Analyzing security protocols using association rule mining

Current studies to analyzing security protocols using formal methods require users to predefine authentication goals. Besides, they are unable to discover potential correlations between secure messages. This research attempts to analyze security protocols using data mining. This is done by extending the idea of association rule mining and converting the verification of protocols into computing the frequency and confidence of inconsistent secure messages. It provides a novel and efficient way to analyze security protocols and find out potential correlations between secure messages. The conducted experiments demonstrate our approaches.

Detecting collusion attacks in security protocols

Security protocols have been widely used to safeguard secure electronic transactions. We usually assume that principals are credible and shall not maliciously disclose their individual secrets to someone else. Nevertheless, it is impractical to completely ignore the possibility that some principals may collude in private to achieve a fraudulent or illegal purpose. Therefore, it is critical to address the possibility of collusion attacks in order to correctly analyse security protocols. This paper proposes a framework by which to detect collusion attacks in security protocols. The possibility of security threats from insiders is especially taken into account. The case study demonstrates that our methods are useful and promising in discovering and preventing collusion attacks.

Mining inconsistent secure messages toward analyzing security protocols

Traditional approaches such as theorem proving and model checking have been successfully used to analyze security protocols. Ideally, they assume the data communication is reliable and require the user to predetermine authentication goals. However, missing and inconsistent data have been greatly ignored, and the increasingly complicated security protocol makes it difficult to predefine such goals. This paper presents a novel approach to analyze security protocols using association rule mining. It is able to not only validate the reliability of transactions but also discover potential correlations between secure messages. The algorithm and experiment demonstrate that our approaches are useful and promising.

Mobile agents security protocols

Mobile agents are expected to run in partially unknown and untrustworthy environments. They transport from one host to another host through insecure channels and may execute on non-trusted hosts. Thus, they are vulnerable to direct security attacks of intruders and non-trusted hosts. The security of information the agents collect is a fundamental requirement for a trusted implementation of electronic business applications and trade negotiations. This chapter discusses the security protocols presented in the literature that aim to secure the data mobile agents gather while searching the Internet, and identifies the security flaws revealed in the protocols. The protocols are analyzed with respect to the security properties, and the security flaws are identified. Two recent promising protocols that fulfill the various security properties are described. The chapter also introduces common notations used in describing security protocols and describes the security properties of the data that mobile agents gather.

Security protocols for EPC class-1 Gen-2 RFID multi-tag systems

The objective of the research is to develop security protocols for EPC C1G2 RFID Passive Tags in the areas of ownership transfer and grouping proof.

Mobile Agents Security Protocols

Mobile agents are expected to run in partially unknown and untrustworthy environments. They transport from one host to another host through insecure channels and may execute on non-trusted hosts. Thus, they are vulnerable to direct security attacks of intruders and non-trusted hosts. The security of information the agents collect is a fundamental requirement for a trusted implementation of electronic business applications and trade negotiations. This chapter discusses the security protocols presented in the literature that aim to secure the data mobile agents gather while searching the Internet, and identifies the security flaws revealed in the protocols. The protocols are analyzed with respect to the security properties, and the security flaws are identified. Two recent promising protocols that fulfill the various security properties are described. The chapter also introduces common notations used in describing security protocols and describes the security properties of the data that mobile agents gather.

A review of security protocols in mHealth Wireless Body Area Networks (WBAN)

The popularity of smartphones has led to an increasing demand for health apps. As a result, the healthcare industry is embracing mobile technology and the security of mHealth is essential in protecting patient’s user data and WBAN in a clinical setting. Breaches of security can potentially be life-threatening as someone with malicious intentions could misuse mHealth devices and user information. In this article, threats to security for mHealth networks are discussed in a layered approach addressing gaps in this emerging field of research. Suite B and Suite E, which are utilized in many security systems, including in mHealth applications, are also discussed. In this paper, the support for mHealth security will follow two approaches; protecting patient-centric systems and associated link technologies. Therefore this article is focused on the security provisioning of the communication path between the patient terminal (PT; e.g., sensors) and the monitoring devices (e.g., smartphone, data-collector).

A Z based approach to verifying security protocols

Security protocols preserve essential properties, such as confidentiality and authentication, of electronically transmitted data. However, such properties cannot be directly expressed or verified in contemporary formal methods. Via a detailed example, we describe the phases needed to formalise and verify the correctness of a security protocol in the state-oriented Z formalism.

Formal verification of type flaw attacks in security protocols

Security protocols are often modelled at a high level of abstraction, potentially overlooking implementation-dependent vulnerabilities. Here we use the Z specification language's rich set of data structures to formally model potentially ambiguous messages that may be exploited in a 'type flaw' attack. We then show how to formally verify whether or not such an attack is actually possible in a particular protocol using Z's schema calculus.

Deniable Authenticated Key Establishment for Internet Protocols

We propose two public-key schemes to achieve “deniable authentication” for the Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Our protocols can be implemented using different concrete mechanisms and we discuss different options; in particular we suggest solutions based on elliptic curve pairings. The protocol designs use the modular construction method of Canetti and Krawczyk which provides the basis for a proof of security. Our schemes can, in some situations, be more efficient than existing IKE protocols as well as having stronger deniability properties.

How HCI design influences web security decisions

Even though security protocols are designed to make computer communication secure, it is widely known that there is potential for security breakdowns at the human machine interface. This paper reports on a diary study conducted in order to investigate what people identify as security decisions that they make while using the web. The study aimed to uncover how security is perceived in the individual's context of use. From this data, themes were drawn, with a focus on addressing security goals such as confidentiality and authentication. This study is the first study investigating users' web usage focusing on their self-documented perceptions of security and the security choices they made in their own environment.

“Who decides?” Security and privacy in the wild

Even though web security protocols are designed to make computer communication secure, it is widely known that there is potential for security breakdowns at the human-machine interface. This paper examines findings from a qualitative study investigating the identification of security decisions used on the web. The study was designed to uncover how security is perceived in an individual user's context. Study participants were tertiary qualified individuals, with a focus on HCI designers, security professionals and the general population. The study identifies that security frameworks for the web are inadequate from an interaction perspective, with even tertiary qualified users having a poor or partial understanding of security, of which they themselves are acutely aware. The result is that individuals feel they must protect themselves on the web. The findings contribute a significant mapping of the ways in which individuals reason and act to protect themselves on the web. We use these findings to highlight the need to design for trust at three levels, and the need to ensure that HCI design does not impact on the users' main identified protection mechanism: separation.

Security properties analysis in a TPM-based protocol

Security protocols are designed in order to provide security properties (goals). They achieve their goals using cryptographic primitives such as key agreement or hash functions. Security analysis tools are used in order to verify whether a security protocol achieves its goals or not. The analysed property by specific purpose tools are predefined properties such as secrecy (confidentiality), authentication or non-repudiation. There are security goals that are defined by the user in systems with security requirements. Analysis of these properties is possible with general purpose analysis tools such as coloured petri nets (CPN). This research analyses two security properties that are defined in a protocol that is based on trusted platform module (TPM). The analysed protocol is proposed by Delaune to use TPM capabilities and secrets in order to open only one secret from two submitted secrets to a recipient