Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”

On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods.

Moulin (1999) characterizes the fixed-path rationing methods by efficiency, strategy-proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity. In this note, we give a straightforward proof of his result.

Infinite-Horizon Choice Functions

We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple linear technology. Time consistency and efficiency are characterized by stationary consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality condition. In addition, we consider the equity axioms Suppes-Sen, Pigou-Dalton, and resource monotonicity. We show that Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton imply that the consumption and inheritance functions are monotone with respect to time—thus justifying sustainability—while resource monotonicity implies that the consumption and inheritance functions are monotone with respect to the resource. Examples illustrate the characterization results.

Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities

In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important applications the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm with responsive priorities (called responsive DA-rule) performs well and economists have successfully implemented responsive DA-rules or slight variants thereof. First, for house allocation problems we characterize the class of responsive DA-rules by a set of basic and intuitive properties, namely, unavailable type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness. We extend this characterization to the full class of allocation problems with capacity constraints by replacing resource- monotonicity with two-agent consistent con ict resolution. An alternative characterization of responsive DA-rules is obtained using unassigned objects invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, weak consistency, and strategy-proofness. Various characterizations of the class of "acyclic" responsive DA-rules are obtained by using the properties efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency.

House allocation via deferred-acceptance

We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules satisfying unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness: any rule with these properties must allocate objects based on (implicitly induced) objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm.

Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics

We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties (unavailable-type-invariance, individual-rationality, weak non-wastefulness, or truncation-invariance). In the house allocation problem, where at most one copy of each object is available, deferred-acceptance (DA)-mechanisms allocate objects based on exogenously fixed objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm. For house allocation we show that DA-mechanisms are characterized by our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity or (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity. Once we allow for multiple identical copies of objects, on the one hand the first characterization breaks down and there are unstable mechanisms satisfying our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. On the other hand, our basic properties and (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity characterize (the most general) class of DA-mechanisms based on objects' fixed choice functions that are acceptant, monotonic, substitutable, and consistent. These choice functions are used by objects to reject agents in the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm. Therefore, in the general model resource-monotonicity is the «stronger» comparative statics requirement because it characterizes (together with our basic requirements and strategy-proofness) choice-based DA-mechanisms whereas population-monotonicity (together with our basic properties and strategy-proofness) does not.

Determinisztikus és valószínűségi elosztási eljárások (Deterministic and probabilistic rationing methods)

Az életben számtalan olyan esettel találkozunk, amikor egy jószág iránti kereslet meghaladja a rendelkezésre álló kínálatot. Példaként említhetjük a kárpótlási igényeket, egy csődbement cég hitelezőinek igényeit, valamely szerv átültetésére váró betegek sorát stb. Ilyen helyzetekben valamilyen eljárás szerint oszthatjuk el a szűkös mennyiséget a szereplők között. Szokás megkülönböztetni a determinisztikus és a sztochasztikus elosztási eljárásokat, jóllehet sok esetben csak a determinisztikus eljárásokat alkalmazzák. Azonban igazságossági szempontból gyakran használnak sztochasztikus elosztási eljárásokat is, mint például tette azt az Egyesült államok hadserege a második világháború végét követően a külföldön állomásozó katonáinak visszavonásakor, illetve a vietnami háború során behívandó személyek kiválasztásakor. / === / We investigated the minimal variance methods introduced in Tasnádi [6] based on seven popular axioms. We proved that if a deterministic rationing method satisfies demand monotonicity, resource monotonicity, equal treatment of equals and self-duality, than the minimal variance methods associated with the given deterministic rationing method also satisfies demand monotonicity, resource monotonicity, equal treatment of equals and self-duality. Furthermore, we found that the consistency, the lower composition and the upper composition of a deterministic rationing method does not imply the consistency, the lower composition and the upper composition of a minimal variance method associated with the given deterministic rationing method.

International human resource management in the introductory HRM course

This paper explores the extent to which students in the introductory HRM course in US institutions are likely to be exposed to information on international and cross-cultural aspects of HRM. Two methods are used: (1) an analysis of international content in fifteen popular introductory HRM textbooks and (2) a survey of professors teaching introductory HRM. The vast majority of responding instructors said their classes got some exposure to international issues in HRM, and most introductory texts included some relevant content. Critiques of international boxed features and dedicated IHRM chapters are provided, and suggestions for improving the quality and depth of IHRM content in introductory textbooks are made.