Refinance operations of the national bank for agriculture and rural development-the kerala experience

NABARD has completed 14 years of operation.ln the light of its experiences and achievements, the performance ev.ilu.ilion of the National Bank need to be looked into.This could provide certain criteria for its strength and weakness which may help in consolidating the institution for better utilisation of its potentialities. It is also noteworthy that no evaluative study on the National Bank has been conducted in Kerala. The Major objective of this study is to evaluate the role of NABARD in catering to the long-term agricultural requirements of Kerala for 1982 to 1992.This is done by analysing the quantum and quality of NABARD's schematic refinance. The qualitative indices like (1) the efficiency of loan recovery, (2) the impact or financial viability of NABARD refinanced schemes, (3) the credit gap, (4) the commitment-disbursement gap, and (5) the imbalances in the NABARD refinance form the core of the study.Hypotheses were formulated inorder to study and analyse these qualitative indices. The study is presented in eight chapters

Environmental Risks : Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Environmental Risk: Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Capital flows to Latin America: fourth quarter 2002

Includes bibliography