A hardware virtualization-based component sandboxing architecture

Modern applications comprise multiple components, such as browser plug-ins, often of unknown provenance and quality. Statistics show that failure of such components accounts for a high percentage of software faults. Enabling isolation of such fine-grained components is therefore necessary to increase the robustness and resilience of security-critical and safety-critical computer systems. In this paper, we evaluate whether such fine-grained components can be sandboxed through the use of the hardware virtualization support available in modern Intel and AMD processors. We compare the performance and functionality of such an approach to two previous software based approaches. The results demonstrate that hardware isolation minimizes the difficulties encountered with software based approaches, while also reducing the size of the trusted computing base, thus increasing confidence in the solution's correctness. We also show that our relatively simple implementation has equivalent run-time performance, with overheads of less than 34%, does not require custom tool chains and provides enhanced functionality over software-only approaches, confirming that hardware virtualization technology is a viable mechanism for fine-grained component isolation.

LibVM: An architecture for shared library sandboxing

Many software applications extend their functionality by dynamically loading libraries into their allocated address space. However, shared libraries are also often of unknown provenance and quality and may contain accidental bugs or, in some cases, deliberately malicious code. Most sandboxing techniques which address these issues require recompilation of the libraries using custom tool chains, require significant modifications to the libraries, do not retain the benefits of single address-space programming, do not completely isolate guest code, or incur substantial performance overheads. In this paper we present LibVM, a sandboxing architecture for isolating libraries within a host application without requiring any modifications to the shared libraries themselves, while still retaining the benefits of a single address space and also introducing a system call inter-positioning layer that allows complete arbitration over a shared library’s functionality. We show how to utilize contemporary hardware virtualization support towards this end with reasonable performance overheads and, in the absence of such hardware support, our model can also be implemented using a software-based mechanism. We ensure that our implementation conforms as closely as possible to existing shared library manipulation functions, minimizing the amount of effort needed to apply such isolation to existing programs. Our experimental results show that it is easy to gain immediate benefits in scenarios where the goal is to guard the host application against unintentional programming errors when using shared libraries, as well as in more complex scenarios, where a shared library is suspected of being actively hostile. In both cases, no changes are required to the shared libraries themselves.

User-Level Sandboxing: a Safe and Efficient Mechanism for Extensibility

Extensible systems allow services to be configured and deployed for the specific needs of individual applications. This paper describes a safe and efficient method for user-level extensibility that requires only minimal changes to the kernel. A sandboxing technique is described that supports multiple logical protection domains within the same address space at user-level. This approach allows applications to register sandboxed code with the system, that may be executed in the context of any process. Our approach differs from other implementations that require special hardware support, such as segmentation or tagged translation look-aside buffers (TLBs), to either implement multiple protection domains in a single address space, or to support fast switching between address spaces. Likewise, we do not require the entire system to be written in a type-safe language, to provide fine-grained protection domains. Instead, our user-level sandboxing technique requires only paged-based virtual memory support, and the requirement that extension code is written either in a type-safe language, or by a trusted source. Using a fast method of upcalls, we show how our sandboxing technique for implementing logical protection domains provides significant performance improvements over traditional methods of invoking user-level services. Experimental results show our approach to be an efficient method for extensibility, with inter-protection domain communication costs close to those of hardware-based solutions leveraging segmentation.

Efficient End-Host Architecture for High Performance Communication Using User-level Sandboxing

Current low-level networking abstractions on modern operating systems are commonly implemented in the kernel to provide sufficient performance for general purpose applications. However, it is desirable for high performance applications to have more control over the networking subsystem to support optimizations for their specific needs. One approach is to allow networking services to be implemented at user-level. Unfortunately, this typically incurs costs due to scheduling overheads and unnecessary data copying via the kernel. In this paper, we describe a method to implement efficient application-specific network service extensions at user-level, that removes the cost of scheduling and provides protected access to lower-level system abstractions. We present a networking implementation that, with minor modifications to the Linux kernel, passes data between "sandboxed" extensions and the Ethernet device without copying or processing in the kernel. Using this mechanism, we put a customizable networking stack into a user-level sandbox and show how it can be used to efficiently process and forward data via proxies, or intermediate hosts, in the communication path of high performance data streams. Unlike other user-level networking implementations, our method makes no special hardware requirements to avoid unnecessary data copies. Results show that we achieve a substantial increase in throughput over comparable user-space methods using our networking stack implementation.

An Android application sandbox system for suspicious software detection

Smartphones are steadily gaining popularity, creating new application areas as their capabilities increase in terms of computational power, sensors and communication. Emerging new features of mobile devices give opportunity to new threats. Android is one of the newer operating systems targeting smartphones. While being based on a Linux kernel, Android has unique properties and specific limitations due to its mobile nature. This makes it harder to detect and react upon malware attacks if using conventional techniques. In this paper, we propose an Android Application Sandbox (AASandbox) which is able to perform both static and dynamic analysis on Android programs to automatically detect suspicious applications. Static analysis scans the software for malicious patterns without installing it. Dynamic analysis executes the application in a fully isolated environment, i.e. sandbox, which intervenes and logs low-level interactions with the system for further analysis. Both the sandbox and the detection algorithms can be deployed in the cloud, providing a fast and distributed detection of suspicious software in a mobile software store akin to Google's Android Market. Additionally, AASandbox might be used to improve the efficiency of classical anti-virus applications available for the Android operating system.

An Efficient User-Level Shared Memory Mechanism for Application-Specific Extensions

This paper focuses on an efficient user-level method for the deployment of application-specific extensions, using commodity operating systems and hardware. A sandboxing technique is described that supports multiple extensions within a shared virtual address space. Applications can register sandboxed code with the system, so that it may be executed in the context of any process. Such code may be used to implement generic routines and handlers for a class of applications, or system service extensions that complement the functionality of the core kernel. Using our approach, application-specific extensions can be written like conventional user-level code, utilizing libraries and system calls, with the advantage that they may be executed without the traditional costs of scheduling and context-switching between process-level protection domains. No special hardware support such as segmentation or tagged translation look-aside buffers (TLBs) is required. Instead, our ``user-level sandboxing'' mechanism requires only paged-based virtual memory support, given that sandboxed extensions are either written by a trusted source or are guaranteed to be memory-safe (e.g., using type-safe languages). Using a fast method of upcalls, we show how our mechanism provides significant performance improvements over traditional methods of invoking user-level services. As an application of our approach, we have implemented a user-level network subsystem that avoids data copying via the kernel and, in many cases, yields far greater network throughput than kernel-level approaches.