Media scepticism, media diets and media landscapes: A consideration of US versus Australian political information environments

The range of political information sources available to modern Australians is greater and more varied today than at any point in the nation’s history, incorporating print, broadcast, Internet, mainstream and non-mainstream media. In such a competitive media environment, the factors which influence the selection of some information sources above others are of interest to political agents, media institutions and communications researchers alike. A key factor in information source selection is credibility. At the same time that the range of political information sources is increasing rapidly, due to the development of new information and communication technologies, audience research suggests that trust in mainstream media organisations in many countries is declining. So if people distrust the mainstream media, but have a vast array of alternative political information sources available to them, what do their personal media consumption patterns look like? How can we analyse such media consumption patterns in a meaningful way? In this paper I will briefly map the development of media credibility research in the US and Australia, leading to a discussion of one of the most recent media credibility constructs to be shown to influence political information consumption, media scepticism. Looking at the consequences of media scepticism, I will then consider the associated media consumption construct, media diet, and evaluate its usefulness in an Australian, as opposed to US, context. Finally, I will suggest alternative conceptualisations of media diets which may be more suited to Australian political communications research.

Scepticism and trust: two counterpoint essentials in science education for complex socio-scientific issues

In this response to Tom G. K. Bryce and Stephen P. Day’s (Cult Stud Sci Educ. doi:10.1007/s11422-013-9500-0, 2013) original article, I share with them their interest in the teaching of climate change in school science, but I widen it to include other contemporary complex socio-scientific issues that also need to be discussed. I use an alternative view of the relationship between science, technology and society, supported by evidence from both science and society, to suggest science-informed citizens as a more realistic outcome image of school science than the authors’ one of mini-scientists. The intellectual independence of students Bryce and Day assume, and intend for school science, is countered with an active intellectual dependence. It is only in relation to emerging and uncertain scientific contexts that students should be taught about scepticism, but they also need to learn when, and why to trust science as an antidote to the expressions of doubting it. Some suggestions for pedagogies that could lead to these new learnings are made. The very recent fifth report of the IPCC answers many of their concerns about climate change.

A Principled Climate Change Scepticism’

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Tanzanian scepticism of a militarised East African Federation and underlying military concerns

Attitudes towards a regional military force are of paramount importance when exploring public support for regional integration. Until now, however, scholarly research has not considered the influence of attitudes towards a regional military mechanism in the sub-Saharan African context. Using Afrobarometer data, we demonstrate that military concerns are vital when exploring Tanzanian attitudes towards the proposed political federation of the East African Community (EAC), the East African Federation (EAF). More specifically, opposition to military cooperation strongly influences Tanzanian scepticism of the EAF. This finding is highly relevant given that referendums in the participating member states must be passed to facilitate political integration. Heightened opposition towards military cooperation raises the possibility of the public rejecting a politically integrated EAC. This poses a potential obstacle to the implementation of joint security policies and crucial mechanisms to provide a more stable region at large. We account for alternative explanations of Tanzanian opinion formation and reflect on the strength of military-orientated concerns for investigating public support for the East African project specifically and regional integration in sub-Saharan Africa more widely.

Increasing scepticism toward potential liars: effects of existential threat on veracity judgments and the moderating role of honesty norm activation

With the present research, we investigated effects of existential threat on veracity judgments. According to several meta-analyses, people judge potentially deceptive messages of other people as true rather than as false (so-called truth bias). This judgmental bias has been shown to depend on how people weigh the error of judging a true message as a lie (error 1) and the error of judging a lie as a true message (error 2). The weight of these errors has been further shown to be affected by situational variables. Given that research on terror management theory has found evidence that mortality salience (MS) increases the sensitivity toward the compliance of cultural norms, especially when they are of focal attention, we assumed that when the honesty norm is activated, MS affects judgmental error weighing and, consequently, judgmental biases. Specifically, activating the norm of honesty should decrease the weight of error 1 (the error of judging a true message as a lie) and increase the weight of error 2 (the error of judging a lie as a true message) when mortality is salient. In a first study, we found initial evidence for this assumption. Furthermore, the change in error weighing should reduce the truth bias, automatically resulting in better detection accuracy of actual lies and worse accuracy of actual true statements. In two further studies, we manipulated MS and honesty norm activation before participants judged several videos containing actual truths or lies. Results revealed evidence for our prediction. Moreover, in Study 3, the truth bias was increased after MS when group solidarity was previously emphasized.

Why there is reason to remain sceptical of Durston's scepticism

In this reply I argue that Durston's defence of his argument from the complexity of history ought to be unacceptable to the theist as it undermines not only common theistic attitudes towards God, such as gratitude and praise, but also the rationality of our ordinary moral practices.

Scepticism is warranted or when the CT scan reveals to be a pitfall

We report the case of a 72-year old woman with known metastatic breast cancer who presented to the emergency department with progressive dyspnea on exertion and chest pain. The diagnosis of pulmonary embolism could be established by pulmonary scintigraphy after computed tomography and ultrasound of the lower extremities had been negative in spite of a moderate clinical pretest probability (Wells score). This case shows that even if we manage suspected pulmonary embolism using algorithms combining clinical probability, computed tomography and ultrasound we must remain aware of eventually missing the diagnosis and carry on investigating cases with elevated clinical probability.