Análisis de la política exterior rusa frente a Abjasia en el período 2000-2008

El objetivo de la presente monografía de grado es analizar la relación entre la identidad dentro de Rusia y la política exterior de dicho Estado hacia la región de Abjasia. Se analiza y explica la manera en que los referentes identitarios dentro de Rusia en el periodo 2000-2008 influyen en las decisiones de política exterior que Rusia tomó hacia Abjasia en el campo militar y político. Se efectúa una revisión de textos (transcripciones de intervenciones y textos escritos) del Presidente y Primer Ministro de la Federación Rusa entre 2000 y 2008 para encontrar los referentes identitarios que determinan el comportamiento de Rusia hacia otros Estados y la forma en que influenciaron sus acciones con respecto a Abjasia.

The theme that dare not speak its name: Geopolitik, geopolitics and German foreign policy since unification

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the emergence of a new security imaginary in the foreign policy discourse in Germany during the 1990s and to determine whether it constitutes a return of Geopolitik in German foreign policy making. Does the re- appearance of geopolitical terms and expressions in the official and the academic discourses in post-unification Germany indicate such a shift? The essay will argue that the claims about a return of Geopolitik cannot be sustained. To the extent that the rhetoric of German government officials changes during the 1990s, this does not produce a coherent geopolitical security imaginary that stands diametrically opposed to the definition of political and institutional spaces of the Bonner Republik.

Foreign policy at the service of modernisation: old wine in a new wineskin. OSW Commentary No. 39, 2010-08-31

Russia’s contacts with the external world over the past year have been characterised by a gradual improvement in its relations with the West, as well as the use of non-confrontational rhetoric, the most far-reaching example of which was the address President Dmitri Medvedev gave to Russian ambassadors this July. In an attempt to harmonise foreign policy with the widely propagated programme for the modernisation of Russia1 President Medvedev presented a vision of the Russian Federation as a responsible global power which is open to co-operation. According to this vision, Russian foreign policy would help to attract foreign investments and technologies. The West was presented as a partner, not a rival. Both this rhetoric and the atmosphere of co-operation in relations with the USA and the EU contrast with the assertive and aggressive Russian policy which was symbolised by and culminated in the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008. The changes observed in Russian foreign policy are quite limited, and are not constructing a new external strategy. Those changes are rather an attempt to find more efficient ways to implement old strategic goals. The new image of a responsible global power is inconsistent, and Russian policy is still assertive and geopolitically motivated. Although a new rhetoric is really in place, the Russian political elite’s perception of their country’s place and role in the contemporary international order remains unchanged. Moscow’s readiness to become engaged in genuine co-operation with the West has not increased significantly; it is still to a great extent declarative in nature.

Ukraine, Russia and the need for more flexibility in EU foreign policy-making. CEPS Policy Brief No. 320, 25 July 2014

After the illegal annexation of Crimea and Russia’s indirect responsibility for the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine, Steven Blockmans asks what it will take before the EU is able to confront a conflict on its borders and prove to both its own citizens and third countries that it has a meaningful role to play in foreign policy. With numerous competing national interests and some member states unwilling to pay different prices for collective action, any sector-wide EU sanctions are likely to lack serious bite. In an effort to paper over the cracks, the author makes a number of recommendations for policy-makers.

The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View, September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 4. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 5. Has it been profitable for Russia? 6. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: 5. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). 6. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. 8. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. 5. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Trudny "Sojusznik" Bialorus w polityce Rosji. Prace OSW 2008. = Difficult "ally." Belarus in Russia's foreign policy. OSW Study 28/2008

Belarus holds a special position in Russian policy due to its geopolitical, military and transit significance. Russia's influence and position in the entire Eastern European region largely depend on how strong Russian influence in Belarus is. The process of Russian-Belarusian integration began in 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power in Minsk. At the time, Russia's policy towards Belarus was based on twomain assumptions. Firstly, the Kremlin supported Lukashenka's authoritarian regime. This allowed Russia to keep Belarus within its orbit of political influence and prevent other states from getting involved, since an undemocratic Belarus could not count on closer contacts with the West. Secondly, Russia heavily subsidised Belarus with cheap energy resources (way below the market price) and allowed the duty-free access of Belarusian goods to its market. Thus Belarus became a kind of 'sponsored authoritarianism' with a specific economic model, owing its existence to Russia's economic and political support. At the same time, Moscow's key objective in its policy towards Belarus was to make Minsk accept the Russian conditions concerning integration, which would in fact lead to Belarus' incorporation by the Russian Federation. However, Belarus managed to maintain its sovereignty, while Alyaksandr Lukashenka bandied the term 'integration' about in order to maintain the preferential model of his state's relations with Russia. Russia's intention to alter the nature of these bilateral relations became evident when Vladimir Putin took power in 2000. However, Moscow faced Minsk's refusal to accept the Russian integration plan (which, among other measures, provided for the takeover of Belarusian economic assets by Russian companies). This forced Russia to use its main tool against Minsk: the supplies of cheap gas and oil that had been sustaining Belarus' archaic economy. The most serious crisis in Russian-Belarusian relations broke out at the beginning of 2007, following Moscow's decision to raise the energy resource prices. This decision marked the beginning of the application of market principles to settlements between Moscow and Minsk. The key question this study is meant to answer concerns the consequences of the aforementioned decision by Russia for future Russian-Belarusian relations. Are they at a turning point? What are Russia's policy objectives? What results can come from the process of moving mutual relations onto an economic footing? What policy will replace Russia's 'sponsoring of Belarusian authoritarianism', which it has been implementing since 1994? Finally, what further measures will Russia undertake towards Belarus? The current study consists of five chapters. The first chapter offers a brief presentation of Belarus' significance and position in Russian policy. The second analyses the development of Russian-Belarusian political relations, first of all the establishment of the Union State, Belarus' position in Russian domestic policy and Russia's influence on Belarusian policy. The third chapter presents bilateral economic relations, primarily energy issues. The fourth chapter describes the state and perspectives of military cooperation between the two states. The fifth chapter presents conclusions, where the author attempts to define the essence of the ongoing re-evaluation in Russian-Belarusian relations and to project their future model.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Diplomatic divergence in the antipodes: Globalisation, foreign policy and state identity in Australia and New Zealand

This article compares the constitutive relationship between foreign policy and globalisation in Australia and New Zealand. Drawing upon insights from constructivist international relations theory we argue that foreign policy instantiates a state's social identity, its self-understanding of its role and moral purpose by projecting a distinctive image onto the global stage. We explore the differences and the similarities between Australia and New Zealand by examining how each country views international order, global trade, global governance and human rights and international security. Although both countries appear to be transforming themselves into more 'globalised' states, there are significant differences in the way each seeks to balance the competing strategic and normative demands. This diplomatic divergence, we argue, stems from different conceptions of state identity.

Armenia's Foreign Policy, 1991-2004: Between History and Geopolitics

This dissertation is the first systematic study of Armenia’s foreign policy during the post-independence period, between 1991 and 2004. It argues that a small state’s foreign policy is best understood when looking at the regional level. Armenia’s geographic proximity to Iran, Russia and Turkey, places it in an area of heightened geopolitical interest by various great powers. This dissertation explores four sets of relationships with Armenia’s major historical ‘partners’: Russia, Iran, Turkey and the West (Europe and the United States). Each relationship reveals a complex reality of a continuous negotiation between ideas of history, collective memory, nationalism and geopolitics. A detailed study of Armenia’s relations with these powers demonstrates how actors’ relations of amity and enmity are formed to constitute a regional security complex. Turkey represents the ultimate “other”, while both Europe and Iran are seen as ideational “others”, whose role in Armenia’s foreign policy, aside from pragmatic policy considerations, reflects a normative quest. Russia and the United States, on the other hand, represent the powerful structural forces that define the regional security complex, in which Armenia operates. This dissertation argues that although Armenia has been severely constrained in certain foreign policy choices, it was adept at carving a space for action that privileged the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh over other geopolitical imperatives.

The DPRK in China's post-cold war foreign policy - a neoclassical realist analysis

Avec l’échec des négociations entre les États-Unis et la Corée du Nord, menées depuis le début des années 1990, sur la question du nucléaire, le problème est devenu graduellement l’affaire des pays voisins, tous soucieux de l’avenir de la région du sud-est asiatique. Présentée comme le seul allié de la Corée du Nord, la China a été invitée à participer à des négociations à trois, à quatre (1997-1998), et à six (2003-2007), dans l’espoir de faire entendre raison au régime isolé, mais jusqu’à maintenant, aucune des tentatives n’est parvenue à satisfaire chacun des membres à la table. Alors que la tension monte et que la politique américaine se fait de moins en moins flexible, la Chine quant à elle, continue d’encourager le retour des négociations à six (Six-Party Talks) dans l’optique de dénucléariser la péninsule coréenne, tout en travaillant à maintenir ses liens avec la Corée du Nord. Le fil conducteur de cette présente recherche est d’abord d’essayer de comprendre pourquoi la Chine continue de soutenir la Corée du Nord, fournissant dons alimentaires et financiers. L’idée est donc d’analyser, selon les principes du réalisme néoclassique, la politique étrangère de la Chine. L’hypothèse principale de cette théorie renvoie à l’idée que la distribution du pouvoir dans le système international influence la politique étrangère des États, mais que des variables au niveau de l’état et/ou de l’individu interviennent dans la formulation et l’application de celle-ci. Il est proposé ici que le lien entre l’unipolarité du système international et la politique nord-coréenne de la Chine, est façonné par des variables intermédiaires telles que : a) la perception des leaders de la distribution du pouvoir et de leur place dans le système international; b) l’idéologie du régime politique, et; c) le type d’unité responsable de la prise de décision en politique étrangère. L’analyse de chacune des variables permettra de faire la lumière sur les intérêts politiques et économiques de la Chine dans l’entretien de cette relation avec la Corée du Nord.

Historic turning point or just another chapter? The results of a foreign-policy summit. EPC Post-Summit Analysis, 24 March 2014

The March 2014 European Council could enter the history books as a turning point, not only in the EU’s relations with Russia but also in its role as a foreign policy actor. Events in Ukraine inevitably dominated the Summit, with EU leaders adopting a balanced approach aimed at achieving three key objectives – de-escalation, containment/deterrence and cooperation – based on political and economic support for Ukraine, increased but limited pressure on Russia, and moves to strengthen ties with other EU neighbours. The Summit also discussed a range of economic and environmental policy issues, with the situation in Ukraine casting a long shadow over the discussion on energy policy, but failed to reach agreement on the EU’s climate goals to 2030, or to put more flesh on the bones of calls for a European “industrial renaissance”. However, two other developments were particularly significant: the creation of the second pillar of the future banking union, establishing a single regime for winding down failing banks; and changes to the savings tax directive, bringing years of negotiation to an end.

Russia's policy in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. OSW Study 23/2006

The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia are priority areas for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Russia mainly sees its influence in both regions as an important factor determining its international stature, and as a precondition for reinforcing its position as a world power. The Caucasus and Central Asia are also important for Russia from the points of view of economy, especially because of those area's natural resource wealth, and security, as both regions generate serious potential threats to the Russian Federation, including Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, the drugs trade and illegal migration.

The turn to the East. The flawed diversification of Russian foreign policy. OSW Point of View Number 44, November 2014

The ‘turn to the East’ proclaimed by Russia in 2010 has failed to bring about a fundamental breakthrough in her relations with Asian countries, nor has it produced impulses for the economic modernization of Russia’s Far Eastern territories. Although the energisation of Russian policy towards Asia which has taken place under this slogan has diversified Russian foreign policy somewhat, this diversification has two weak points: Firstly, it has occurred only in the political sphere. The share of Asian countries in Russia’s foreign economic relations has not risen significantly in comparison with the share of European and North American countries. Secondly, the ‘turn to the East’ has turned out primarily to be a turn towards China. In all spheres – diplomatic, economic, energy and military – it is Beijing that has become the most important Asian partner for Moscow. The result is that the policy that aimed to limit the excessive – in the Kremlin’s view – dependence of Russia on the West is likely to turn Russia into a ‘junior partner’ of the People’s Republic of China.

Global flows of foreign talent: Identity anxieties in Singapore's ethnoscape

This paper draws on Appadurai's (1996) concept of ethnoscapes — the global flow of people or what has become increasingly popularized as the global flow of talent. Singapore has initiated a foreign talent policy to compete for a global pool of talent to make up for its shortfall of indigenous work-force. The rationale for recruiting foreign talent is informed by a nationalist competitive ideology to sustain Singapore in the new knowledge-based economy. This paper examines the competing and dissenting discourses surrounding the foreign talent policy. It argues that the mobility of migratory flow has transformative and disruptive effects at the level of culture and the identity landscape of Singapore, where its discursive cultural boundaries are drawn according to a nationalist framework. Drawing on theories and concepts of ‘diaspora’, ‘hybridity’, and ‘third space’, these are the political and cultural issues that this paper attempts to tease out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Armenia's foreign policy, 1991–2004: Between history and geopolitics

This dissertation is the first systematic study of Armenia’s foreign policy during the post-independence period, between 1991 and 2004. It argues that a small state’s foreign policy is best understood when looking at the regional level. Armenia’s geographic proximity to Iran, Russia and Turkey, places it in an area of heightened geopolitical interest by various great powers. This dissertation explores four sets of relationships with Armenia’s major historical ‘partners’: Russia, Iran, Turkey and the West (Europe and the United States). Each relationship reveals a complex reality of a continuous negotiation between ideas of history, collective memory, nationalism and geopolitics. A detailed study of Armenia’s relations with these powers demonstrates how actors’ relations of amity and enmity are formed to constitute a regional security complex. Turkey represents the ultimate “other”, while both Europe and Iran are seen as ideational “others”, whose role in Armenia’s foreign policy, aside from pragmatic policy considerations, reflects a normative quest. Russia and the United States, on the other hand, represent the powerful structural forces that define the regional security complex, in which Armenia operates. This dissertation argues that although Armenia has been severely constrained in certain foreign policy choices, it was adept at carving a space for action that privileged the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh over other geopolitical imperatives.