The Keyes to Reclaiming the Racial History Of the Roberts Court

This article advocates for a fundamental re-understanding about the way that the history of race is understood by the current Supreme Court. Represented by the racial rights opinions of Justice John Roberts that celebrate racial progress, the Supreme Court has equivocated and rendered obsolete the historical experiences of people of color in the United States. This jurisprudence has in turn reified the notion of color-blindness, consigning racial discrimination to a distant and discredited past that has little bearing to how race and inequality is experienced today. The racial history of the Roberts Court is centrally informed by the context and circumstances surrounding Brown v. Board of Education. For the Court, Brown symbolizes all that is wrong with the history of race in the United States - legal segregation, explicit racial discord, and vicious and random acts of violence. Though Roberts Court opinions suggest that some of those vestiges still exits, the bulk of its jurisprudence indicate the opposite. With Brown’s basic factual premises as its point of reference, the Court has consistently argued that the nation has made tremendous strides away from the condition of racial bigotry, intolerance, and inequity. The article accordingly argues that the Roberts Court reliance on Brown to understand racial progress is anachronistic. Especially as the nation’s focus for racial inequality turned national in scope, the same binaries in Brown that had long served to explain the history of race relations in the United States (such as Black-White, North-South, and Urban-Rural) were giving way to massive multicultural demographic and geographic transformations in the United States in the years and decades after World War II. All of the familiar tropes so clear in Brown and its progeny could no longer fully describe the current reality of shifting and transforming patterns of race relations in the United States. In order to reclaim the history of race from the Roberts Court, the article assesses a case that more accurately symbolizes the recent history and current status of race relations today: Keyes v. School District No. 1. This was the first Supreme Court case to confront how the binaries of cases like Brown proved of little probative value in addressing how and in what ways race and racial discrimination was changing in the United States. Thus, understanding Keyesand the history it reflects reveals much about how and in what ways the Roberts Court should rethink its conclusions regarding the history of race relations in the United States for the last 60 years.

Digest of opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the Army : War Department, Bureau of Military Justice.

Compiled by William W. Winthrop.

Memoir of the life and medical opinions of John Armstrong ... To which is added an inquiry into the facts connected with those forms of fever attributed to malaria or marsh effluvium.

Vol. 2: Printed for E. Rainford.

A brief account of some of the most important proceedings in Parliament, relative to the defects in the administration of justice in the Court of Chancery, the House of Lords, and the Court of Commissioners of Bankrupt ; together with the opinions of different statesmen and lawyers, as to the remedies to be applied /

The "Erratum," one leaf following the Contents (p. [vii]-xi) is wrongly paged: (vii)

The rambling justice, or, The jealous husbands. With the humours of Sir John Twiford. As it is acted at the Theatre Royal ...

Mode of access: Internet.

The report of Hiram Maxwell's case, decided at the City-hall of the city of New-York, on the 3d day of February, 1823 : with the speech and doctrine advanced by John A. Graham, L.L.D., on the practice of taking the examinations and confessions in the police office of prisoners charged with crime; together with the letters and opinions of many of the greatest and wisest philosophers, civilians, orators, and statesmen in the United States.

Contains only Graham's speech and letters concerning it, from John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, John Jay and others.

A treatise of the relative rights and duties of belligerent and neutral powers in maritime affairs: in which the principles of armed neutralities and the opinions of Hubner and Schlegel are fully discussed.

Mode of access: Internet.

Directing Democracy : The Case of the John Lewis Partnership

The John Lewis Partnership was founded in 1929 as an “experiment in industrial democracy” (Lewis, 1948). This thesis explores the meaning of democracy in the Partnership and examines the wider implications of the case. It argues that democracy in work should be viewed as something which is intrinsically valuable because of its connection to furthering justice, equality, freedom and the rights and interests of all workers. The thesis makes three main contributions. Firstly, the production of a historically situated exploration of democratic participation in the John Lewis Partnership – the largest co-owned business in the UK. Secondly, an analysis of power relations in the organisation and an examination of the ways in which disciplinary power and regimes of truth both constrain democratic practice and offer the potential for resistance and challenge. Thirdly, the thesis challenges critics of the Partnership who have dismissed it as a form of “pseudo democracy” (Pateman, 1970: 73) and “suffocatingly paternalistic” (Ramsay, 1980: 52). Despite the constant threat of degeneration and dilution of the value framework laid down by the founder, the Partnership’s continued commitment to democratic participation provides an important contribution to our understanding of co-ownership and democratically organised forms of work. The analysis shows that management have attempted to direct and define democracy in a highly constrained way, assigning it an instrumental purpose, and privileging the ‘business case’ for democratic engagement. However, the study emphasises that the meaning of democracy is heavily contested and fraught with contradictions and paradoxes. This creates a space in which understandings of equality, solidarity and democracy are debated by the 69,000 employees who are co-owners of the business.

The judgments of Justice Lionel Murphy

Member of High Court Bench; includes references to Aboriginal voting rights; protection of Aboriginal sites in Franklin Dam Case; authors statements from cases - Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd, Portland; Neal v Queen, Yarrabah, Koowarta v BjelkePeterson, and Racial Discrimination Act 1975, Archer River; Queen v Toohey (Kenbi, Cox Peninsula); Coe v Commonwealth; Veen v Queen.

Using Comparative Reasoning in Human Rights Adjudication:The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights Compared

This article examines the relationship between the methods that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) use to decide disputes that involve ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ rights claims, and the substantive outcomes that result from the use of these particular methods. It has a limited aim: in attempting to understand the interrelationship between human rights methodology and human rights outcomes, it considers primarily the use of ‘comparative reasoning’ in ‘human’ and ‘fundamental’ rights claims by these courts. It is not primarily concerned with examining the extent to which the use of comparative reasoning is based on an appropriate methodology or whether there is a persuasive normative theory underpinning the use of comparative reasoning. The issues considered in this chapter do some of the groundwork, however, that is necessary in order to address these methodological and normative questions.

In search of the Holy Grail : how viable is John Rawls' purely political conception of justice?

Please consult the paper edition of this thesis to read. It is available on the 5th Floor of the Library at Call Number: Z 9999 P65 Y68 1995

"Judicial Activism in the ""Eye of the Beholder"" : the Israeli High Court of Justice and the Human Rights of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories"

Il est mondialement reconnu que les institutions judiciaires jouent un rôle central dans le processus de prise de décisions politiques, à la fois au niveau national et international. C’est d’ailleurs le cas à la Haute Cour de justice d’Israël. L’étendue de son succès (ou de son échec) dans la tentative de trouver une solution aux violations des droits humains dans les territoires occupés est un problème qui continue de faire l’objet de bien des débats et de recherches académiques. À cet égard, il a été suggéré que, malgré l’absence de constitution écrite et l’existence d’un état d’urgence prolongé en Israël, la Haute Cour de justice a réussi à adopter une approche « judiciairement active » quant à la protection et la promotion des droits de l’homme de manière générale, y compris ceux des Palestiniens dans les territoires occupés. Dans cette perspective, le débat sur le processus d’examen judiciaire de la Haute Cour de Justice tient pour acquise la notion qu’Israël est une démocratie. Ainsi, cet article cherche à examiner cette hypothèse. Premièrement, en adoptant la position que le processus de révision judiciaire est compatible avec la démocratie et la règle de loi. Deuxièmement, il examine l’approche « judiciairement active » de la Cour et soumet un bref aperçu du processus, des outils et des principes légaux que la Cour adopte pour examiner les actions des autorités israéliennes, y compris l’armée, et imposer une loi commune de protection des droits de la personne, donc ceux des Palestiniens dans les territoires occupés. L’article argumente également que le contrôle prolongé des territoires occupés par Israël a eu des conséquences significatives, car tout effort fourni par la Cour pour garantir le respect des droits humains de la population civile palestinienne doit se faire sans compromettre la sécurité du pouvoir israélien. La conclusion à laquelle on arrive ici dépend de la façon dont on qualifie ce contrôle: une occupation à long terme ou une annexion (ce qui n’est pas réglementaire par rapport à loi internationale), ce qui n’est pas sans conséquence sur le rôle que la Haute Cour de justice peut effectivement jouer pour faire respecter les droits de la personne dans les territoires occupés.

Translation of the Decision of the International Court of Justice related to the Case concerning the dispute regarding navigational and related rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) Judgment

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The Court of Justice of the European Union as a fundamental rights tribunal: challenges for the effective delivery of fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 49, 29 August 2012

This paper reflects on the challenges facing the effective implementation of the new EU fundamental rights architecture that emerged from the Lisbon Treaty. Particular attention is paid to the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its ability to function as a ‘fundamental rights tribunal’. The paper first analyses the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and its long-standing experience in overseeing the practical implementation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Against this analysis, it then examines the readiness of the CJEU to live up to its consolidated and strengthened mandate on fundamental rights as one of the prime guarantors of the effective implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. We specifically review the role of ‘third-party interventions’ by non-governmental organisations, international and regional human rights actors as well as ‘interim relief measures’ when ensuring effective judicial protection of vulnerable individuals in cases of alleged violations of fundamental human rights. To flesh out our arguments, we rely on examples within the scope of the relatively new and complex domain of EU legislation, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), and its immigration, external border and asylum policies. In view of the fundamental rights-sensitive nature of these domains, which often encounter shifts of accountability and responsibility in their practical application, and the Lisbon Treaty’s expansion of the jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret and review EU AFSJ legislation, this area can be seen as an excellent test case for the analyses at hand. The final section puts forth a set of policy suggestions that can assist the CJEU in the process of adjusting itself to the new fundamental rights context in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting.