Vested interest in the decision to resolve social dilemma conflicts

This exploratory study investigated the degree of correspondence between individual and group interests in the decision to adopt a sanctioning system to manage a shared resource with social dilemma properties. Fifty-two groups of four people accessed a "free-running" computer-simulated shared resource and had either equal or unequal resource access and experienced either an equitable or inequitable sanctioning system. Consistent with past research, a worse group outcome and greater voting for system change was found under the equitable than under the inequitable sanctioning system. However, at the individual level of analysis, the results suggested that the sanctioning systems did not have the same implications for all group members and that some of those differences predicted voting for system change. The study suggests the need to investigate the various decision frames and inequitable implications associated with structural/institutional change and calls for further investigation of dependencies between micro- and macro-level units of analysis.

社会困境中的行为决策――社会身份与地位的影响

Social dilemmas are defined as such situations in which short-term individual and long-term collective interests are at odds (Hardin, 1968; Messick & Brewer, 1983). Severe social problems lead more and more researchers to pay attention to the issue of social dilemmas. Until now, research has widely examined the factors influencing cooperation in social dilemmas, and provided solutions to social dilemmas. In the need of theory development, previous research generally simplified the situation of realistic social dilemmas. Therefore, few studies have explored the issue of cooperation in social dilemmas in an intergroup situation. On the other hand, there has been little empirical attention for such issues in countries outside of United States and Western Europe. To meet this gap, the present study grounded itself in social identity theories and examined the effect of unequal group status on behavioral decision making in social dilemmas. To this end, the study designed three experiments to examine how individuals with different group status response psychologically and behaviorally to cooperation in intragroup and intergroup social dilemmas. In experiment 1, the study examined how independent and interdependent self- construals affect cooperative behavior in an intragroup social dilemma. The results showed that when individuals were primed with interdependent (as opposed to independent) self-construal, they consistently contributed highly, regardless of context manipulation. In contrast, those primed with independent self-construal contributed less in the investment game but only when placed in a context where group members were encouraged to think about their individual (versus shared) fate. Results supported the idea that independent self-construal in a low interdependent context produces the most competitive behavior and that this effect was partially mediated by the feeling of interaction within a group. In experiment 2, the study examined how the effect of group status on different level of cooperation in a nested social dilemma was moderated by individual status, and what roles ingroup and superordinate identifications played in the above effect. Results found that individuals in higher status groups tended to allocate more to private account and less to subgroup account compared to those in lower status group; individuals in higher status groups allocated more to higher level accounts than to private account, whereas those in lower status acted in a reverse way. The results indicated that group status (compared to individual status) exerted a positive influence on behavioral decision making in social dilemmas, with higher group status contributing more to subgroup as well as collective interests. Results also found that the effect of group status and/or individual status on cooperation in social dilemmas was moderated by sex. As for individual status, results showed that the effect of individual status on subgroup interest was significantly moderated only by the combination of higher ingroup identification and lower superordinate identification. In experiment 3, the study explored how group stability and cognitive categorization interactively influenced the relationship between group status and behavioral decision making in a social dilemma. Results did not support the prediction that group status and stability interactively affected behavioral decision-making in social dilemmas. However, it was found that this relationship was moderated by which level individuals categorized themselves at. When categorization at the individual level was salient, individuals in high status group contributed more to subgroup account than those in low status group if they perceived a stable status hierarchy; whereas they contributed more to private account and less to collective account if they perceived that the status was instable. On the other hand, when categorization at the subgroup level was salient, individuals in high status group contributed less to collective account than those in low status group if they perceived that the status was stable; whereas they contributed less to private account and more to subgroup account if they perceived an instable status relation. In summary, the present study suggests that cooperation with ingroup forms the basis of social harmony, and higher status for everyone in any given group is a necessary for social development. On the other hand, individuals in higher status group tend to be more selfish once they realize that their current status hierarchy is unstable. However, activating their collective identity will to some degree increase the level of their cooperation with the collective. The study thus provides psychological explanations on how to construct group harmony and management suggestions on how to solve social conflicts.

Institutions, Behavior and Evolution

The three articles constituting this thesis are for reasons of content or method related to the following three fields in economics: Behavioral Economics, Evolutionary Game Theory and Formal Institutional Economics. A core element of these fields is the concept of individual preferences. Preferences are of central importance for the conceptional framework to analyze human behavior. They form the foundation for the theory of rational choice which is defined by the determination of the choice set and the selection of the most preferred alternative according to some consistency requirements. The theory of rational choice is based on a very simplified description of the problem of choice (object function and constraints). However, that choices depend on many more factors is for instance propagated by psychological theories and is supported by many empirical and experimental studies. This thesis adds to a better understanding of individual behavior to the extent that the evolution of certain characteristics of preferences and their consequences on human behavior forms the overarching theme of the dissertation. The long-term effect of evolutionary forces on a particular characteristic of importance in the theoretical, empirical and experimental economic literature, the concept of inequality aversion, is subject of the article “The evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life” (Chapter 4). The contribution of the article is the overcoming of a restriction of former approaches to analyze the evolution of preferences in very simple environments. By classifying human interaction into three central economic games, the article provides a first step towards a simplified and sufficiently complete description of the interaction environment. Within such an environment the article characterizes the evolutionary stable preference distribution. One result shows, that the interaction of the aforementioned three classes can stabilize a preference of inequality aversion in the subpopulation which is favored in the problem of redistribution. The two remaining articles are concerned with social norms, which dissemination is determined by medium-run forces of cultural evolution. The article “The impact of market innovations on the evolution of social norms: the sustainability case.“ (Chapter 2) studies the interrelation between product innovations which are relevant from a sustainability perspective and an according social norm in consumption. This relation is based on a conformity bias in consumption and the attempt to avoid cognitive dissonances resulting from non-compliant consumption. Among others, it is shown that a conformity bias on the consumption side can lead to multiple equilibria on the side of norm adoption. The article “Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas: signaling internalized norms.” (Chapter 3) studies the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas based on the signaling of social norms. The article provides a potential explanation of cooperative behavior, which does not rely on the assumption of structured populations or on the unmotivated ability of social norms to restrict individual actions or strategy spaces. A comprehensive result of the single articles is the explanation of the phenomenon of partial norm adaption or dissemination of preferences. The plurality of the applied approaches with respect to the proximity to the rational choice approach and regarding the underlying evolutionary mechanics is a particular strength of the thesis. It shows the equality of these approaches in their potential to explain the phenomenon of cooperation in environments that provide material incentives for defective behavior. This also points to the need of a unified framework considering the biological and cultural coevolution of preference patterns.

An Experiment on Prisoner's Dilemma with confirmed Proposals

We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of signing a cooperative agreement in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and on their beliefs about the others’ type.

Measuring moral judgement and the implications of cooperative education and rule-based learning

The Defining Issues Test (DIT), developed by Rest (1986), measures a person's level of moral development using hypothetical social dilemmas. Although the DIT is useful for measuring moral development in social settings, it might not adequately capture an individual's moral judgement abilities in solving work-related problems (Weber, 1990; Trevino, 1992; Welton et al., 1994). In the present study, the moral judgement levels of 97 accounting students were measured over a 1 year period using two separate test instruments, the DIT and a context-specific instrument developed by Welton et al. (1994). The test scores are significantly higher on the DIT than the Welton instrument (between the instruments and over time), suggesting that accounting students use higher levels of moral reasoning in resolving hypothetical social dilemmas and lower levels of moral reasoning in resolving context-specific dilemmas. The difference in test scores was highest during cooperative education (work placement programme), implying that the environment is a significant determinant on students' test scores.

A cooperação em crianças de rede pública de Natal/RN:uma abordagem evolucionista

Cooperation is a well known behavior and influenced by all cultures. Probably selective pressures brought advantages to individuals that cooperate, and then this behavior is current in human societies. Most of it is studied about cooperation and natural selection was understood by the game theory, a mathematical approach that helps to understand the conflict and cooperation. We believe that natural selection and game theory could facilitate understanding these behaviors and two theoretical articles were written regarding this view. It was also found that most of data about cooperation was obtained in (with) adults. Since game theory is effective to understand this phenomenon, and to be used and understood, two games were used with five and eleven year old children: the common pool and public goods games. The results are presented in four empirical articles. We found that children respond to social dilemmas of game theory like the adults do. They adjust their rounds regarding the feedback obtained of their partness; in the beginning they cooperate and reduce the degree of cooperation along (throughout) the following session; in the absence of punition the level of opportunism increased, mainly in larger groups; boys and girls behave differently when donate. This research suggest that cooperation has an evolutionary basis in human and it is since earlier in the behavioral pattern shown by adults.

Does group size matter? Cheating and cooperation in Brazilian school children

Cooperation between individuals is an important requisite for the maintenance of social relationships. The purpose of this study was to investigate cooperation in children in the school environment, where individuals could cooperate or not with their classmates in a public goods game. We investigated which of the following variables influenced cooperation in children: sex, group size, and information on the number of sessions. Group size was the only factor to significantly affect cooperation, with small-group children cooperating significantly more than those in large groups. Both sex and information had no effect on cooperation. We suggest that these results reflect the fact that, in small groups, individuals were more efficient in controlling and retaliating theirs peers than in large groups. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Dynamics in the governance of collective irrigation systems: Evidence from field experiments in Nicaragua.

The objective of this study is to analyze the common pool resource appropriation and public good provisiondecisions in a dynamic setting, testing the differences in behavior and performance between lab and field subjects. We performeda total of 45 games in Nicaragua, including 88 villagers in rural communities and 92 undergraduate students. In order to analyze sequential decision making, we introduce a dynamic and asymmetric irrigation game that combines the typical social dilemmas associated to irrigation systems management.In addition, in 9 out of 22 villagers’ groups, we implemented a treatment that included the disclosure of subjects’ appropriation of the common pool resource. The results reveal that the provision of individuals’ appropriation level results in higher appropriation in subsequent rounds. In addition, the results show that non-treated villagers provide more public good than treated villagers but if compared with students the differences are not significant. The results also suggest that appropriation levels are below the Nash prediction of full appropriation, but above the social efficient level. This results in an efficiency loss in the game that can be explained to a large extent by individual decisions on appropriation and public good contribution and by group appropriation behavior.

The prisoners' dilemma, congestion games and correlation

Social dilemmas, in particular the prisoners' dilemma, are represented as congestion games, and within this framework soft correlated equilibria as introduced by Forgó F. (2010, A generalization of correlated equilibrium: A new protocol. Mathematical Social Sciences 60:186-190) is used to improve inferior Nash payoffs that are characteristic of social dilemmas. These games can be extended to several players in different ways preserving some important characteristics of the original 2-person game. In one of the most frequently studied models of the n-person prisoners' dilemma game we measure the performance of the soft correlated equilibrium by the mediation and enforcement values. For general prisoners' dilemma games the mediation value is ∞, the enforcement value is 2. This also holds for the class of separable prisoners’ dilemma games.

Antropología de la Conservación en España. Balance y perspectivas

En este artículo presentamos un balance de la Antropología de la Conservación en el Estado español. Durante las últimas décadas, la protección de los espacios naturales ha aumentado de una manera exponencial en todo el mundo. A la vez que se extendía esta patrimonialización de la naturaleza, los trabajos etnográficos sobre las áreas protegidas han ido ganando terreno dentro de la disciplina y, en particular, en el campo de la Antropología Ambiental. La mencionada bibliografía ha puesto de relieve los múltiples aspectos derivados de las nuevas políticas territoriales de regulación, apropiación y mercantilización de la ‘naturaleza’. En este trabajo realizamos una revisión exhaustiva de la producción generada a raíz de este interés por las áreas protegidas en nuestro país subrayando sus principales aportaciones, características y debilidades. De este modo pretendemos reflexionar acerca de su continuidad, con el fin de evitar la mera reiteración y favorecer el avance en sus resultados.

Reconciling dilemmas of social justice in literacy lessons : a case study of preservice primary teachers

Literacy is promoted as one factor in overcoming disadvantage. In this paper, we employ Fraser’s (1997 & 2008) framing of social justice in order to analyse the disparate agendas of literacy education for improved outcomes in national policy. We do this to better understand the dilemmas confronting preservice teachers as they prepare to become teachers in complex education contexts. We then examine what 20 preservice primary teachers say about social justice in interview responses to a scripted scenario. Our findings demonstrate that most preservice teachers are trying to demonstrate that they have a well-placed commitment to teaching for social justice, however, most of our respondents are yet to frame productive practices that might work in providing socially just education for the students they will teach. These outcomes raise possibilities for future iterations of preservice teacher courses at the case study site and beyond.

Dynamics and dilemmas in social psychology: social relations, identities and cognition

This paper aims to provide a systematised overview of the paradigmatic orientations in social psychology in Portugal by identifying the most cited publications. Results show that the eight most cited thematic are: (1) deviance and reactions to deviance, (2) methodology, (3) prejudice and discrimination, (4) gender studies, (5) risk, environment and safety, (6) information processing, social judgment, familiarity and mood, (7) social representations and (8) social justice and belief in a just world. These eight most salient thematics can be sorted into three current paradigmatic orientations in contemporary social psychology: (a) social cognition; (b) the study of collective beliefs, ideologies and social representations; and (c) the study of identity and its impact on intra- and intergroup processes. The paper finishes with a reflection on the future developments of the discipline and the dilemmas that social psychology in Portugal could face.