La représentation de l'Amérique latine dans le cinéma hollywoodien de l'ère Reagan (1981-1989)

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Theological Voices. PAC Politics and the Abortion Debate: Abortion Politics and the Reagan Era

This investigation shall focus upon the issue of legalized abortion. I believe the complex controversy surrounding the issue of abortion, demonstrates more clearly than any other single contemporary issue the social, political, moral and religious forces working for change in a post-Reagan America. I shall examine in depth the theology, writings, strategies and activities of those Americans who seek to express themselves and their beliefs in religious, or religiously supported interest groups. The current debate surrounding abortion legislation lends itself to several forms of analysis: religious, political, sociological, etc. I will write from the perspective of a student of religion. I shall focus more upon the religious, moral and theological conviction-s of the abortion activists than upon their constitutional right to free speech or assembly. I shall give more attention to denominational structures and church/state relations than to the structuring of representative districts and democratic theory.

Caribbean Basin Plan or Iniciative: some comments, 30 March 1982. Summary and comments on the remarks by President Reagan about the Caribbean Basin Plan", 1 March 1982"

Resume y comenta la iniciativa o plan de ayuda del Presidente Reagan a los paises de la Cuenca del Caribe, presentado al Congreso de los Estados Unidos, como proyecto de ley. Comenta ademas el discurso pronunciado por el Presidente Reagan ante la Organizacion de Estados Americanos, en el que analizo los aspectos principales de dicho Plan.

Tra pacifismo e ambientalismo: il Nuclear Freeze Movement e la risposta dell'amministrazione Reagan

Negli anni Ottanta si assiste tanto nel vecchio quanto nel nuovo continente alla rinascita del movimento antinucleare. Mentre in Europa l’origine di questa ondata di proteste antinucleari è collegata alla “doppia decisione” NATO del 1979, negli Stati Uniti la genesi si colloca nel contesto dalla mobilitazione dei gruppi ambientalisti in seguito all’incidente alla centrale nucleare di Three Mile Island. Dopo l’elezione di Ronald Reagan, alle proteste contro le applicazioni pacifiche dell’atomo si affiancarono quelle contro la politica nucleare del Paese. La retorica di Reagan, il massiccio piano di riarmo, unitamente al rinnovato deteriorarsi delle relazioni tra USA e URSS contribuirono a diffondere nell’opinione pubblica la sensazione che l’amministrazione Reagan, almeno da un punto di vista teorico, non avesse escluso dalle sue opzioni il ricorso alle armi nucleari nel caso di un confronto con l’URSS. I timori legati a questa percezione produssero una nuova ondata di proteste che assunsero dimensioni di massa grazie alla mobilitazione provocata dalla Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC). Il target della NWFC era l’ampio programma di riarmo nucleare sostenuto da Reagan, che secondo gli attivisti nucleari, in un quadro di crescenti tensioni internazionali, avrebbe fatto aumentare le possibilità di uno scontro atomico. Per evitare lo scenario dell’olocausto nucleare, la NWFC proponeva «un congelamento bilaterale e verificabile del collaudo, dell’installazione e della produzione di armi nucleari». L’idea del nuclear freeze, che era concepito come un passo per fermare la spirale del riarmo e tentare successivamente di negoziare riduzioni negli arsenali delle due superpotenze, riscosse un tale consenso nell’opinione pubblica americana da indurre l’amministrazione Reagan a formulare una risposta specifica. Durante la primavera del 1982 fu, infatti, creato un gruppo interdipartimentale ad hoc, l’Arms Control Information Policy Group, con il compito di arginare l’influenza della NWFC sull’opinione pubblica americana e formulare una risposta coerente alle critiche del movimento antinucleare.

Non-State United States Support For The Contras During The Reagan Era

Under President Ronald Reagan, the White House pursued a complex foreign policy towards the Contras, rebels in trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, in Nicaragua. In 1979, the leftist Sandinista government seized power in Nicaragua. The loss of the previous pro-United States Somoza military dictatorship deeply troubled the conservatives, for whom eradication of communism internationally was a top foreign policy goal. Consequently, the Reagan Administration sought to redress the policy of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, and assume a hard line stance against leftist regimes in Central America. Reagan and the conservatives within his administration, therefore, supported the Contra through military arms, humanitarian aid, and financial contributions. This intervention in Nicaragua, however, failed to garner popular support from American citizens and Democrats. Consequently, between 1982 and 1984 Congress prohibited further funding to the Contras in a series of legislation called the Boland Amendments. These Amendments barred any military aid from reaching the Contras, including through intelligence agencies. Shortly after their passage, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey and influential members of Reagan¿s National Security Council (NSC) including National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, NSC Aide Oliver North, and Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter cooperated to identify and exploit loopholes in the legislation. By recognizing the NSC as a non-intelligence body, these masterminds orchestrated a scheme in which third parties, including foreign countries and private donors, contributed both financially and through arms donations to sustain the Contras independently of Congressional oversight. This thesis explores the mechanism and process of soliciting donations from private individuals, recognizing the forces and actors that created a situation for covert action to continue without detection. Oliver North, the main actor of the state, worked within his role as an NSC bureaucrat to network with influential politicians and private individuals to execute the orders of his superiors and shape foreign policy. Although Reagan articulated his desire for the Contras to remain a military presence in Nicaragua, he delegated the details of policy to his subordinates, which allowed this scheme to flourish. Second, this thesis explores the individual donors, analyzing their role as private citizens in sustaining and encouraging the policy of the Reagan Administration. The Contra movement found non-state support from followers of the New Right, demonstrated through financial and organizational assistance, that allowed the Reagan Administration¿s statistically unpopular policy in Nicaragua to continue. I interpret these donors as politically involved, but politically philanthropic, individuals, donating to their charity of choice to further the principles of American freedom internationally in a Cold War environment. The thesis then proceeds to assess the balance of power between the executive and other political actors in shaping policy, concluding that the executive cannot act alone in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

Covert or Overt Intervention? The Reagan Administration in Latin America

In my thesis I looked at Cold War interventionism by America. In the Post WWII period, many countries were searching for freedom from colonial rule, and many were attracted to the idea of communism or socialism. In this context of a destabilized world and power struggle between the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R., revolutions often became points of interests and parts of this larger power play. Any type of revolution was a destabilization, in a system that was unstable at best, and peace between the powers rested precariously on the idea of “Mutually Assured Destruction.” I would like to look more specifically, at the Latin American Region, which seemed full of upheaval, and was an area of much intervention, especially during the Reagan Administration. This administration had varying goals and conflicts about the region. The large amount of interventionism in the 1980s was in part a response to the Vietnam War, which was seen as an American failure, since prevention of communism did not occur. Following this, American strength needed to be shown again in the international stage, especially in Latin America, due to its close proximity to America. I would like to explore the intervention in Grenada and see if it followed a pattern of intervention in the region. This will be contrasted with the case of Nicaragua, which seemed more typical of interventions in the region. The causes of intervention in the region as well as the reasons these interventions took such different courses will be explored and investigated.

Sarney só discutira com Reagan questões importantes

Para presidente ágio é bandeirinha.