O enredo prisional em Angola: soberanias duais na disciplina do corpo colonial

A análise das estruturas de aprisionamento necessita de atender ao quadro institucional no qual se encontra enquadrado. A compreensão das finalidades às quais reporta apenas pode ser captada na alusão a um quadro teórico e conceptual que não se cinja à apreensão restrita das suas mais evidentes manifestações. O enredo da Angola colonial, no qual nos focamos, imprime a necessidade de nos afastarmos dos recorrentes estudos que tendem a evidenciar a brutalidade da prática repressiva no interior das prisões, menosprezando, por iminência, uma análise que capte as características longitudinais que ditam as estruturas administrativas das suas bases materiais. Assente na defesa de um alargamento conceptual das práticas de confinamento, pretende esta investigação contribuir para os estudos que atendem à necessidade destes estabelecimentos serem analisados à luz de outras instâncias, nomeadamente o trabalho forçado e o incipiente poder infraestrutural do estado colonial. De forma a alcançar tal propósito esta dissertação concebe uma análise que contrapõe às finalidades impressas nos códigos legais dos estatutos criminais coloniais os relatórios arquivísticos. Estes dão conta da prática que regia o modus operandi destes estabelecimentos e atestam a debilidade morfológica do poder estatal colonial. É face a tal que se apresenta, numa última análise, as instâncias que nos permitem pensar o enredo edificado pelas empresas concessionárias no território colonial numa relação de analogia com a prisão colonial. Tal comparação é aqui edificada pelo recurso ao estudo de caso da Companhia de Diamantes de Angola, problematizando-se o modo como esta empresa substituía o poder do estado colonial ao implementar políticas públicas de gestão e controlo das massas trabalhadoras que se encontravam sob a sua alçada.

Biochemical properties of an extracellular beta-D-fructofuranosidase II produced by Aspergillus phoenicis under Solid-Sate Fermentation using soy bran as substrate

The filamentous fungus A. phoenicis produced high levels of beta-D-fructofuranosidase (FFase) when grown for 72 hrs under Solid-State Fermentation (SSF), using soy bran moistened with tap water (1:0.5 w/v) as substrate/carbon source. Two isoforms (I and II) were obtained, and FFase II was purified 18-fold to apparent homogeneity with 14% recovery. The native molecular mass of the glycoprotein (12% of carbohydrate content) was 158.5 kDa with two subunits of 85 kDa estimated by SDS-PAGE. Optima of temperature and pH were 55 degrees C and 4.5. The enzyme was stable for more than 1 hr at 50 degrees C and was also stable in a pH range from 7.0 to 8.0. FFase II retained 80% of activity after storage at 4 degrees C by 200 hrs. Dichroism analysis showed the presence of random and beta-sheet structure. A. phoenicis FFase II was activated by Mn(2+), Mg(2+) and Co(2+), and inhibited by Cu(2+), Hg(2+) and EDTA. The enzyme hydrolyzed sucrose, inulin and raffinose. K(d) and V(max) values were 18 mM and 189 U/mg protein using sucrose as substrate.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints

In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.

Complexity and Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Problemsing.

I develop a model of endogenous bounded rationality due to search costs, arising implicitly from the problems complexity. The decision maker is not required to know the entire structure of the problem when making choices but can think ahead, through costly search, to reveal more of it. However, the costs of search are not assumed exogenously; they are inferred from revealed preferences through her choices. Thus, bounded rationality and its extent emerge endogenously: as problems become simpler or as the benefits of deeper search become larger relative to its costs, the choices more closely resemble those of a rational agent. For a fixed decision problem, the costs of search will vary across agents. For a given decision maker, they will vary across problems. The model explains, therefore, why the disparity, between observed choices and those prescribed under rationality, varies across agents and problems. It also suggests, under reasonable assumptions, an identifying prediction: a relation between the benefits of deeper search and the depth of the search. As long as calibration of the search costs is possible, this can be tested on any agent-problem pair. My approach provides a common framework for depicting the underlying limitations that force departures from rationality in different and unrelated decision-making situations. Specifically, I show that it is consistent with violations of timing independence in temporal framing problems, dynamic inconsistency and diversification bias in sequential versus simultaneous choice problems, and with plausible but contrasting risk attitudes across small- and large-stakes gambles.

Social rationality and scales of action: inter-ethnic relations in cockfighting and game-fishing, Raiatea, French Polynesia

This article challenges the notion of economic rationality as a criterion for explaining ethnic boundary maintenance. It offers an ethnographic analysis of inter-ethnic relations in the context of games (cockfights and game-fishing contests) in the island of Raiatea (French Polynesia). Although all players engage in the same basic gambling practices, money is differentially scaled and mobilized by the Tahitian and Chinese participants. Building on recent pragmatic approaches to rationality, it is shown that the players' rationalities differ not from the point of view of economic maximization, but only in so far as they participate in social relations at different scales.

Regions of rationality: Maps for bounded agents

An important problem in descriptive and prescriptive research in decision making is to identify regions of rationality, i.e., the areas for which heuristics are and are not effective. To map the contours of such regions, we derive probabilities that heuristics identify the best of m alternatives (m > 2) characterized by k attributes or cues (k > 1). The heuristics include a single variable (lexicographic), variations of elimination-by-aspects, equal weighting, hybrids of the preceding, and models exploiting dominance. We use twenty simulated and four empirical datasets for illustration. We further provide an overview by regressing heuristic performance on factors characterizing environments. Overall, sensible heuristics generally yield similar choices in many environments. However, selection of the appropriate heuristic can be important in some regions (e.g., if there is low inter-correlation among attributes/cues). Since our work assumes a hit or miss decision criterion, we conclude by outlining extensions for exploring the effects of different loss functions.

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. Wereplace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probability p or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a kind of correlated equilibrium satisfying certain p-belief constraints, and that it varies continuously in the parameters p and, for p sufficiently close to one,with high probability is supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend the analysis to characterizing rational expectations of interimtypes, to games of incomplete information, as well as to the case of non-common priors.

Economic rationality and ethical behavior

This paper argues that economic rationality and ethical behavior cannotbe reduced one to the other, casting doubts on the validity of formulaslike 'profit is ethical' or 'ethics pays'. In order to express ethicaldilemmas as opposing economic interest with ethical concerns, we proposea model of rational behavior that combines these two irreducible dimensions in an open but not arbitrary manner. Behaviors that are neither ethicalnor profitable are considered irrational (non-arbitrariness). However,behaviors that are profitable but unethical, and behaviors that are ethicalbut not profitable, are all treated as rational (openness). Combiningethical concerns with economic interest, ethical business is in turn anoptimal form of rationality between venality and sacrifice.Because every one prefers to communicate that he acts ethically, ethicalbusiness remains ambiguous until some economic interest is actuallysacrificed. We argue however that ethical business has an interest indemonstrating its consistency between communication and behavior by atransparent attitude. On the other hand, venal behaviors must remainconfidential to hide the corresponding lack of consistency. Thisdiscursive approach based on transparency and confidentiality helpsto further distinguish between ethical and unethical business behaviors.