Less Risk, More Effort : Demand Risk Allocation in Incomplete Contracts

This article investigates the allocation of demand risk within an incomplete contract framework. We consider an incomplete contractual relationship between a public authority and a private provider (i.e. a public-private partnership), in which the latter invests in non-verifiable cost-reducing efforts and the former invests in non-verifiable adaptation efforts to respond to changing consumer demand over time. We show that the party that bears the demand risk has fewer hold-up opportunities and that this leads the other contracting party to make more effort. Thus, in our model, bearing less risk can lead to more effort, which we describe as a new example of âeuro~counter-incentivesâeuro?. We further show that when the benefits of adaptation are important, it is socially preferable to design a contract in which the demand risk remains with the private provider, whereas when the benefits of cost-reducing efforts are important, it is socially preferable to place the demand risk on the public authority. We then apply these results to explain two well-known case studies.

Risk allocation in a public–private partnership: a case study of construction and operation of kindergartens in Kazakhstan

In Kazakhstan, a transitional nation in Central Asia, the development of public–private partnerships (PPPs) is at its early stage and increasingly of strategic importance. This case study investigates risk allocation in an ongoing project: the construction and operation of 11 kindergartens in the city of Karaganda in the concession form for 14 years. Drawing on a conceptual framework of effective risk allocation, the study identifies principal PPP risks, provides a critical assessment of how and in what way each partner bears a certain risk, highlights the reasons underpinning risk allocation decisions and delineates the lessons learned. The findings show that the government has effectively transferred most risks to the private sector partner, whilst both partners share the demand risk of childcare services and the project default risk. The strong elements of risk allocation include clear assignment of parties’ responsibilities, streamlined financing schemes and incentives to complete the main project phases on time. However, risk allocation has missed an opportunity to create incentives for service quality improvements and take advantage of economies of scale. The most controversial element of risk allocation, as the study finds, is a revenue stream that an operator is supposed to receive from the provision of services unrelated to childcare, as neither partner is able to mitigate this revenue risk. The article concludes that in the kindergartens’ PPP, the government has achieved almost complete transfer of risks to the private sector partner. However, the costs of transfer are extensive government financial outlays that seriously compromise the PPP value for money.

Risk Allocation in Toll Highway Concessions in Spain: Lessons from Economic Recession

Spain has a long tradition of encouraging toll highways by granting concessions to private companies. Concessions in Spain have been characterized by a willingness to transfer considerable risk to the private sector. Traffic demand, acquisition of the right-of-way, and financial risk have often been allocated to the private sector. From 1996 to 2011, 16 toll highway concessions, covering a total distance of 835 km, were awarded by the central government of Spain with this approach. Some of those highways started their operations just before the economic recession began. The recession had negative consequences for Spain's economy. The gross domestic product per capita plummeted, and the unemployment rate increased from 9% to 20% of the working population in just 2 years. The recession also had severe consequences for the economic performance of toll highway concessions. Traffic levels declined at a much greater rate than did the gross domestic product. In addition, the conditions imposed by the financial markets on borrowers became much stricter because of the liquidity crisis. This study analyzes the impact that the economic recession ultimately had on the performance of toll highway concessions in Spain and the actions that the government adopted to avoid the bankruptcy of the concessionaires. It was found that the economic recession helped identify some deficiencies in how risk had been allocated in Spain. The measures that both Spain and the European Union are adopting so as to improve risk allocation are discussed.

On the impossibility of fair risk allocation

Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using a coherent measure of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying the natural requirements of (Solution) Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. To obtain the result we characterize the Shapley value on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games.

On the impossibility of fair risk allocation

Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using coherent measures of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying simultaneously the natural requirements of Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. To obtain the result we characterize the Shapley value on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games.

Tőkeallokáció nem likvid portfóliók esetén (Risk capital allocation in case of illiquid portfolios)

A kockázat jó mérése és elosztása elengedhetetlen a bankok, biztosítók, befektetési alapok és egyéb pénzügyi vállalkozások belső tőkeallokációjához vagy teljesítményértékeléséhez. A cikkben bemutatjuk, hogy a koherens kockázati mértékek axiómáit nem likvid portfóliók esetén is el lehet várni. Így mérve a kockázatot, ismertetünk a kockázatelosztásra vonatkozó két kooperatív játékelméleti cikket. Az első optimista, eszerint mindig létezik stabil, az alegységek minden koalíciója által elfogadható, általános módszer a kockázat (tőke) elosztására. A második cikk pesszimista, mert azt mondja ki, hogy ha a stabilitás mellett igazságosak is szeretnénk lenni, akkor egy lehetetlenségi tételbe ütközünk. / === / Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to fi nancial risk. We argue that the axioms of coherent measures of risk are valid for illiquid portfolios as well. Then, we present the results of two papers on allocating risk measured by a coherent measure of risk. Assume a bank has some divisions. According to the fi rst paper there is always a stable allocation of risk capital, which is not blocked by any coalition of the divisions, that is there is a core compatible allocation rule (we present some examples for risk allocation rules). The second paper considers two more natural requirements, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. Equal Treatment Property makes sure that similar divisions are treated symmetrically, that is if two divisions make the same marginal risk contribution to all the coalition of divisions not containing them, then the rule should allocate them the very same risk capital. Strong Monotonicity requires that if the risk environment changes in such a way that the marginal contribution of a division is not decreasing, then its allocated risk capital should not decrease either. However, if risk is evaluated by any coherent measure of risk, then there is no risk allocation rule satisfying Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity, we encounter an impossibility result.

Dealing with traffic risk in Latin American toll roads

Análisis de los sistemas de mitigación del riesgo de tráfico en autopistas de peaje en diferentes países de Latinoamérica. This paper presents a cross-country analysis of traffic risk allocation in road concessions of Latin America. It shows that some countries such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru have been greatly concerned with mitigating traffic risk, either by putting into practice public guarantees, implementing flexible term concessions, or through availability payment concessions; whereas other countries such as Mexico and Brazil have assigned traffic risk to the private concessionaire by using fixed-term concession contracts without any traffic guarantees. Based on an analysis of data from 1990 to 2010, the paper finds that shifting traffic risk from the concessionaire to the government or users was not confined to the riskiest projects, as one might expect. The analysis also suggests that the implementation of traffic risk mitigation mechanisms in Latin American toll roads has not been very successful in reducing renegotiation rates or in increasing the number of bidders in the tenders

Tőkeallokációs módszerek és tulajdonságaik a gyakorlatban (Methods of capital allocation and their characteristics in practice)

A pénzügyekben mind elméletileg, mind az alkalmazások szempontjából fontos kérdés a tőkeallokáció. Hogyan osszuk szét egy adott portfólió kockázatát annak alportfóliói között? Miként tartalékoljunk tőkét a fennálló kockázatok fedezetére, és a tartalékokat hogyan rendeljük az üzleti egységekhez? A tőkeallokáció vizsgálatára axiomatikus megközelítést alkalmazunk, tehát alapvető tulajdonságok megkövetelésével dolgozunk. Cikkünk kiindulópontja Csóka-Pintér [2010] azon eredménye, hogy a koherens kockázati mértékek axiómái, valamint a tőkeallokációra vonatkozó méltányossági, ösztönzési és stabilitási követelmények nincsenek összhangban egymással. Ebben a cikkben analitikus és szimulációs eszközökkel vizsgáljuk ezeket a követelményeket. A gyakorlati alkalmazások során használt, illetve az elméleti szempontból érdekes tőkeallokációs módszereket is elemezzük. A cikk fő következtetése, hogy a Csóka-Pintér [2010] által felvetett probléma gyakorlati szempontból is releváns, tehát az nemcsak az elméleti vizsgálatok során merül fel, hanem igen sokszor előforduló és gyakorlati probléma. A cikk további eredménye, hogy a vizsgált tőkeallokációs módszerek jellemzésével segítséget nyújt az alkalmazóknak a különböző módszerek közötti választáshoz. / === / Risk capital allocation in finance is important theoretically and also in practical applications. How can the risk of a portfolio be shared among its sub-portfolios? How should the capital reserves be set to cover risks, and how should the reserves be assigned to the business units? The study uses an axiomatic approach to analyse risk capital allocation, by working with requiring basic properties. The starting point is a 2010 study by Csoka and Pinter (2010), who showed that the axioms of coherent measures of risk are not compatible with some fairness, incentive compatibility and stability requirements of risk allocation. This paper discusses these requirements using analytical and simulation tools. It analyses methods used in practical applications that have theoretically interesting properties. The main conclusion is that the problems identified in Csoka and Pinter (2010) remain relevant in practical applications, so that it is not just a theoretical issue, it is a common practical problem. A further contribution is made because analysis of risk allocation methods helps practitioners choose among the different methods available.

A szervezet kockázati attitűdjének jelentősége a szerződéses kapcsolatokban (Significance of the organizational risk attitude on the contractual relations)

A tanulmány azt vizsgálja, milyen befolyással van a szervezetek kockázati attitűdje az általuk kötött szerződésre, elsősorban a projektszintű kockázatok megosztására. Esettanulmányként egy PPP-projekt szerződését használja fel, amely jól szemlélteti, hogy az eltérő kockázati magatartású szervezetek egymás közötti kockázatallokációja eltér az optimálistól. A konkrét esetben a közösségi aktor kerül kockázati aspektusból hátrányos helyzetbe. A vizsgálat eredménye, hogy meghatároz néhány kulcsparamétert, melyek a felek kockázati szempontból nyertes vagy vesztes pozícióját döntő módon befolyásolják. ___________ This paper examines the influence of the risk attitude of organizations on the contracts made by them, especially on allocation of the project level risk. A PPP project contract is used as a case study, because it illustrates expressively that the risk allocation between the concerned organiza tions with different risk attitudes differs from the optimal version. In this very case the public actor's position becomes disadvantageous. Specification some of the key parameters able to determine the winner or loser position of the risk taken parties is defined as the outcome of this study.

The Abundance and Behavioral Ecology of Cape Cod Gray Seals Under Predation Risk From White Sharks

The ultimate goal of wildlife recovery is abundance growth of a species, though it must also involve the reestablishment of the species’ ecological role within ecosystems frequently modified by humans. Reestablishment and subsequent recovery may depend on the species’ degree of adaptive behavior as well as the duration of their functional absence and the extent of ecosystem alteration. In cases of long extirpations or extensive alteration, successful reestablishment may entail adjusting foraging behavior, targeting new prey species, and encountering unfamiliar predatory or competitive regimes. Recovering species must also increasingly tolerate heightened anthropogenic presence, particularly within densely inhabited coastal zones. In recent decades, gray seals (Halichoerus grypus) recovered from exploitation, depletion, and partial extirpation in the Northwest Atlantic. On Cape Cod, MA, USA, gray seals have reestablished growing breeding colonies and seasonally interact with migratory white sharks (Carcarodon carcharias). Though well-studied in portions of their range due to concerns over piscivorous impacts on valuable groundfish, there are broad knowledge gaps regarding their ecological role to US marine ecosystems. Furthermore, there are few studies that explicitly analyze gray seal behavior under direct risk of documented shark predation.

In this dissertation, I apply a behavioral and movement ecology approach to telemetry data to understand gray seal abundance and activity patterns along the coast of Cape Cod. This coastal focus complements extensive research documenting and describing offshore movement and foraging behavior and allows me to address questions about movement decisions and risk allocation. Using beach counts of seals visible in satellite imagery, I estimate the total regional abundance of gray seals using correction factors from haul out behavior and demonstrate a sizeable prey base of gray seals locally. Analyzing intra-annual space use patterns, I document small, concentrated home ranges utilizing nearshore habitats that rapidly expand with shifting activity budgets to target disperse offshore habitats following seasonal declines in white sharks. During the season of dense shark presence, seals conducted abbreviated nocturnal foraging trips structured temporally around divergent use of crepuscular periods. The timing of coastal behavior with different levels of twilight indicate risk allocation patterns with diel cycles of empirical white shark activity. The emergence of risk allocation to explain unique behavioral and spatial patterns observed in these gray seals points to the importance of the restored predator-prey dynamic in gray seal behavior along Cape Cod.