Ineficiências entre os mercados onshore e offshore de Renminbi

Autoridades chinesas tem buscado agir com rapidez, mas com costumeira cautela, para que sua moeda seja capaz de adquirir status de moeda internacional de reserva. Embora tal objetivo exija eliminação ou considerável relaxamento dos controles de capitais, estes ainda existem e geram significativas distorções entre os mercados de câmbio e juros em Renminbi onshore, na China Continental, e offshore, em Hong Kong. Este trabalho descreve algumas destas distorções através da análise de instrumentos financeiros operados nos mercados à vista de moeda (Renminbi spot), forward de moeda (NDF de Renminbi), e de dívida governamental e corporativa em Hong Kong (Dim Sum Bonds).

Willingness to pay for cataract surgery in rural Southern China.

PURPOSE: To study willingness to pay for cataract surgery, and its associations, in Southern China. DESIGN: Cross-sectional willingness-to-pay interview incorporating elements of the open-ended and bidding formats. PARTICIPANTS: Three-hundred thirty-nine persons presenting for cataract screening in Yangjiang, China, with presenting visual acuity (VA) < or = 6/60 in either eye due to cataract. METHODS: Subjects underwent measurement of their VA and a willingness-to-pay interview. Age, gender, literacy, education, and annual income also were recorded. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Maximum amount that the subjects would be willing to pay for cataract surgery. RESULTS: Among 325 (95.9%) subjects completing the interview, 169 (52.0%) were 70 years or older, 213 (65.5%) were women, and 217 (66.8%) had an annual income of <5000 renminbi (5000 = US 625 dollars). Eighty percent (n = 257) of participants were willing to pay something for surgery (mean, 442+/-444 renminbi [US 55 dollars+/-55]). In regression models, older subjects were willing to pay less (8 renminbi [US 1 dollar] per year of age; P = 0.01). Blind subjects were significantly more likely (odds ratio, 5.7; 95% confidence interval, 1.7-19.3) to pay anything for surgery, but would pay on average 255 renminbi (US 32 dollars) less (P = 0.004). Persons at the highest annual income level (>10,000 renminbi [US 1250 dollars]) would pay 50 dollars more for surgery than those at the lowest level (<5000 renminbi) (P = 0.0003). The current cost of surgery in this program is 500 renminbi (US 63 dollars). CONCLUSIONS: Sustainable programs will need to attract younger, more well-to-do persons with better vision, while still providing access to the neediest patients.

Reversal in gender valuations of cataract surgery after the implementation of free screening and low-priced high-quality surgery in a rural population of southern China.

PURPOSE: To assess the impact of community outreach and the availability of low-cost surgeries [500 Renminbi (RMB) or 65 United States dollars (US$) per surgery] on the willingness to pay for cataract surgery among male and female rural-dwelling Chinese.METHODS: Cross-sectional willingness-to-pay surveys were conducted at the initiation of a cataract outreach programme in June 2001 and then again in July 2006. Respondents underwent visual acuity testing and provided socio-demographic data.RESULTS: In 2001 and 2006, 325 and 303 subjects, respectively, were interviewed. On average the 2006 sample subjects were of similar age, more likely to be female (p < 0.01), illiterate (p < 0.01), and less likely to come from a household with annual income of less than US$789 (62% vs. 87%, p < 0.01). Familiarity with cataract surgery increased from 21.2% to 44.4% over the 5 years for male subjects (p < 0.01) and 15.8%-44.4% among females (p < 0.01). The proportion of respondents willing to pay at least 500 RMB for surgery increased from 67% to 88% (p < 0.01) among male subjects and from 50% to 91% (p < 0.01) among females.CONCLUSIONS: Five years of access to free cataract testing and low-cost surgery programmes appears to have improved the familiarity with cataract surgery and increased the willingness to pay at least 500 RMB (US$65) for it in this rural population. Elderly women are now as likely as men to be willing to pay at least 500 RMB, reversing gender differences present 5 years ago.

Exportaciónes de China en Estados Unidos implicaciones comerciales para América Latina

Este trabajo estima el efecto en el nivel de las exportaciones realizadas por América Latina haciaEstados Unidos cuando se asumen los siguientes tres escenarios. Reducción del nivel de precios delos productos de origen chino, Apreciación del veinte por ciento del Renminbi.

The relationship between the real exchange rate and balance of payments: empirical evidence for China from cointegration and causality testing

This article examines the relationship between the renminbi real exchange rate and China's foreign exchange reserves using cointegration and Granger causality testing. The main findings are that in the long run foreign exchange reserves Granger cause the real exchange rate. Meanwhile, in the short run there is unidirectional Granger causality running from foreign exchange reserves to the real exchange rate.

The relationship between stock returns and the foreign exchange rate: the ARDL approach

This study employs the ARDL cointegration approach in order to examine the impact
of financial liberalization on the relationships between the exchange rate and share
market performance in China. We discovered that cointegration has existed between the
Shanghai A Share Index and the exchange rate of the renminbi against the US dollar
and Hong Kong dollar since 2005, when the Chinese exchange rate regime became a
flexible, managed, floating system. We found that both the exchange rate and the money
supply influenced stock price, with a positive correlation. We further show that the
money supply increase was largely caused by a huge ‘hot money’ inflow from other
countries in recent years. After local currency appreciation, hot money, followed by
the money supply increase, pushed the market into a high level, based on expectations
regarding the local currency’s further appreciation.

The BRICS: some historical experiences, growth challenges and opportunities

The acronym BRICS was a fad among the media and global investors. Now, the acronym sounds passé. However, the group of countries remains important, from both political and economic reasons. They have a large aggregate size, 28% of the global GDP and 42% of the world’s population, high growth potential due to the current significant misallocation of resources and relatively low stock of human capital, structural transformation is in progress and one of them, China, is taking steps to become a global power and a challenger to the US dominance. This paper provides a brief overview of the five economies, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. We focus on some aspects of their history, the Chinese initiatives in international finance and geopolitical strategic moves, their growth experience and structural transformation over the last 35 years, trade and investment integration into the global economy and among themselves, the growth challenges faced by their economies and the potential gains to the Brazilian economy from a stronger integration with the other BRICS. In association with its efforts to be a global power, China aims to become a major player in global finance and to achieve the status of global currency for the renminbi, which would be the first currency of an emerging economy to attain such position. Despite the similarities, the BRICS encompass very diverse economies. In the recent decades, China and India showed stellar growth rates. On the other hand, Brazil, Russia and South Africa have expanded just in line with global output growth with the Russian economy exhibiting high volatility. China is by far the largest economy, and South Africa the smallest, the only BRICS economy with a GDP lower than US$ 1 trillion. Russia abandoned communism almost 25 years ago, but reversed many of the privatizations of 90’s. China is still ruled by communism, but has a vibrant private sector and recently has officially declared market forces to play a dominant role in its economy. Brazil, Russia and South Africa are global natural resources powerhouses and commodity exporters while China and India are large commodity importers. Brazil is relatively closed to international trade of goods and services, in marked contrast to the other four economies. Brazil, India and South Africa are dependent on external capital flows whereas China and Russia are capital exporters. India and South Africa have younger populations and a large portion living below the poverty line. Despite its extraordinary growth experience that lifted many millions from poverty, China still has 28% of its population classified as poor. Russia and China have much older populations and one of their challenges is to deal with the effects of a declining labor force in the near future. India, China and South Africa face a long way to urbanization, while Brazil and Russia are already urbanized countries. China is an industrial economy but its primary sector still absorbs a large pool of workers. India is not, but the primary sector employs also a large share of the labor force. China’s aggregate demand structure is biased towards investment that has been driving its expansion. Brazil and South Africa have an aggregate demand structure similar to the developed economies, with private consumption accounting for approximately 70%. The same similarity applies to the supply side, as in both economies the share of services nears 70%. The development problem is a productivity problem, so microeconomic reforms are badly needed to foster long-term growth of the BRICS economies since they have lost steam due a variety of factors, but fundamentally due to slower total factor productivity growth. China and India are implementing ambitious reform programs, while Brazil is dealing with macroeconomic disequilibria. Russia and South Africa remain mute about structural reforms. There are some potential benefits to Brazil to be extracted from a greater economic integration with the BRICS, particularly in natural resources intensive industries and services. Necessary conditions to the materialization of those gains are the removal of the several sources of resource misallocation and strong investment in human capital.

Trade, Exchange Rates, and Macroeconomic Dynamics in East Asia: Why the Electronics Cycle Matters

Against the background of increasing regional trade and investment, there is growing interest in monetary and macroeconomic policy coordination in East Asia. Although there is a sizable literature on macroeconomic linkages among East Asian countries and the potential merit of policy coordination in the region, the existing studies tend to examine these issues exclusively in terms of macroeconomic variables and do not consider how these aggregate variables are influenced by one prominent feature of a number of East Asian economies: their heavy dependence on the electronics industry. Although active engagement in the global electronics industry has been a powerful growth engine for the Asian countries, it has also left their economies vulnerable to cyclical fluctuations in the world electronics market. As the cycle of the global electronics industry exerts profound impacts on the medium-term dynamics of the Asian economies, it is imperative to take an explicit account of its influence when studying the way in which the regional economies are linked to one another and how this relationship can be altered by a specific policy initiative. We illustrate the importance of this point by examining recent studies on: (1) trade competition between China andother Asian countries and the role of the Chinese renminbi therein; and (2) the effect offluctuations in the yen/dollar exchange rate on the regional economies.

China’s slowdown: When the dragon catches the flu, Europe sneezes. CEPS Commentary, 25 September 2015

Notwithstanding the erratic stock market responses around the world, this CEPS Commentary argues that while a slowdown of the world’s second-largest economy may not be good news for Europe, its effects will not be as bad as headlines would have us believe. In the short term, it finds that the biggest risks from the Chinese slowdown may be political, stemming from a weakening of the Renminbi, either from actions taken by China’s central bank and/or from large capital outflows.

Internationalising the currency while leveraging massively: the case of China. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/12, October 2015

This paper reviews the steps that China has taken towards financial reform with a particular focus on capital account liberalisation and internationalisation of the use of the renminbi. • After a slowdown in reform momentum during the global financial crisis, there is a clear push towards reform, especially in terms of RMB internationalisation. • During the same period, though, China’s debt has doubled, reaching levels that are clearly above those of most emerging markets. This increases the risks embedded in financial reform and, in particular, capital account liberalisation. • At this juncture, however, China has no option but to press for reform since the current growth model is no longer working and China urgently needs to better allocate its savings.

La política económica de la República Popular China: un desafío a la hegemonía monetaria de los Estados Unidos en el Sudeste Asiático. Periodo 2003 -2015

La presente investigación parte del declive de la hegemonía de los Estados Unidos y el paralelo asenso económico de la República Popular China en las últimas décadas. De este modo, se plantea como objetivo principal analizar cómo China mediante su política económica desafía a la hegemonía monetaria de los Estado Unidos en el Sudeste Asiático, durante el periodo de 2003 a 2015. Con el fin de lograr este objetivo, se elabora un estudio de la hegemonía de los Estados Unidos y sus dinámicas en el Sudeste Asiático. Asimismo, se analiza la política económica de la República Popular China y su incidencia frente a la hegemonía estadounidense en el Sudeste Asiático.