The Renegotiation extension act of 1979 : hearing before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, on H.R. 2002 ... March 22, 1979.

"Serial 96-19."

Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1956; report to accompany H.R. 11947, a bill to extend and amend the Renegotiation Act of 1951.

Mode of access: Internet.

Report of the Honourable the Postmaster General of the methods adopted in Canada in the carrying out of government clothing contracts,

Mode of access: Internet.

Memorial of merchants, ship owners, and others, against the establishment by Congress, of additional lines of steamships under government contracts.

Signed by John Griswold and others.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Campaign donation and government contracts in Brazilian states

A corporate firm may influence policies in its favor by transferring money to political candidates. However, empirical studies which document evidence about the return on campaign donations are rare (Großer, Reuben and Tymula, 2013). In this paper we estimate the net expected return of a campaign donation in eight Brazilian states using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to separate the return of winning and losing state deputy candidates in the electoral coalition in 2006. Our results show that that the net return is quite high (i.e., the investment of donor firms is almost 2% of the net expected return), and is larger among traditional electoral parties than any other parties, on average. Looking at the heterogeneity of local executive and legislative levels, we find that net returns are higher when donor firms finance deputies within a governor’s electoral coalition than deputies outside this coalition.

Oversight hearings on National Development Bank legislation : hearings before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, second session, on H.R. 7902 ... September 10, 18, and 24, 1980.

"Serial no. 96-73."

Establishment of a national development bank and related matters : hearing before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session, on H.R. 14 ... September 15 and 28, 1982.

Item 1013-A, 1013-B (microfiche)

The influence of Government antidiscrimination programs : actual vs. potential impact /

Cover title.

To establish uniform requirements affecting government contracts. Hearing before a subcommittee, Seventy-fourth Congress, first session, on S. 215, a bill to establish uniform requirements affecting government contracts, and for other purposes. May 7, 1935.

Mode of access: Internet.

Essays on the Role of Government Incentives in the Private Provision of Social Goods

The economic rationale for public intervention into private markets through price mechanisms is twofold: to correct market failures and to redistribute resources. Financial incentives are one such price mechanism. In this dissertation, I specifically address the role of financial incentives in providing social goods in two separate contexts: a redistributive policy that enables low income working families to access affordable childcare in the US and an experimental pay-for-performance intervention to improve population health outcomes in rural India. In the first two papers, I investigate the effects of government incentives for providing grandchild care on grandmothers’ short- and long-term outcomes. In the third paper, coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato, and Marcos Vera-Hernandez, we use an experimental framework to consider the the effects of financial incentives in improving maternal and child health outcomes in the Indian state of Karnataka.

Grandmothers provide a significant amount of childcare in the US, but little is known about how this informal, and often uncompensated, time transfer impacts their economic and health outcomes. The first two chapters of this dissertation address the impact of federally funded, state-level means-tested programs that compensate grandparent-provided childcare on the retirement security of older women, an economically vulnerable group of considerable policy interest. I use the variation in the availability and generosity of childcare subsidies to model the effect of government payments for grandchild care on grandmothers’ time use, income, earnings, interfamily transfers, and health outcomes. After establishing that more generous government payments induce grandmothers to provide more hours of childcare, I find that grandmothers adjust their behavior by reducing their formal labor supply and earnings. Grandmothers make up for lost earnings by claiming Social Security earlier, increasing their reliance on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and reducing financial transfers to their children. While the policy does not appear to negatively impact grandmothers’ immediate economic well-being, there are significant costs to the state, in terms of both up-front costs for care payments and long-term costs as a result of grandmothers’ increased reliance on social insurance.

The final paper, The Role of Non-Cognitive Traits in Response to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial of Obstetrics Care Providers in India, is coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato and Marcos Vera-Hernandez. We report the results from “Improving Maternal and Child Health in India: Evaluating Demand and Supply Side Strategies” (IMACHINE), a randomized controlled experiment designed to test the effectiveness of supply-side incentives for private obstetrics care providers in rural Karnataka, India. In particular, the experimental design compares two different types of incentives: (1) those based on the quality of inputs providers offer their patients (inputs contracts) and (2) those based on the reduction of incidence of four adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (outcomes contracts). Along with studying the relative effectiveness of the different financial incentives, we also investigate the role of provider characteristics, preferences, expectations and non-cognitive traits in mitigating the effects of incentive contracts.

We find that both contract types input incentive contracts reduce rates of post-partum hemorrhage, the leading cause of maternal mortality in India by about 20%. We also find some evidence of multitasking as output incentive contract providers reduce the level of postnatal newborn care received by their patients. We find that patient health improvements in response to both contract types are concentrated among higher trained providers. We find improvements in patient care to be concentrated among the lower trained providers. Contrary to our expectations, we also find improvements in patient health to be concentrated among the most risk averse providers, while more patient providers respond relatively little to the incentives, and these difference are most evident in the outputs contract arm. The results are opposite for patient care outcomes; risk averse providers have significantly lower rates of patient care and more patient providers provide higher quality care in response to the outputs contract. We find evidence that overconfidence among providers about their expectations about possible improvements reduces the effectiveness of both types of incentive contracts for improving both patient outcomes and patient care. Finally, we find no heterogeneous response based on non-cognitive traits.

Corruption and the size of government: causality tests for OECD and Latin American countries

The purpose of this article is to examine the causality between government size and corruption, and to verify if there is a different pattern of causality between developed Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (excluding Mexico) and developing countries (Latin American countries) during the period 1996 to 2003. Applying Granger and Huang`s (1997) methodology we find evidence that size of government Granger causes corruption in both samples. Since a larger government involvement in private markets today will be followed in future by a higher level of corruption a policy advice would be to enhance governance. The promotion of good governance helps to combat corruption given that it complements efforts to reduce corruption more directly, and it is strongly recommended by the International Monetary Fund, other multilateral institutions, and all worried with the negative impacts of corruption on economic activity.