The knowing employment of illegal immigrants : hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, on employer sanctions, September 30, 1981.

Item 1042-A, 1042-B (microfiche)

Administrativa sanktioner – Utmaningar och möjligheter

I seminariet samlades nordiska experter inom fältet för att diskutera om de aktuella frågorna gällande administrativa sanktioner.

Management deficiencies in environmental enforcement : "forceless enforcement" : hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, first session, June 19, 1991.

Shipping list no.: 93-0101-P.

FY 2004 : fee and penalty increases : Public Act 93-0032 (SB 1903)

"LPU Order 38511"--Colophon.

Economic law enforcement : final report /

"EPA-901/9-76-003A-(b)

Implementation in Colorado of the Immigration Reform and Control Act : a preliminary review /

"A summary report, January 1989."

DOT penalty actions resulting from violations of hazardous materials regulations.

"July 1986"--P. [1].

Beyond sanctions : is there a need to treat first-time offenders?

Aims: Driving Under the Influence (DUI) enforcement can be a broad screening mechanism for alcohol and other drug problems. The current response to DUI is focused on using mechanical means to prevent inebriated persons from driving, with little attention the underlying substance abuse problems. ---------- Methods: This is a secondary analysis of an administrative dataset of over 345,000 individuals who entered Texas substance abuse treatment between 2005 and 2008. Of these, 36,372 were either on DUI probation, referred to treatment by probation, or had a DUI arrest in the past year. The DUI offenders were compared on demographic characteristics, substance use patterns, and levels of impairment with those who were not DUI offenders and first DUI offenders were compared with those with more than one past-year offense. T tests and chi square tests were used to determine significance. ---------- Results: DUI offenders were more likely to be employed, to have a problem with alcohol, to report more past-year arrests for any offense, to be older, and to have used alcohol and drugs longer than the non-DUI clients who reported higher ASI scores and were more likely to use daily. Those with one past-year DUI arrest were more likely to have problems with drugs other than alcohol and were less impaired than those with two or more arrests based on their ASI scores and daily use. Non-DUI clients reported higher levels of mood disorders than DUIs but there was no difference in their diagnosis of anxiety. Similar findings were found between those with one or multiple DUI arrests. ----------Conclusion: Although first-time DUIs were not as impaired as non-DUI clients, their levels of impairment were sufficient to cause treatment. Screening and brief intervention at arrest for all DUI offenders and treatment in combination with abstinence monitoring could decrease future recidivism.

Removing barriers to protection at the exported border : visas, carrier sanctions, and international obligation

Asylum is being gradually denuded of the national institutional mechanisms (judicial, legislative and administrative) that provide the framework for a fair and effective asylum hearing. In this sense, there is an ongoing ‘denationalization’ or ‘deformalization’ of the asylum process. This chapter critically examines one of the linchpins of this trend: the erection of pre-entry measures at ports of embarkation in order to prevent asylum seekers from physically accessing the territory of the state. Pre-entry measures comprise the core requirement that foreigners possess an entry visa granting permission to enter the state of destination. Visa requirements are increasingly implemented by immigration officials posted abroad or by officials of transit countries pursuant to bilateral agreements (so-called ‘juxtaposed’ immigration controls). Private carriers, which are subject to sanctions if they bring persons to a country who do not have permission to enter, also engage in a form of de facto immigration control on behalf of states. These measures constitute a type of ‘externalized’ or ‘exported’ border that pushes the immigration boundaries of the state as far from its physical boundaries as possible. Pre-entry measures have a crippling impact on the ability of asylum seekers to access the territory of states to claim asylum. In effect, states have ‘externalized’ asylum by replacing the legal obligation on states to protect refugees arriving at ports of entry with what are perceived to be no more than moral obligations towards asylum seekers arriving at the external border of the state.

An Assessment of the Penalties System for Infringements of EU Competition Law: Can Personal Sanctions be the Missing Piece of the Puzzle? IES WORKING PAPER 6/2013

Competition law seeks to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. In order to be successful, therefore, competition authorities should be adequately equipped and have at their disposal all necessary enforcement tools. However, at the EU level the current enforcement system of competition rules allows only for the imposition of administrative fines by the European Commission to liable undertakings. The main objectives, in turn, of an enforcement policy based on financial penalties are two fold: to impose sanctions on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the violation, and to ensure that the risk of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings (often referred to as 'specific deterrence') and other undertakings that may be considering anti-competitive activities from engaging in them (often referred to as 'general deterrence'). In all circumstances, it is important to ensure that pecuniary sanctions imposed on infringing undertakings are proportionate and not excessive. Although pecuniary sanctions against infringing undertakings are a crucial part of the arsenal needed to deter competition law violations, they may not be sufficient. One alternative option in that regard is the strategic use of sanctions against the individuals involved in, or responsible for, the infringements. Sanctions against individuals are documented to focus the minds of directors and employees to comply with competition rules as they themselves, in addition to the undertakings in which they are employed, are at risk of infringements. Individual criminal penalties, including custodial sanctions, have been in fact adopted by almost half of the EU Member States. This is a powerful tool but is also limited in scope and hard to implement in practice mostly due to the high standards of proof required and the political consensus that needs first to be built. Administrative sanctions for individuals, on the other hand, promise to deliver up to a certain extent the same beneficial results as criminal sanctions whilst at the same time their adoption is not likely to meet strong opposition and their implementation in practice can be both efficient and effective. Directors’ disqualification, in particular, provides a strong individual incentive for each member, or prospective member, of the Board as well as other senior executives, to take compliance with competition law seriously. It is a flexible and promising tool that if added to the arsenal of the European Commission could bring balance to the current sanctioning system and that, in turn, would in all likelihood make the enforcement of EU competition rules more effective. Therefore, it is submitted that a competition law regime in order to be effective should be able to deliver policy objectives through a variety of tools, not simply by imposing significant pecuniary sanctions to infringing undertakings. It is also clear that individual sanctions, mostly of an administrative nature, are likely to play an increasingly important role as they focus the minds of those in business who might otherwise be inclined to regard infringing the law as a matter of corporate risk rather than of personal risk. At the EU level, in particular, the adoption of directors’ disqualification promises to deliver more effective compliance and greater overall economic impact.

A study of administrative hearings conducted by state driver licensing agencies. Volume I. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

A study of administrative hearings conducted by state driver licensing agencies. Volume II - appendices. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

La protection de l'environnement par les sanctions administratives pécuniaires au Québec

Avec l’adoption le 4 octobre 2011 par l’Assemblée nationale du Québec du projet de loi 89 intitulé «Loi modifiant la Loi sur la qualité de l’environnement afin d’en renforcer le respect», le législateur est venu renforcer le régime de droit pénal en augmentant la sévérité des peines pour les infractions à Loi sur la qualité de l’environnement. Il a aussi élargi les pouvoirs d’intervention du ministre en lien avec les autorisations qu’il émet. Cependant, la principale réforme apportée par le projet de loi 89 qui touche aux mécanismes même de protection de l’environnement, est la création de toute pièce d’un régime de sanctions dites administratives pécuniaires, parallèlement au régime de sanctions déjà existantes. La première interrogation, soulevée à l’égard des sanctions administratives pécuniaires, et la plus fondamentale, était celle de savoir si le contrevenant devait bénéficier des protections constitutionnelles énoncées à l’article 11 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, tel un inculpé face à une procédure pénale. Puisque nous concluons que ces sanctions relèvent uniquement du droit administratif, nous avons cherché à déterminer quel serait le contenu du devoir d’agir équitablement de l’Administration lors du processus d’émission et de contestation de la sanction administrative pécuniaire.

La protection de l'environnement par les sanctions administratives pécuniaires au Québec

Avec l’adoption le 4 octobre 2011 par l’Assemblée nationale du Québec du projet de loi 89 intitulé «Loi modifiant la Loi sur la qualité de l’environnement afin d’en renforcer le respect», le législateur est venu renforcer le régime de droit pénal en augmentant la sévérité des peines pour les infractions à Loi sur la qualité de l’environnement. Il a aussi élargi les pouvoirs d’intervention du ministre en lien avec les autorisations qu’il émet. Cependant, la principale réforme apportée par le projet de loi 89 qui touche aux mécanismes même de protection de l’environnement, est la création de toute pièce d’un régime de sanctions dites administratives pécuniaires, parallèlement au régime de sanctions déjà existantes. La première interrogation, soulevée à l’égard des sanctions administratives pécuniaires, et la plus fondamentale, était celle de savoir si le contrevenant devait bénéficier des protections constitutionnelles énoncées à l’article 11 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, tel un inculpé face à une procédure pénale. Puisque nous concluons que ces sanctions relèvent uniquement du droit administratif, nous avons cherché à déterminer quel serait le contenu du devoir d’agir équitablement de l’Administration lors du processus d’émission et de contestation de la sanction administrative pécuniaire.