Demand Response Programs Definition Using Demand Price Elasticity to Define Consumers Aggregation for an Improved Remuneration Structure

The positioning of the consumers in the power systems operation has been changed in the recent years, namely due to the implementation of competitive electricity markets. Demand response is an opportunity for the consumers’ participation in electricity markets. Smart grids can give an important support for the integration of demand response. The methodology proposed in the present paper aims to create an improved demand response program definition and remuneration scheme for aggregated resources. The consumers are aggregated in a certain number of clusters, each one corresponding to a distinct demand response program, according to the economic impact of the resulting remuneration tariff. The knowledge about the consumers is obtained from its demand price elasticity values. The illustrative case study included in the paper is based on a 218 consumers’ scenario.

Remuneration Structure Definition for Distributed Generation Units and Demand Response Participants Aggregation

The implementation of competitive electricity markets has changed the consumers’ and distributed generation position power systems operation. The use of distributed generation and the participation in demand response programs, namely in smart grids, bring several advantages for consumers, aggregators, and system operators. The present paper proposes a remuneration structure for aggregated distributed generation and demand response resources. A virtual power player aggregates all the resources. The resources are aggregated in a certain number of clusters, each one corresponding to a distinct tariff group, according to the economic impact of the resulting remuneration tariff. The determined tariffs are intended to be used for several months. The aggregator can define the periodicity of the tariffs definition. The case study in this paper includes 218 consumers, and 66 distributed generation units.

Remuneration and tariffs in the context of virtual power players

Power systems have been through deep changes in recent years, namely with the operation of competitive electricity markets in the scope and the increasingly intensive use of renewable energy sources and distributed generation. This requires new business models able to cope with the new opportunities that have emerged. Virtual Power Players (VPPs) are a new player type which allows aggregating a diversity of players (Distributed Generation (DG), Storage Agents (SA), Electrical Vehicles, (V2G) and consumers), to facilitate their participation in the electricity markets and to provide a set of new services promoting generation and consumption efficiency, while improving players` benefits. A major task of VPPs is the remuneration of generation and services (maintenance, market operation costs and energy reserves), as well as charging energy consumption. This paper proposes a model to implement fair and strategic remuneration and tariff methodologies, able to allow efficient VPP operation and VPP goals accomplishment in the scope of electricity markets.

Intelligent Remuneration and Tariffs for Virtual Power Players

Power systems have been through deep changes in recent years, namely due to the operation of competitive electricity markets in the scope the increasingly intensive use of renewable energy sources and distributed generation. This requires new business models able to cope with the new opportunities that have emerged. Virtual Power Players (VPPs) are a new type of player that allows aggregating a diversity of players (Distributed Generation (DG), Storage Agents (SA), Electrical Vehicles (V2G) and consumers) to facilitate their participation in the electricity markets and to provide a set of new services promoting generation and consumption efficiency, while improving players’ benefits. A major task of VPPs is the remuneration of generation and services (maintenance, market operation costs and energy reserves), as well as charging energy consumption. This paper proposes a model to implement fair and strategic remuneration and tariff methodologies, able to allow efficient VPP operation and VPP goals accomplishment in the scope of electricity markets.

The structure of middle management remuneration packages: An application to Australian mine managers

This paper investigates the composition of remuneration packages for middle managers and relates the structure of remuneration contracts to firm-specific attributes. A statutorily defined position in a single industry is studied as an example of middle management. This allows us to control for differences in task complexity across managers and industry-induced factors that could determine differences in remuneration contracts. Higher-risk firms are expected to pay their mine managers a greater proportion of variable salaries and market and/or accounting-based compensation than low-risk firms. Results indicate that high-risk firms pay a higher proportion of variable salaries and more compensation based on market and/or accounting performance.

Knowledge extraction from medium voltage load diagrams to support the definition of electrical tariffs

With the electricity market liberalization, distribution and retail companies are looking for better market strategies based on adequate information upon the consumption patterns of its electricity customers. In this environment all consumers are free to choose their electricity supplier. A fair insight on the customer´s behaviour will permit the definition of specific contract aspects based on the different consumption patterns. In this paper Data Mining (DM) techniques are applied to electricity consumption data from a utility client’s database. To form the different customer´s classes, and find a set of representative consumption patterns, we have used the Two-Step algorithm which is a hierarchical clustering algorithm. Each consumer class will be represented by its load profile resulting from the clustering operation. Next, to characterize each consumer class a classification model will be constructed with the C5.0 classification algorithm.

Transmission tariffs in competitive electricity markets

In context of electricity market, the transmission price is an important tool to an efficient development of the electricity system. The electricity market is influenced by several factors; however the transmission network management is one of the most important aspects, because the network is a natural monopoly. The transmission tariffs can help to regulate the market, for that reason evaluate tariff must have strict criterions. This paper explains several methodologies to tariff the use of transmission network by transmission network users. The methods presented are: Post-Stamp Method; MW-Mile Method; Distribution Factors Methods; Tracing Methodology; Bialek’s Tracing Method and Locational Marginal Price.

Desirable role in an international duopoly model with tariffs

In this paper, we study an international market model in which the home government imposes a tariff on the imported goods. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize a function that cares about the home firm’s profit and the total revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Environmental and international tariffs in a mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets, in which the public firm maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and its profit. We also analyse the effects of privatization. The model has two stages. In the first stage, governments choose environmental taxes and import tariffs, simultaneously. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output levels for the domestic market and to export. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

International Stackelberg model with tariffs

This paper analyses the effects of tariffs on an international economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, located in two countries, each one producing a homogeneous good for both home consumption and export to the other identical country. We consider a game among governments and firms. First, the government imposes a tariff on imports and then we consider the two types of moving: simultaneous (Cournot-type model) and sequential (Stackelberg-type model) decisions by the firms. We also compare the results obtained in each model.

Defining Electricity Tariffs Using the Knowledge About the Consumers Profiles in ELECON Project

The increasing importance of the integration of distributed generation and demand response in the power systems operation and planning, namely at lower voltage levels of distribution networks and in the competitive environment of electricity markets, leads us to the concept of smart grids. In both traditional and smart grid operation, non-technical losses are a great economic concern, which can be addressed. In this context, the ELECON project addresses the use of demand response contributions to the identification of non-technical losses. The present paper proposes a methodology to be used by Virtual Power Players (VPPs), which are entities able to aggregate distributed small-size resources, aiming to define the best electricity tariffs for several, clusters of consumers. A case study based on real consumption data demonstrates the application of the proposed methodology.

Real-Time Tariffs for Electric Vehicles in Wind Power based Power Systems

The use of Electric Vehicles (EVs) will change significantly the planning and management of power systems in a near future. This paper proposes a real-time tariff strategy for the charge process of the EVs. The main objective is to evaluate the influence of real-time tariffs in the EVs owners’ behaviour and also the impact in load diagram. The paper proposes the energy price variation according to the relation between wind generation and power consumption. The proposed strategy was tested in two different days in the Danish power system. January 31st and August 13th 2013 were selected because of the high quantities of wind generation. The main goal is to evaluate the changes in the EVs charging diagram with the energy price preventing wind curtailment.

Definition of Distribution Network Tariffs Considering Distribution Generation and Demand Response

The use of distribution networks in the current scenario of high penetration of Distributed Generation (DG) is a problem of great importance. In the competitive environment of electricity markets and smart grids, Demand Response (DR) is also gaining notable impact with several benefits for the whole system. The work presented in this paper comprises a methodology able to define the cost allocation in distribution networks considering large integration of DG and DR resources. The proposed methodology is divided into three phases and it is based on an AC Optimal Power Flow (OPF) including the determination of topological distribution factors, and consequent application of the MW-mile method. The application of the proposed tariffs definition methodology is illustrated in a distribution network with 33 buses, 66 DG units, and 32 consumers with DR capacity.

Going with the wind: The time for time-of-use tariffs

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The ambivalence of two-part tariffs for bottleneck access

Two-part tariffs, when used at the retail level, increase efficiency by lowering the price of marginal units. The same potential for higher efficiency exists for two-part tariffs at wholesale level for a given market structure, but the fixed part of the wholesale tariff can negatively affect the latter. In a simulated competition model of next-generation telecommunications access networks that has been calibrated with engineering cost data, we show that the latter effects strongly outweigh the former. That is, substituting a cost-based linear wholesale access tariff with revenue-equivalent two-part tariffs reduces the number of access seekers and therefore leads to higher prices and lower welfare and consumer surplus.