Security Analysis of Randomize-Hash-then-Sign Digital Signatures

At CRYPTO 2006, Halevi and Krawczyk proposed two randomized hash function modes and analyzed the security of digital signature algorithms based on these constructions. They showed that the security of signature schemes based on the two randomized hash function modes relies on properties similar to the second preimage resistance rather than on the collision resistance property of the hash functions. One of the randomized hash function modes was named the RMX hash function mode and was recommended for practical purposes. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), USA standardized a variant of the RMX hash function mode and published this standard in the Special Publication (SP) 800-106. In this article, we first discuss a generic online birthday existential forgery attack of Dang and Perlner on the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes. We show that a variant of this attack can be applied to forge the other randomize-hash-then-sign schemes. We point out practical limitations of the generic forgery attack on the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes. We then show that these limitations can be overcome for the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes if it is easy to find fixed points for the underlying compression functions, such as for the Davies-Meyer construction used in the popular hash functions such as MD5 designed by Rivest and the SHA family of hash functions designed by the National Security Agency (NSA), USA and published by NIST in the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). We show an online birthday forgery attack on this class of signatures by using a variant of Dean’s method of finding fixed point expandable messages for hash functions based on the Davies-Meyer construction. This forgery attack is also applicable to signature schemes based on the variant of RMX standardized by NIST in SP 800-106. We discuss some important applications of our attacks and discuss their applicability on signature schemes based on hash functions with ‘built-in’ randomization. Finally, we compare our attacks on randomize-hash-then-sign schemes with the generic forgery attacks on the standard hash-based message authentication code (HMAC).

On Randomizing Hash Functions to Strengthen the Security of Digital Signatures

Halevi and Krawczyk proposed a message randomization algorithm called RMX as a front-end tool to the hash-then-sign digital signature schemes such as DSS and RSA in order to free their reliance on the collision resistance property of the hash functions. They have shown that to forge a RMX-hash-then-sign signature scheme, one has to solve a cryptanalytical task which is related to finding second preimages for the hash function. In this article, we will show how to use Dean’s method of finding expandable messages for finding a second preimage in the Merkle-Damgård hash function to existentially forge a signature scheme based on a t-bit RMX-hash function which uses the Davies-Meyer compression functions (e.g., MD4, MD5, SHA family) in 2 t/2 chosen messages plus 2 t/2 + 1 off-line operations of the compression function and similar amount of memory. This forgery attack also works on the signature schemes that use Davies-Meyer schemes and a variant of RMX published by NIST in its Draft Special Publication (SP) 800-106. We discuss some important applications of our attack.

Low-cost digital signature architecture suitable for radio frequency identification tags

Continuing achievements in hardware technology are bringing ubiquitous computing closer to reality. The notion of a connected, interactive and autonomous environment is common to all sensor networks, biosystems and radio frequency identification (RFID) devices, and the emergence of significant deployments and sophisticated applications can be expected. However, as more information is collected and transmitted, security issues will become vital for such a fully connected environment. In this study the authors consider adding security features to low-cost devices such as RFID tags. In particular, the authors consider the implementation of a digital signature architecture that can be used for device authentication, to prevent tag cloning, and for data authentication to prevent transmission forgery. The scheme is built around the signature variant of the cryptoGPS identification scheme and the SHA-1 hash function. When implemented on 130 nm CMOS the full design uses 7494 gates and consumes 4.72 mu W of power, making it smaller and more power efficient than previous low-cost digital signature designs. The study also presents a low-cost SHA-1 hardware architecture which is the smallest standardised hash function design to date.

Practical Lattice-Based Digital Signature Schemes

Digital signatures are an important primitive for building secure systems and are used in most real-world security protocols. However, almost all popular signature schemes are either based on the factoring assumption (RSA) or the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem (DSA/ECDSA). In the case of classical cryptanalytic advances or progress on the development of quantum computers, the hardness of these closely related problems might be seriously weakened. A potential alternative approach is the construction of signature schemes based on the hardness of certain lattice problems that are assumed to be intractable by quantum computers. Due to significant research advancements in recent years, lattice-based schemes have now become practical and appear to be a very viable alternative to number-theoretic cryptography. In this article, we focus on recent developments and the current state of the art in lattice-based digital signatures and provide a comprehensive survey discussing signature schemes with respect to practicality. Additionally, we discuss future research areas that are essential for the continued development of lattice-based cryptography.

On the robustness and security of digital image watermarking

In most of the digital image watermarking schemes, it becomes a common practice to address security in terms of robustness, which is basically a norm in cryptography. Such consideration in developing and evaluation of a watermarking scheme may severely affect the performance and render the scheme ultimately unusable. This paper provides an explicit theoretical analysis towards watermarking security and robustness in figuring out the exact problem status from the literature. With the necessary hypotheses and analyses from technical perspective, we demonstrate the fundamental realization of the problem. Finally, some necessary recommendations are made for complete assessment of watermarking security and robustness.

Zero knowledge one time digital signature scheme

In many applications, when communicating with a host, we may or may not be concerned about the privacy of the data but are mainly concerned about the integrity of data being transmitted. This paper presents a simple algorithm based on zero knowledge proof by which the receiver can confirm the integrity of data without the sender having to send the digital signature of the message directly. Also, if the same document is sent across by the same user multiple times, this scheme results in different digital signature each time thus making it a practical one-time signature scheme.

Hardware-based and Software-based Security in Digital Rights Management Solutions

The main requirements to DRM platforms implementing effective user experience and strong security measures to prevent unauthorized use of content are discussed. Comparison of hardware-based and software- based platforms is made showing the general inherent advantages of hardware DRM solutions. Analysis and evaluation of the main flaws of hardware platforms are conducted, pointing out the possibilities to overcome them. The overview of the existing concepts for practical realization of hardware DRM protection reveals their advantages and disadvantages and the increasing demand for creation of multi-core architecture, which could assure an effective DRM protection without decreasing the user’s freedom and importing risks for end system security.

A novel nonrepudiable threshold multi-proxy multi-signature scheme with shared verification

Tzeng et al. proposed a new threshold multi-proxy multi-signature scheme with threshold verification. In their scheme, a subset of original signers authenticates a designated proxy group to sign on behalf of the original group. A message m has to be signed by a subset of proxy signers who can represent the proxy group. Then, the proxy signature is sent to the verifier group. A subset of verifiers in the verifier group can also represent the group to authenticate the proxy signature. Subsequently, there are two improved schemes to eliminate the security leak of Tzeng et al.’s scheme. In this paper, we have pointed out the security leakage of the three schemes and further proposed a novel threshold multi-proxy multi-signature scheme with threshold verification.

Identity-based strong designated verifier signature schemes: Attacks and new construction

A strong designated verifier signature scheme makes it possible for a signer to convince a designated verifier that she has signed a message in such a way that the designated verifier cannot transfer the signature to a third party, and no third party can even verify the validity of a designated verifier signature. We show that anyone who intercepts one signature can verify subsequent signatures in Zhang-Mao ID-based designated verifier signature scheme and Lal-Verma ID-based designated verifier proxy signature scheme. We propose a new and efficient ID-based designated verifier signature scheme that is strong and unforgeable. As a direct corollary, we also get a new efficient ID-based designated verifier proxy signature scheme.

Identity management : strengthening one-time password authentication through usability

Usability in HCI (Human-Computer Interaction) is normally understood as the simplicity and clarity with which the interaction with a computer program or a web site is designed. Identity management systems need to provide adequate usability and should have a simple and intuitive interface. The system should not only be designed to satisfy service provider requirements but it has to consider user requirements, otherwise it will lead to inconvenience and poor usability for users when managing their identities. With poor usability and a poor user interface with regard to security, it is highly likely that the system will have poor security. The rapid growth in the number of online services leads to an increasing number of different digital identities each user needs to manage. As a result, many people feel overloaded with credentials, which in turn negatively impacts their ability to manage them securely. Passwords are perhaps the most common type of credential used today. To avoid the tedious task of remembering difficult passwords, users often behave less securely by using low entropy and weak passwords. Weak passwords and bad password habits represent security threats to online services. Some solutions have been developed to eliminate the need for users to create and manage passwords. A typical solution is based on generating one-time passwords, i.e. passwords for single session or transaction usage. Unfortunately, most of these solutions do not satisfy scalability and/or usability requirements, or they are simply insecure. In this thesis, the security and usability aspects of contemporary methods for authentication based on one-time passwords (OTP) are examined and analyzed. In addition, more scalable solutions that provide a good user experience while at the same time preserving strong security are proposed.