Reserve price commitments in auctions

It is well known that the optimal auction-one that maximizes the seller's expected revenue-can be implemented using a standard auction format with a suitably chosen reserve price. This reserve price is above the seller's value of retaining the object and the mechanism requires a commitment not to sell the object below the reserve. This commitment is what makes the reserve valuable to the seller. However, in practice, a reserve price commits the seller to sell the object if the reserve is reached, but does not commit her to withhold the object from sale if bidding falls short of the reserve. In this note we investigate whether reserve prices remain valuable for the seller when she may negotiate with the highest bidder if the reserve is not met. We show that the value of the reserve price may be completely undermined if the seller is a sufficiently weak bargainer. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Simultaneous pooled auctions

Suppose a seller wants to sell k similar or identical objects and there are n > k potential buyers. Suppose that each buyer wants only one object. In this case, we suggest the use of a simultaneous auction that would work as follows. Players are asked to submit sealed bids for one object. The individual with the highest bid chooses an object first; the individual with the second-highest bid chooses the next object; and this process continues until the individual with the kth highest bid receives the last object. Each individual pays the equivalent to his or her bid. When objects are identical, we show that the proposed auction generates the same revenue as a first-price sealed-bid sequential auction. When objects are perfectly correlated, there is no known solution for sequential auctions, whereas we can characterize bidding strategies in the proposed auction. Moreover, the proposed auction is optimal (given an appropriately chosen reserve price), and it may be easier and cheaper to run than a sequential auction.

Preferred suppliers in auction markets

In a procurement setting, this paper examines agreements between a buyer and one of the suppliers which would increase their joint surplus. The provisions of such agreements depend on the buyer's ability to design the rules of the final procurement auction. When the buyer has no such ability, their joint surplus can be increased by an agreement which grants to the preferred supplier a right-of-first-refusal on the lowest price offer from the other suppliers. When the buyer does have this ability, one agreement which maximizes their joint surplus includes a revelation game for the cost of the preferred supplier and a reserve price in the procurement auction based on that cost.

Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets

In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incentive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by posting an auction with a reserve price equal to their own valuation, along with a transfer that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. However, we define a novel condition on meeting technologies, which we call “invariance,” and show that the transfer is equal to zero if and only if the meeting technology satisfies this condition.

Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions

Increasingly used in online auctions, buyout prices allow bidders to instantly purchase the item listed. We distinguish two types: a temporary buyout option disappears if a bid above the reserve price is made; a permanent one remains throughout the auction or until it is exercised. In a model featuring time-sensitive bidders with uniform valuations and Poisson arrivals but endogenous bidding times, we focus on finding temporary and permanent buyout prices maximizing the seller's discounted revenue, and examine the relative benefit of using each type of option in various environments. We characterize equilibrium bidder strategies in both cases and then solve the problem of maximizing seller's utility by simulation. Our numerical experiments suggest that buyout options may significantly increase a seller’s revenue. Additionally, while a temporary buyout option promotes early bidding, a permanent option gives an incentive to the bidders to bid late, thus leading to concentrated bids near the end of the auction.

Cartéis em leilões: atuação e medidas de combate

Leilão é um procedimento de alocação de recursos com boas propriedades. Apresento a literatura teórica de leilões a qual demonstra, que sob diversas condições, leilões levam à alocação eficiente de recursos e maximização da receita do leiloeiro. Entretanto estes resultados valem apenas se os participantes do leilão não estejam organizados em cartéis. Um Cartel é uma organização que inibe a concorrência entre firmas. A atuação de um cartel pode ou não levar a uma alocação eficiente de recursos, mas a receita do leiloeiro será sempre prejudicada. Analiso a literatura teórica de cartel em leilões de objeto único que caracteriza formas de coordenação do cartel, estratégias de atuação e sua sustentabilidade. Apresento os desafios que o cartel deve superar. Mais ainda, proponho medidas que devem ser tomadas, caso haja suspeita de existência de cartel. O leilão de primeiro preço é o menos suscetível a ação de cartéis, pois nele há incentivo para as firmas desviarem das orientações do cartel. O combate a cartéis é avaliado por meio da taxa de desconto necessária para o cartel existir. Se a taxa de desconto necessária é menor significa um cartel mais difícil de ser sustentado. Demonstro que o preço de reserva randômico é melhor para combater cartéis do que o preço de reserva fixo em leilões de primeiro preço que se repetem.

Hybrid Auctions I: Theory

In this paper we examine the properties of a hybrid auction that combines a sealed bid and an ascending auction. In this auction, each bidder submits a sealed bid. Once the highest bid is known, the bidder who submitted it is declared the winner if her bid is higher than the second highest by more than a predetermined amount or percentage. If at least one more bidder submitted a bid su¢ciently close to the highest bid (that is, if the di¤erence between this bid and the highest bid is smaller than the predetermined amount or percentage) the quali…ed buyers compete in an open ascending auction that has the highest bid of the …rst stage as the reserve price. Quali…ed bidders include not only the highest bidder in the …rst stage but also those who bid close enough to her. We show that this auction generates more revenue than a standard auction. Although this hybrid auction does not generate as much revenue as the optimal auction, it is ex-post e¢cient.

Auctions with options for re-auction

We examine the role of seller bidding and reserve prices in an infinitely repeated independent-private-value (IPV) ascending-price auction. The seller has a single object that she values at zero. At the end of any auction round, she may either sell to the highest bidder or pass-in the object and hold a new auction next period. New bidders are drawn randomly in each round. The ability to re-auction motivates a notion of reserve price as the option value of retaining the object for re-auctioning. Even in the absence of a mechanism with which to commit to a reserve price, the optimal “secret” reserve is shown to exceed zero. However, despite the infinite repetition, there may be significant value to the seller from a binding reserve price commitment: the optimal binding reserve is higher than the optimal “secret” reserve, and may be substantially so, even with very patient players. Furthermore, reserve price commitments may even be socially preferable at high discount factors. We also show that the optimal “phantom” bidding strategy for the seller is revenue-equivalent to a commitment to an optimal public reserve price.

Modelos baseados em agentes aplicados à dinâmica de preços do mercado imobiliário

Um dos aspectos regulatórios fundamentais para o mercado imobiliário no Brasil são os limites para obtenção de financiamento no Sistema Financeiro de Habitação. Esses limites podem ser definidos de forma a aumentar ou reduzir a oferta de crédito neste mercado, alterando o comportamento dos seus agentes e, com isso, o preço de mercado dos imóveis. Neste trabalho, propomos um modelo de formação de preços no mercado imobiliário brasileiro com base no comportamento dos agentes que o compõem. Os agentes vendedores têm comportamento heterogêneo e são influenciados pela demanda histórica, enquanto que os agentes compradores têm o seu comportamento determinado pela disponibilidade de crédito. Esta disponibilidade de crédito, por sua vez, é definida pelos limites para concessão de financiamento no Sistema Financeiro de Habitação. Verificamos que o processo markoviano que descreve preço de mercado converge para um sistema dinâmico determinístico quando o número de agentes aumenta, e analisamos o comportamento deste sistema dinâmico. Mostramos qual é a família de variáveis aleatórias que representa o comportamento dos agentes vendedores de forma que o sistema apresente um preço de equilíbrio não trivial, condizente com a realidade. Verificamos ainda que o preço de equilíbrio depende não só das regras de concessão de financiamento no Sistema Financeiro de Habitação, como também do preço de reserva dos compradores e da memória e da sensibilidade dos vendedores a alterações na demanda. A memória e a sensibilidade dos vendedores podem levar a oscilações de preços acima ou abaixo do preço de equilíbrio (típicas de processos de formação de bolhas); ou até mesmo a uma bifurcação de Neimark-Sacker, quando o sistema apresenta dinâmica oscilatória estável.

Nonparametric Identication and Structural Estimation of Auction Models

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Evolutionary market agents for resource allocation in decentralised systems

We introduce self-interested evolutionary market agents, which act on behalf of service providers in a large decentralised system, to adaptively price their resources over time. Our agents competitively co-evolve in the live market, driving it towards the Bertrand equilibrium, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, at which all sellers charge their reserve price and share the market equally. We demonstrate that this outcome results in even load-balancing between the service providers. Our contribution in this paper is twofold; the use of on-line competitive co-evolution of self-interested service providers to drive a decentralised market towards equilibrium, and a demonstration that load-balancing behaviour emerges under the assumptions we describe. Unlike previous studies on this topic, all our agents are entirely self-interested; no cooperation is assumed. This makes our problem a non-trivial and more realistic one.

What price life insurance? : Not how but what to sell or buy--and why, facts and supporting figures which prove the fallacy of the self-serving propaganda of those "term-ites" who seek to undermine confidence in legal reserve (old line) life insurance /

Mode of access: Internet.

The Federal reserve system; the course of the Federal reserve banks before and during the price crisis and readjustment: address ... before the North Carolina bankers' convention at Pinehurst, April 26-28, 1922.

Mode of access: Internet.

Energy and reserve provision dispatch considering distributed generation and demand response

In competitive electricity markets with deep concerns at the efficiency level, demand response programs gain considerable significance. In the same way, distributed generation has gained increasing importance in the operation and planning of power systems. Grid operators and utilities are taking new initiatives, recognizing the value of demand response and of distributed generation for grid reliability and for the enhancement of organized spot market´s efficiency. Grid operators and utilities become able to act in both energy and reserve components of electricity markets. This paper proposes a methodology for a joint dispatch of demand response and distributed generation to provide energy and reserve by a virtual power player that operates a distribution network. The proposed method has been computationally implemented and its application is illustrated in this paper using a 32 bus distribution network with 32 medium voltage consumers.