The structure of middle management remuneration packages: An application to Australian mine managers

This paper investigates the composition of remuneration packages for middle managers and relates the structure of remuneration contracts to firm-specific attributes. A statutorily defined position in a single industry is studied as an example of middle management. This allows us to control for differences in task complexity across managers and industry-induced factors that could determine differences in remuneration contracts. Higher-risk firms are expected to pay their mine managers a greater proportion of variable salaries and market and/or accounting-based compensation than low-risk firms. Results indicate that high-risk firms pay a higher proportion of variable salaries and more compensation based on market and/or accounting performance.

Remuneration and tariffs in the context of virtual power players

Power systems have been through deep changes in recent years, namely with the operation of competitive electricity markets in the scope and the increasingly intensive use of renewable energy sources and distributed generation. This requires new business models able to cope with the new opportunities that have emerged. Virtual Power Players (VPPs) are a new player type which allows aggregating a diversity of players (Distributed Generation (DG), Storage Agents (SA), Electrical Vehicles, (V2G) and consumers), to facilitate their participation in the electricity markets and to provide a set of new services promoting generation and consumption efficiency, while improving players` benefits. A major task of VPPs is the remuneration of generation and services (maintenance, market operation costs and energy reserves), as well as charging energy consumption. This paper proposes a model to implement fair and strategic remuneration and tariff methodologies, able to allow efficient VPP operation and VPP goals accomplishment in the scope of electricity markets.

Intelligent Remuneration and Tariffs for Virtual Power Players

Power systems have been through deep changes in recent years, namely due to the operation of competitive electricity markets in the scope the increasingly intensive use of renewable energy sources and distributed generation. This requires new business models able to cope with the new opportunities that have emerged. Virtual Power Players (VPPs) are a new type of player that allows aggregating a diversity of players (Distributed Generation (DG), Storage Agents (SA), Electrical Vehicles (V2G) and consumers) to facilitate their participation in the electricity markets and to provide a set of new services promoting generation and consumption efficiency, while improving players’ benefits. A major task of VPPs is the remuneration of generation and services (maintenance, market operation costs and energy reserves), as well as charging energy consumption. This paper proposes a model to implement fair and strategic remuneration and tariff methodologies, able to allow efficient VPP operation and VPP goals accomplishment in the scope of electricity markets.

Demand Response Programs Definition Using Demand Price Elasticity to Define Consumers Aggregation for an Improved Remuneration Structure

The positioning of the consumers in the power systems operation has been changed in the recent years, namely due to the implementation of competitive electricity markets. Demand response is an opportunity for the consumers’ participation in electricity markets. Smart grids can give an important support for the integration of demand response. The methodology proposed in the present paper aims to create an improved demand response program definition and remuneration scheme for aggregated resources. The consumers are aggregated in a certain number of clusters, each one corresponding to a distinct demand response program, according to the economic impact of the resulting remuneration tariff. The knowledge about the consumers is obtained from its demand price elasticity values. The illustrative case study included in the paper is based on a 218 consumers’ scenario.

Remuneration Structure Definition for Distributed Generation Units and Demand Response Participants Aggregation

The implementation of competitive electricity markets has changed the consumers’ and distributed generation position power systems operation. The use of distributed generation and the participation in demand response programs, namely in smart grids, bring several advantages for consumers, aggregators, and system operators. The present paper proposes a remuneration structure for aggregated distributed generation and demand response resources. A virtual power player aggregates all the resources. The resources are aggregated in a certain number of clusters, each one corresponding to a distinct tariff group, according to the economic impact of the resulting remuneration tariff. The determined tariffs are intended to be used for several months. The aggregator can define the periodicity of the tariffs definition. The case study in this paper includes 218 consumers, and 66 distributed generation units.

Illusory correlation in the remuneration of chief executive officers: It pays to play golf, and well

Illusory correlation refers to the use of information in decisions that is uncorrelated with the relevantcriterion. We document illusory correlation in CEO compensation decisions by demonstrating thatinformation, that is uncorrelated with corporate performance, is related to CEO compensation. We usepublicly available data from the USA for the years 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 to examine the relationsbetween golf handicaps of CEOs and corporate performance, on the one hand, and CEO compensationand golf handicaps, on the other hand. Although we find no relation between handicap and corporateperformance, we do find a relation between handicap and CEO compensation. In short, golfers earnmore than non-golfers and pay increases with golfing ability. We relate these findings to the difficultiesof judging compensation for CEOs. To overcome this and possibly other illusory correlations inthese kinds of decisions, we recommend the use of explicit, mechanical decision rules.

Pattern of Executive Remuneration in the Manufacturing Public Enterprises in Kerala

The study is undertaken by the researcher with the object of examining the remuneration pattern of executive personnel in the manufacturing public enterprises in Kerala so as to find out whether there is any rationale or criteria involved in remunerating executives. It is also envisaged to find out the pattern of executive remuneration in the various categories of industries and inter—industry disparities among the public sector enterprises. This is considered to be a very fruitful area for investigation, particularly in view of the generally prevailing notion that public sector executives in Kerala are not remunerated properly and glaring inequalities and disparities are existing among the various categories of industries and within the same industry. Therefore the study is to explore the criteria used for the determination of executive remuneration and the relative weightage of various factors such as size of the firm, rate of return sales volume etc of the organisation and various other factors such as qualification, experience, level of job and functions of executives. Further the study is extended to find out the role of 'pay' towards motivation and efficiency of the executive personnel

Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.