central bank should be as conservative as the government. Further, we obtain that the relationship between the optimal relative degree of conservativeness of the central bank and the degree of corruption is affected by supply shocks. Concretely, when these shocks are not important, the central bank should be less conservative if the degree of corruption increases. However, this result may not hold when the shocks are relevant. JEL classi fication: D6, D73, E52, E58, E62, E63. Keywords: Central Bank Conservativeness; Corruption; Fiscal Policy; Monetary Policy; Seigniorage.

The Backing of Government Debt and the Price Level

This paper studies the interdependence between fiscal and monetary policies, and their joint role in the determination of the price level. The government is characterized by a long-run fiscal policy rule whereby a given fraction of the outstanding debt, say d, is backed by the present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is backed by seigniorage revenue. The parameter d characterizes the interdependence between fiscal and monetary authorities. It is shown that in a standard monetary economy, this policy rule implies that the price level depends not only on the money stock, but also on the proportion of debt that is backed with money. Empirical estimates of d are obtained for OECD countries using data on nominal consumption, monetary base, and debt. Results indicate that debt plays only a minor role in the determination of the price level in these economies. Estimates of d correlate well with institutional measures of central bank independence.

Moratória interna, dívida pública e juros reais

Desenvolve-se, neste trabalho, um modelo de oferta e de demanda de dívida pública. Através dele estuda-se a dinâmica da dívida pública e dos juros reais. Introduz-se a possibilidade de moratória interna e seus efeitos são analisados. Para o caso do Brasil, descobre-se que a seigniorage do governo é uma variável aleatória independente da taxa de inflação, quando esta atinge valores elevados. Através de estimativas, são feitas simulações para o caso brasileiro. Um dos resultados é que, sem a possibilidade de moratória interna, o governo não teria problemas em financiar sua dívida. Porém, uma pequena chance de ocorrência desta moratória interna faz com que os juros reais e a relação dívida/PIB explodam.

Speculative attacks on debts and optimum currency area: a welfare analysis

Traditionally the issue of an optimum currency area is based on the theoretical underpinnings developed in the 1960s by McKinnon [13], Kenen [12] and mainly Mundell [14], who is concerned with the benefits of lowering transaction costs vis-à- vis adjustments to asymmetrical shocks. Recently, this theme has been reappraised with new aspects included in the analysis, such as: incomplete markets, credibility of monetary policy and seigniorage, among others. For instance, Neumeyer [15] develops a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and shows that a monetary union is desirable when the welfare gains of eliminating the exchange rate volatility are greater than the cost of reducing the number of currencies to hedge against risks. In this paper, we also resort to a general equilibrium model to evaluate financial aspects of an optimum currency area. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country heavily dependent on foreign capital that may suffer a speculative attack on its public debt. The welfare analysis uses as reference the self-fulfilling debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([6], [7] and [8]), which is employed here to represent dollarization. Under this regime, the national government has no control over its monetary policy, the total public debt is denominated in dollars and it is in the hands of international bankers. To describe a country that is a member of a currency union, we modify the original Cole-Kehoe model by including public debt denominated in common currency, only purchased by national consumers. According to this rule, the member countries regain some influence over the monetary policy decision, which is, however, dependent on majority voting. We show that for specific levels of dollar debt, to create inflation tax on common-currency debt in order to avoid an external default is more desirable than to suspend its payment, which is the only choice available for a dollarized economy when foreign creditors decide not to renew their loans.

Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, we try and seek for the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. We show that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion, or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner, maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit rather than implicit taxation.

Monetary Systems in Developing Countries: An Unorthodox View

This paper analyzes some recent theoretical and practical evidence in terms of economic results of different exchange rate systems. It begins with a historical review and a summary of fixed versus flexible exchange rate systems. Then it compares the experiences of recent currency unions, mostly unilateral, and their relative economic performance during the past currency crises in Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe. A set of issues is discussed in order to weigh the overall costs and benefits for several economies. These issues include exchange rates, GDP performance, inflation rates and foreign reserves. The case of Argentina is also considered separately, comparing mostly seigniorage costs and interest-rate savings. The benefits and costs of the producers (central banks/governments) and the consumers (citizens) of money are discussed separately. Free banking is also considered in a fast-changing world where there will probably be fewer but better currencies. Not just the euro is a reality now, but maybe the "amero" and the "worldo" or the "mondo" very soon.

Europe on the Road to the Third Stage of EMU: Recent Evidence. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.2, 1996

The paper deals with Europe's effort to proceed to the thud stage of EMU and establish a common currency. It is argued that the success of the common currency experiment will greatly depend on the fulfillment of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criteria, on the adoption of the proper adjustment policies as well as on the political desirability of the project. The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 deals briefly with the index of criteria that define an OCA. Section 2 examines the extent to which Europe experiences common demand disturbances, while sections 3 and 4 focus on evidence about the mobility of factors of production across Europe, namely labor and capital. Section 5 examines the possibility of an increase in trade volume across the EU under fixed exchange rates or a common currency regime. Section 6 sheds light on the possibility of the EURO (the ex-ECU} to become a vehicle currency in the international financial system, and Section 7 is concerned with the benefits and costs of the establishment of a European Central Bank (ECB), paying special attention to seigniorage revenues. Section 8 deals with the necessity of establishing an EU federal mechanism facilitating adjustment. Section 9 sketches out a proper role for a hegemonic power in a common currency regime. Finally, section 10 examines EMU prospects during the transitional period. The paper closes with some concluding remarks, where the role of politics and coordination of economic policies are particularly emphasized as of cardinal importance on the road to the third stage of EMU.

Polish EU accession in comparative perspective:macroeconomics, finance and the government

This book is a collection of papers that focusses on the macroeconomic and financial aspects of EU accession of its largest new member, Poland, seen in comparative perspective. Two main themes are covered. One relates to empirical estimations, evaluating the effects of integration on fiscal balance, prices, seigniorage wealth and FDI flows. The second theme relates to institutional reform and policy recommendations. Discussion focuses on how transparency and fiscal rules, including those implied by EU accession, may help to reduce the deficit bias in fiscal policy; what is the institutional framework for low inflation and how to make the insurance sector regulation more efficient, including its implications for insurance offer for small and medium-size enterprises. Last but not least, the Irish model of development and the role of the foreign direct investment in it is discussed, including the applicability of the Irish policy in Poland and other new EU member states.