Respecting contractual intentions : balancing consumer expectations with the sanctity of contract in the context of standard form insurance contracts

It is the purpose of this article to examine the means curently available to judges to achieve a workable balance between providing appropriate consumer protection to signatories of standard form contractors while still retaining adequate respect for the sanctity of contract, and, based on this analysis, to determine whether a significantly greater scope of contract (re)construction is likely to become the norm in most common law jurisdictions in the coming decades.

Defending the sanctity of life principle : a reply to John Keown

This article is a response to Professor Keown’s criticism of my paper “Finding a Way Through the Ethical and Legal Maze: Withdrawal of Medical Treatment and Euthanasia” (2005) 13 (3) Medical Law Review 357. The article takes up and responds to a number of criticisms raised by Keown in an attempt to further the debate concerning the moral and legal status of withdrawing life-sustaining measures, its distinction from euthanasia, and the implications of the lawfulness of withdrawal for the principle of the sanctity of life.

Manifestations of heavenly light and fire and the construction of a saint: sanctity, mission and salvation in Adomnán's Vita Columbae

This thesis examines the late seventh-century Latin Life of Columba (Vita Columbae) in a context sympathetic to the spiritual aims and formative intellectual background of its author, Adomnán of Iona. It argues that the Vita Columbae is a sophisticated work, shaped by Adomnán’s spiritual and theological concerns. This sophistication is revealed by a forensic examination of Adomnán’s representation of Columba’s sanctity through a series of miracles, in particular, miracle stories depicting divine manifestations of fire and light. This thesis considers the form and function of these miracle stories in the context of biblical, patristic and medieval interpretations of their archetypes, towards revealing the underlying influence of scriptural, hagiographical and monastic models of sanctity. Chapter one evaluates the function of the Vita Columbae, and outlines the core themes of sanctity which pervade the work, by considering the technical terminology and literary devices found in the opening prefaces in the context of the wider monastic tradition. Chapter two examines Adomnán’s use of biblical models of sanctity to establish Columba’s sanctity, and their relationship between these models and certain miraculous episodes in the Vita Columbae. Chapter three investigates Adomnán’s description of the Holy Spirit as an illuminating fire, and its significance for his portrayal of the saint, by means of a forensic examination of biblical, exegetical and hagiographical treatments of the image. Chapter four examines the missiological, soteriological and providential elements contributing to Adomnán’s portrayal of Columba’s sanctity, as conveyed through the presence of biblical models, particularly the image of the column of fire. Chapter five establishes the influence of monastic examinations of the contemplative life on Adomnán’s portrayal of Columba’s sanctity, and shows how that sanctity is confirmed in terms of his ability to contemplate divine light.

Sanctity and social service,

Activity the goal of prayer.--Catherine of Sienna, saint and suffragist.--Francis of Assisi, saint and social reformer.--Joan of Arc, saint and patriot.--Ignatius Loyola, saint and empire-builder.--Vincent de Paul, saint and founder of modern philosophy.--The apology of works.

The holy man of Tours : or, the life of Léon Papin-Dupont, who died at Tours in the odor of sanctity, March 18, 1876 /

Translation of the second edition of Vie de M. Dupont, mort a Tours en odeur de sainteté le 18 Mard 1876.

The sanctity of marriage.

Mode of access: Internet.

A theoretic explanation of the science of sanctity : according to reason, Scripture, common sense, and the analogy of things : containing an idea of God, of his creations and kingdoms, of the Holy Scriptures, of the Christian trinity, and of the Gospel system /

Mode of access: Internet.

Sanctity of Human Life in the Context of Human Genetic Research

The study on the concept of sanctity of human life is a journey in finding out what is it said to be “human” in human life. It is an evaluation of the universal concept and the role it plays in controlling and moulding human conduct and relationships. This concept is a foundational principle of human rights law and the grundnorm of every legal system. However, of late, the challenges by way of certain advances in human genetic research had prompted the need to evaluate the significance and extent of the concept in human endeavours. Scientific advances by way of human genetic research promises significant diagnostic and therapeutic advances but at the same time pose threat to fundamental notions and assumptions on humanity, hence there is a global concern to derive common legal standards, Thus the major challenge is to analyse universal principles which can be a common criteria for evolving legal standards to control certain advances in human genetic research. Hence the relevance of the study. The study aims at analysing the content, scope, extent and limitation of the concept of sanctity of human life. In this attempt it evaluates the extent to which the concept had been accommodated by legal systems and international human rights regimes. The problem which had been undertaken in the study is the extent of intrusion made to the concept by virtue of certain advances in human genetic research.

Everyday life and the edges of existence : wrongs with no name or the wrong name?

Actions for wrongful life, as they have come unfortunately to be styled, encompass various types of claim. These include claims for alleged negligence after conception, those based on negligent advice or diagnosis prior to conception concerning possible effects of treatment given to the child's mother, contraception or sterilisation, or genetic disability. This distinguishes such claims from those for so called wrongful birth, which are claims by parents for the cost of raising either a healthy or a disabled child where the unplanned birth imposes costs on the parents as a result of clinical negligence. Two of the more controversial cases to have reached the High Court of Australia which are if interest to us here in the past decade are Cattanach v Melchior where the court, by a narrow majority (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ; Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon dissenting) acknowledged recovery for wrongful birth. In the second joined appeals of Harriton v Stephens and Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan the court overwhelmingly precluded a ‘wrongful life’ claim (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ; Kirby J dissenting). Both cases raised issues around the sanctity and value of life and the nature of harm and the assessment of damages, and this brief note affords us the opportunity to consider the way in which the ‘life as legal loss’ arguments were treated by the various judges in both cases.

Finding a way through the ethical and legal maze : withdrawing medical treatment and euthanasia

This article examines Finnis' and Keown's claim that the intention/foresight distinction should be used as the basis for the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawing medical treatment, rather than the act/omission distinction which is currently used. I argue that whilst the intention/foresight distinction is sound and can apply to palliative pain relief hastening death, it cannot be applied to withholding and withdrawing medical treatment. Instead, the act/omission distinction remains the better basis for the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawal, and law reform is consequently unnecessary.

Advance directives, autonomy and the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment

As Australian society 1s agemg, individuals are increasingly concerned about managing their future, including making decisions about the medical treatment they may wish to receive or refuse if they lose decision-making capacity. To date, there has been relatively little research into the extent to which legal regulation allows competent adults to make advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment that will bind health professionals and others when a decision needs to be made at a future time. This thesis aims to fill this gap in the research by presenting the results of research into the legal regulation of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. In the five papers that comprise this thesis, the law that governs this area is examined, and the ethical principle of autonomy is used to critically evaluate that law. The principal finding of this research is that the current scheme of regulation is ineffective to adequately promote the right of a competent adult to make binding advance directives about refusal of medical treatment. The research concludes that legislation should be enacted to enable individuals to complete an advance directive, only imposing restrictions to the extent that this is necessary to promote individual autonomy. The thesis first examines the principle of autonomy upon which the common law (and some statutory law) is expressed to be based, to determine whether that principle is an appropriate one to underpin regulation. 1 The finding of the research is that autonomy can be justified as an organising principle on a number of grounds: it is consistent with the values of a liberal democracy; over recent decades, it is a principle that has been even more prominent within the discipline of medical ethics; and it is the principle which underpins the legal regulation of a related topic, namely the contemporaneous refusal of medical treatment. Next, the thesis reviews the common law to determine whether it effectively achieves the goal of promoting autonomy by allowing a competent adult to make an advance directive refusing treatment that will operate if he or she later loses decision-making capacity. 2 This research finds that conunon law doctrine, as espoused by the judiciary, prioritises individual choice by recognising valid advance directives that refuse treatment as binding. However, the research also concludes that the common law, as applied by the judiciary in some cases, may not be effective to promote individual autonomy, as there have been a number of circumstances where advance directives that refuse treatment have not been followed. The thesis then examines the statutory regimes in Australia that regulate advance directives, with a focus on the regulation of advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment.3 This review commences with an examination ofparliamentary debates to establish why legislation was thought to be necessary. It then provides a detailed review of all of the statutory regimes, the extent to which the legislation regulates the form of advance directives, and the circumstances in which they can be completed, will operate and can be ignored by medical professionals. The research finds that legislation was enacted mainly to clarify the common law and bring a level of certainty to the field. Legislative regimes were thought to provide medical professionals with the assurance that compliance with an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment will not expose them to legal sanction. However, the research also finds that the legislation places so many restrictions on when an advance directive refusing treatment can be made, or will operate, that they have not been successful in promoting individual autonomy.

How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide?

The purpose of this paper is to provide a basis from which to start an informed and rational dialogue in Australia about voluntary euthanasia (VE) and assisted suicide (AS). It does this by seeking to chart the broad landscape of issues that can be raised as relevant to how this conduct should be regulated by the law. It is not our purpose to persuade. Rather, we have attempted to address the issues as neutrally as possible and to canvass both sides of the argument in an even-handed manner. We hope that this exercise places the reader in a position to consider the question posed by this paper: How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide? In line with the approach taken in the paper, this question does not take sides in the debate. It simply asks how VE and AS should be regulated, acknowledging that both prohibition and legalisation of such conduct involve regulation. We begin by considering the wider legal framework that governs end of life decision-making. Decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment that result in a person’s death can be lawful. This could be because, for example, a competent adult refuses such treatment. Alternatively, stopping or not providing treatment can be lawful when it is no longer in a person’s best interests to receive it. The law also recognises that appropriate palliative care should not attract criminal responsibility. By contrast, VE and AS are unlawful in Australia and could lead to prosecution for crimes such as murder, manslaughter or aiding and abetting suicide. But this is not to say that such conduct does not occur in practice. Indeed, there is a body of evidence that VE and AS occur in Australia, despite them being unlawful. There have been repeated efforts to change the law in this country, mainly by the minor political parties. However, apart from a brief period when VE and AS was lawful in the Northern Territory, these attempts to reform the law have been unsuccessful. The position is different in a small but increasing number of jurisdictions overseas where such conduct is lawful. The most well known is the Netherlands but there are also statutory regimes that regulate VE and/or AS in Belgium and Luxembourg in Europe, and Oregon and Washington in the United States. A feature of these legislative models is that they incorporate review or oversight processes that enable the collection of data about how the law is being used. As a result, there is a significant body of evidence that is available for consideration to assess the operation of the law in these jurisdictions and some of this is considered briefly here. Assisting a suicide, if done for selfless motives, is also legal in Switzerland, and this has resulted in what has been referred to as ‘euthanasia tourism’. This model is also considered. The paper also identifies the major arguments in favour of, and against, legalisation of VE and AS. Arguments often advanced in favour of law reform include respect for autonomy, that public opinion favours reform, and that the current law is incoherent and discriminatory. Key arguments against legalising VE and AS point to the sanctity of life, concerns about the adequacy and effectiveness of safeguards, and a ‘slippery slope’ that will allow euthanasia to occur for minors or for adults where it is not voluntary. We have also attempted to step beyond these well trodden and often rehearsed cases ‘for and against’. To this end, we have identified some ethical values that might span both sides of the debate and perhaps be the subject of wider consensus. We then outline a framework for considering the issue of how Australia should regulate VE and AS. We begin by asking whether such conduct should be criminal acts (as they presently are). If VE and AS should continue to attract criminal responsibility, the next step is to enquire whether the law should punish such conduct more or less than is presently the case, or whether the law should stay the same. If a change is favoured as to how the criminal law punishes VE and AS, options considered include sentencing reform, creating context-specific offences or developing prosecutorial guidelines for how the criminal justice system deals with these issues. If VE and AS should not be criminal acts, then questions arise as to how and when they should be permitted and regulated. Possible elements of any reform model include: ensuring decision-making is competent and voluntary; ascertaining a person’s eligibility to utilise the regime, for example, whether it depends on him or her having a terminal illness or experiencing pain and suffering; and setting out processes for how any decision must be made and evidenced. Options to bring about decriminalisation include challenging the validity of laws that make VE and AS unlawful, recognising a defence to criminal prosecution, or creating a statutory framework to regulate the practice. We conclude the paper where we started: with a call for rational and informed consideration of a difficult and sensitive issue. How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide?