Using Comparative Constitutionalism in Human Rights Discourse:Ireland’s Past and Scotland’s Future

The article considers the use of comparisons in constitutional development, specifically the use of comparative reasoning in the context of debates about human rights in newly emerging independent states, using the examples of Ireland and Scotland.

Legal outlier, again? U.S. felon suffrage: comparative and international human rights perspectives

The judiciousness of American felon suffrage policies has long been the subject of scholarly debate, not least due to the large number of affected Americans: an estimated 5.3 million citizens are ineligible to vote as a result of a criminal conviction. This article offers comparative law and international human rights perspectives and aims to make two main contributions to the American and global discourse. After an introduction in Part I, Part II offers comparative law perspectives on challenges to disenfranchisement legislation, juxtaposing U.S. case law against recent judgments rendered by courts in Canada, South Africa, Australia, and by the European Court of Human Rights. The article submits that owing to its unique constitutional stipulations, as well as to a general reluctance to engage foreign legal sources, U.S. jurisprudence lags behind an emerging global jurisprudential trend that increasingly views convicts’ disenfranchisement as a suspect practice and subjects it to judicial review. This transnational judicial discourse follows a democratic paradigm and adopts a “residual liberty” approach to criminal justice that considers convicts to be rights-holders. The discourse rejects regulatory justifications for convicts’ disenfranchisement, and instead sees disenfranchisement as a penal measure. In order to determine its suitability as a punishment, the adverse effects of disenfranchisement are weighed against its purported social benefits, using balancing or proportionality review. Part III analyzes the international human rights treaty regime. It assesses, in particular, Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which proclaims that “every citizen” has a right to vote without “unreasonable restrictions.” The analysis concludes that the phrase “unreasonable restrictions” is generally interpreted in a manner which tolerates certain forms of disenfranchisement, whereas other forms (such as life disenfranchisement) may be incompatible with treaty obligations. This article submits that disenfranchisement is a normatively flawed punishment. It fails to treat convicts as politically-equal community members, degrades them, and causes them grave harms both as individuals and as members of social groups. These adverse effects outweigh the purported social benefits of disenfranchisement. Furthermore, as a core component of the right to vote, voter eligibility should cease to be subjected to balancing or proportionality review. The presumed facilitative nature of the right to vote makes suffrage less susceptible to deference-based objections regarding the judicial review of legislation, as well as to cultural relativity objections to further the international standardization of human rights obligations. In view of this, this article proposes the adoption of a new optional protocol to the ICCPR proscribing convicts’ disenfranchisement. The article draws analogies between the proposed protocol and the ICCPR’s “Optional Protocol Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty.” If adopted, the proposed protocol would strengthen the current trajectory towards expanding convicts’ suffrage that emanates from the invigorated transnational judicial discourse.

Using Comparative Reasoning in Human Rights Adjudication:The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights Compared

This article examines the relationship between the methods that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) use to decide disputes that involve ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ rights claims, and the substantive outcomes that result from the use of these particular methods. It has a limited aim: in attempting to understand the interrelationship between human rights methodology and human rights outcomes, it considers primarily the use of ‘comparative reasoning’ in ‘human’ and ‘fundamental’ rights claims by these courts. It is not primarily concerned with examining the extent to which the use of comparative reasoning is based on an appropriate methodology or whether there is a persuasive normative theory underpinning the use of comparative reasoning. The issues considered in this chapter do some of the groundwork, however, that is necessary in order to address these methodological and normative questions.

A “very limited” effect or a “seismic” impact? A study of the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the Courts of Northern Ireland

This article focuses on the question of what impact the Human Rights Act 1998 has had in practice on the courts of Northern Ireland. How frequently are human rights arguments made in the course of cases in this jurisdiction, and to what extent do such arguments affect outcomes of cases? In order to assess the impact of the Act, the use of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Northern Irish courts during four periods of time is examined. These are, firstly, prior to the passing of the Act in November 1998; secondly, between the Act’s passing and its coming into force in October 2000; thirdly, the first three years after the coming into force of the Act (October 2000 until October 2003); and fourthly, the three years between October 2006 and October 2009.

Operationalizing the Comparative International Human Rights Law Method: A Case Study of CEDAW in National Courts

In this chapter, I focus on how the example of CEDAW illustrates the methodological and conceptual difficulties that future work in comparative international human is likely to encounter. Despite the challenges, I suggest that the worked example of CEDAW has raised interesting lines for empirical analysis, and additional perspectives which may enrich normative inquiry, sufficient to justify comparative international human rights law being regarded as likely to give rise to insights that might not otherwise have emerged, and therefore to be as an approach worth pursuing in the future.

Navigating human rights across the life course

Issues related to human rights have increasingly moved to the forefront of professional concern in recent years. Despite this, there has been minimal attention paid to exploring how changing human needs across the lifespan impact upon human rights. This paper takes a broad look at human rights issues that occur across the life course, and uses examples of life course transitions to illuminate issues related to moral rights and human rights. The examples include family formation, raising children, adolescent maturation in the context of youth offending and grandparents parenting their grandchildren. Each example explores the contestable rights and responsibilities of children, young people and adults and the ways in which these are negotiated within the context of the family.

The analytical approach of the European Court of Human Rights in surveillance cases—the implications, justifications, and future of the Court’s reasoning, with a focus on the legislative impact in Ireland

A notable feature of the surveillance case law of the European Court of Human Rights has been the tendency of the Court to focus on the “in accordance with the law” aspect of the Article 8 ECHR inquiry. This focus has been the subject of some criticism, but the impact of this approach on the manner in which domestic surveillance legislation has been formulated in the Party States has received little scholarly attention. This thesis addresses that gap in the literature through its consideration of the Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages (Regulation) Act, 1993 and the Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act, 2009. While both Acts provide several of the safeguards endorsed by the European Court of Human Rights, this thesis finds that they suffer from a number of crucial weaknesses that undermine the protection of privacy. This thesis demonstrates how the focus of the European Court of Human Rights on the “in accordance with the law” test has resulted in some positive legislative change. Notwithstanding this fact, it is maintained that the legality approach has gained prominence at the expense of a full consideration of the “necessary in a democratic society” inquiry. This has resulted in superficial legislative responses at the domestic level, including from the Irish government. Notably, through the examination of a number of more recent cases, this project discerns a significant alteration in the interpretive approach adopted by the European Court of Human Rights regarding the application of the necessity test. The implications of this development are considered and the outlook for Irish surveillance legislation is assessed.

How could Human Rights Law be used by the Courts to assist Victims of Domestic Violence? A Comparative Study

It has been increasingly recognised in recent years that domestic violence constitutes a human rights issue. This article seeks to shed light on the question of how human rights law may be used in the area of domestic violence through the medium of a litigation strategy. The method used is a comparative assessment of the approaches taken towards gender issues by the Constitutional Courts in three states that have famously dynamic judiciaries- India, South Africa and Canada. A number of the obstacles to the effectiveness of human rights law are also examined.

Comparative International Human Rights Law

This chapter locates of international human rights in current discussion of comparative international law, and distinguishes comparative international human rights law from both the 'fragmentation' literature, and from comparative constitutional rights discourse.

Triangulation of rights, balancing of interests : exploring the tensions between freedom of conscience and freedom of religion in comparative constitutional law

La liberté de religion, souvent reconnue comme étant la « première liberté » dans de nombreuses traditions juridiques, reflète également les différentes conceptions de la place de l’individu et de la communauté dans la société. Notre étude analysera les modèles constitutionnels canadien, américain et européen de liberté de religion et conscience. Dans un premier chapitre, nous examinerons les conceptions théoriques de la religion dans les sciences sociales ainsi les approches juridiques afin de mieux cerner comment la religion est conçue et de plus, comprendre les diverses influences sur sa conceptualisation. Dans un second et troisième chapitre, nous tenterons d’une part, de qualifier la relation entre la liberté de conscience et la liberté de religion au Canada en nous livrant à une analyse approfondie des deux libertés et d’autre part, d’identifier les questions qui demeurent irrésolues. Dans le chapitre final, nous observerons comment la liberté de conscience a été interprétée dans les contextes américain et dans l’Union Européenne, par le biais de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’Homme. Notre hypothèse est que l’on peut arriver à une meilleure compréhension de la relation entre les libertés de conscience et religion en clarifiant les conceptions théoriques de la religion et de la conscience en droit constitutionnel comparé.

Redefining 'media' using a 'media-as-a-constitutional-component' concept:an evaluation of the need for the European Court of Human Rights to alter its understanding of 'media' within a new media landscape

This paper considers the impact of new media on freedom of expression and media freedom within the context of the European Convention on Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence. Through comparative analysis of US jurisprudence and scholarship, this paper deals with the following three issues. First, it explores the traditional purpose of the media, and how media freedom, as opposed to freedom of expression, has been subject to privileged protection, within an ECHR context at least. Secondly, it considers the emergence of new media, and how it can be differentiated from the traditional media. Finally, it analyses the philosophical justifications for freedom of expression, and how they enable a workable definition of the media based upon the concept of the media-as-a-constitutional-component.